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**THE ROLE OF SENIOR PUBLIC SERVANTS IN
SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

Student: Ms. Karen Johnston
Supervisor: Prof. R. Schrire

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ABSTRACT

The researcher has attempted to analyse the impact of transformation on the role of the most senior public servant in South Africa, the Director General. This required an analysis of the Director General's administrative and policy roles within the political-administrative interface.

The aims of the research were firstly to provide a description of the role of the Director General in the South African public service and thereby provide an insight into the office of the Director General. Secondly, the aim was to evaluate the South African public service transformation process as well as changes which have taken place at Director General level. A third aim was to provide a normative framework of the political and administrative interface in the South African context, and finally to contribute to the analysis of public service senior management.

Thus, three research questions were posed:

1. What role did the Director General play in the pre-and post-1994 South African public service?
2. What is the administrative and political interface in South Africa?
3. What ought to be the administrative and political interface in South Africa?

In order to answer these questions, literature was reviewed and interviews were conducted with Directors General who served at a national level during the pre-and

post-1994 eras. An open and closed questionnaire was developed by the researcher in order to gather data, and the research is therefore original work. The research incorporated scientific principles of social science and is a qualitative study.

The research findings can be summarised as follows. Directors General, both pre-and post-1994, have two basic roles one of which is an administrative role, the other, a policy role. The administrative role of the Director General has not fundamentally changed over the past fifteen years. Directors General continue to be responsible for human and financial resources within their administrative capacity. Problems and issues identified in Director Generals' administrative capacity persist and need to be addressed by improving management capacity. The Director General's policy role appears to be changing. A trend has been identified which indicates that Directors General are playing less of a policy role and more of an administrative role. It appears that the political leadership is usurping the Director General's policy role. Although a political-administrative dichotomy has never existed in South Africa, the role of the Director General is becoming more politicised with the introduction of presidential appointments.

The research concludes with recommendations for improving management capacity, and developing a more sustainable political-administrative interface. It is hoped that this research will assist the South African government in its efforts to improve the management capacity in the public service in order for it to deliver quality services to all South Africans in an increasingly complex global environment.

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INTRODUCTION

"The role assigned to government in the planning and management of national economic and social activities has undergone fundamental reassessment in both developed and developing economies..." - M. Kaul¹

Reform of the public sector is not a new phenomenon. There have been successive waves of public sector reforms from Britain and the United States of America in the mid-19th century, to post World War II reforms, and then in response to the rise and decline of the welfare state. However, since the 1980's there has been an unprecedented wave of public sector reforms that are global in scope (Larson and Coe, 1999:22). According to Larson and Coe (ibid) there are four catalysts to this new wave of reforms. Firstly financial constraints faced by many governments, secondly the decline of public confidence in government, thirdly technological change, and finally the global dynamics in economies and decision making have required many states to become more competitive (ibid). The changing role of the state has therefore prompted many governments to re-assess their public service in terms of its capacity to deliver services efficiently and effectively. The changing role of the state and the re-assessment of the public service have had many implications. This research will focus on the implications of public sector reforms and transformation for senior public service managers, specifically within the South African context.

¹ Kaul, M. (1996) "From Problem to Solution." Commonwealth Strategies for Reform: Managing the Public Service. Strategies for Improvement Series, No. 1

South Africa is no exception in the effort to re-assess its public service, although the transformation of its public service has socio-political imperatives. The political, ideological and racial interference in the South African public service during apartheid has resulted in a public service that has seemingly insurmountable challenges. In 1992 the Financial Mail predicted that control over the new South Africa would be determined in the public service and not necessarily at the political level. Moreover, unless the public service changed concurrently with the political and constitutional reform process, South Africa would run the risk of the new political dispensation inheriting a public service structured and staffed according to outdated policies (Financial Mail, 6/3/1992). This prediction has come true as the government realised that the implementation of its transformation and development policies is dependent on the public service. This is a public service that is accustomed to the apartheid system of governance, not representative of the population at senior decision making levels, and is beset with problems from lack of skills and resources to more serious problems of corruption. As South Africa entered into the next millennium and its second era as a democratic state, the emphasis now lies in improving service delivery and the quality of life for all South Africans.

The South African government realised that the public service, the institution responsible for the implementation of development policies and provision of basic services, needs to be transformed. It is the public service through senior management effort, which has to transform itself. Since 1994 the South African government has introduced a number of

policies and legislation to expedite the transformation of the public service. In 1996 a Presidential Review Commission was mandated to evaluate the South African public service. The Commission published its comprehensive findings in 1998 and concluded that the South African public service had made little progress in addressing the inherited inequalities and inefficiencies, and that the efficient delivery of quality services leaves much to be desired (1998:17).

One of the problems identified by the Presidential Review Commission (1998) is a role conflict between senior public servants (Directors General) and their political counterparts (Ministers and Members of Executive Councils) both at national and provincial spheres of government. Ministers and Members of Executive Councils (MEC's) were suspicious of senior public servants from the apartheid era. This mistrust hindered an effective political and administrative interface. In some cases the mistrust of public servants who implemented apartheid policies was justified. However, senior public servants who were appointed during the post-apartheid era were often lacking in skills and experience. It is therefore not surprising that the Presidential Review Commission (1998:22) expressed the concern that a weakness in the system of governance in South Africa is the uncertainty, even confusion, as to responsibilities of Ministers and MEC's, and senior public servants.

This paper attempts to identify the problems that senior management, more specifically Directors General, face in the management of government departments responsible for the delivery of services. The paper will therefore provide a critical insight into the role of

the Director General as the most senior public servant. In doing so, the paper will describe the transformation process that has taken place in the South African public service and how it has impacted on the role of the Director General. The changing role of the Director General will therefore be discussed and a critical analysis of the changing nature of the political-administrative interface will also be provided. The paper will also provide recommendations as to what the role of the Director General ought to be in the South African context.

Organisation of the Research Paper

The first section of this paper provides a description of the research process and methodology. The research, although qualitative, incorporates core principles of social science to ensure its internal validity. The second section of the paper provides a theoretical framework for this research in terms of a literature review. The review of major literature that deals with senior management in public services is designed to provide a basis for understanding this paper. However, it should be noted that most of the available literature analyses more developed countries' public services. Research in the area of senior management in developing countries has been largely neglected. The first chapter of this study critically discusses the theoretical and conceptual models of public administration with particular attention to the nature of the political and administrative interface. The second chapter discusses the changing role of the modern state and the imperatives of change which resulted in a global re-examination of the public service. This chapter provides international perspectives of public service transformation and

some insights into the South African public service transformation initiatives. Chapter Three describes apartheid's public service and the institutional heritage which provides an understanding of the challenges that the democratic dispensation faces in South Africa. Chapter Four provides a chronological description as well as an analysis of the South African public service transformation process. The paper also provides a description of transformation initiatives for senior public servants in South Africa and provides a basis for the analysis of the changing role of senior management in Chapter Five. Chapter Five provides a description and analysis of legislation that has impacted upon the role of the Director General in South Africa. Chapter Six includes the research findings and analysis, and attempts to answer the research questions. The seventh chapter of this paper provides policy recommendations and a normative framework of what ought to be the role of Directors General in terms of the political-administrative interface.

Significance of the Research

The Presidential Review Commission consisted of national and international public administration experts and was a body constituted to assist South Africa in its public service transformation effort. This involved a study of the South African public service and recommendations for overcoming the challenges and constraints that it faced (The Presidential Review Commission, 1998:2). The Presidential Review Commission (1998:23) made a number of recommendations and argued that the role of elected officials, that is Ministers and MECs should be to:

1. Provide vision and policy direction,
2. Oversee and monitor the implementation of policy,
3. Secure resources for their ministries and departments to implement policy effectively,
4. Represent the ministry in Cabinet and Parliament, or in provincial executive council and legislature,
5. Account for the performance of the ministry,
6. Take collective responsibility for Cabinet decisions, and
7. Be accountable to the legislature for their actions.

Furthermore, the Presidential Review Commission (1998:23) also argued that the role of Directors General should be to:

1. Inform and advise elected officials accurately, completely and on time,
2. Implement policy and Ministerial decisions effectively and efficiently,
3. Be fully accountable to Ministers or MECs, and where appropriate to the legislature,
4. Provide the Minister or MEC with the broadest possible basis for policy consideration and formulation by utilising various sources, and
5. Co-ordinate, control, manage and communicate within their department.

Although the Presidential Review Commission suggested these roles, the Commission believed that more research needed to be undertaken so that more authoritative guidance on the roles and relationships of politicians and administrators could be issued by the President and endorsed by Parliament as a foundation for future governance in South Africa (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:23-24). This paper is an attempt to develop guidance as to the role of Directors General at the national level of government.

Twenty-eight Directors General who occupy the most senior public servant position in South Africa, have left the public service at national level. The most common reason cited for the turnover is the failure of Ministers to appreciate their roles as distinct from that of the Director General, and a tendency for Ministers to place innumerable demands on Directors General (Bernstein, 1999:19). Whether the Directors General are from the apartheid regime (most have retired) or new appointees, they are finding politicians acting as line supervisors as well as political executives (ibid). On the other hand newly appointed Directors General readily admit their own lack of experience in administering and managing a large complex public organisation (ibid). According to Maphai (as cited in Sunday Times, 24/01/1999) the Director General is at a crucial level of management and the lack of stability and quick turnover of staff detrimentally affects performance and service delivery. Thus, there is clearly a need to develop procedural guidance on the role of Directors General and their political counterparts. This research will therefore attempt to develop procedural guidance as to the role of the Directors General within the political-administrative interface.

Research at this level of the public service seldom receives scholarly attention. According to Lungu (1998:2) senior management of the public service is governed by a convention of anonymity and there is a need for deeper knowledge and insight into the role of senior public servants (ibid). Most importantly, in the South African context it is this particular level of the public service that has undergone many changes which deserves analysis and

assessment. The research intends to provide an insight into the office of the Director General, and to add to the debate of senior public management, a neglected area of study.

It is hoped that this research will provide an insight into the managerial and policy roles of senior management in the South African public service. This descriptive exercise will provide an insight into the role of Directors General in South Africa. The research will also provide an evaluative analysis of transformation in South Africa as well as an assessment of transformation initiatives at senior managerial level. The research will also provide a normative framework of what the role of the Director General in South Africa ought to be.

Research Questions

The research question is threefold:

1. What role did the Director General play in the pre-and post-1994 South African public service?
2. What is the administrative and political interface in South Africa?
3. What ought to be the administrative and political interface in South Africa?

Aim of the Research

The aim of this research is therefore to provide:

1. A description of the role of the Director General in the South African public service and thereby provide an insight into the office of the Director General.
2. An evaluation of South Africa's public service transformation process as well as the transformation of senior management in the South African public service.
3. A normative framework of the political and administrative interface in the South African context.
4. A contribution to the analysis of public service senior management.

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Definitions

Apolitical means the non-involvement of a person in partisan politics.

Batho Pele is the South African government's policy on service delivery to all South Africans. It is based on the premise that the people's needs are a priority, thereby incorporating the notion of the public as customers and introducing private sector principles into the public service.

Career public servants are public servants who are recruited into the public service at lower levels of the hierarchy and through promotion attain more senior positions. The public service is the sole occupation of the public servant who remains in the public service for his or her entire career.

Director General is the most senior public administration position in the public service. The Director General is at the apex of the public service hierarchy and at the interface between politics and administration.

Elites are persons who are distinguished from the broader population by virtue of their access to resources and opportunities, and the use of which provides them with access to power and the ability to influence the polity.

Executing Authorities are Ministers, the President, the Premier and Members of Executive Council.

General public service is distinguished from the senior public service as they do not manage or make strategic decisions.

Member of Executive Council is the equivalent of a Minister at provincial level.

Meritorious appointment or promotion is the appointment or promotion of an official to a position because of qualifications and expertise relevant to the requirements of the position.

Minister is a politician who has been selected by the President to form the most senior executive decision making forum, the Cabinet. The Ministers are responsible for a portfolio and Ministry, and provide political leadership for that institution.

New Public Management is the incorporation of private sector principles, such as efficiency and effectiveness, into the management and delivery of the public services.

Partisan refers to a state of mind of a person who is a supporter of a political party, person or interest group.

Patronage refers to the power a person may have in the appointment of supporters to particular positions where the appointee will be loyal to the appointing authority.

Decisions and actions are not based on merit or the most rational choice, but based upon the loyalty to the appointing authority.

Permanent Secretary is equivalent to the Director General position in some Commonwealth countries.

Political appointment refers to the appointment of a person to a position by its political authority.

Political-administrative dichotomy refers to the distinct separation of roles between the political and administrative executive.

Political-administrative interface refers to the nature of the relationship between the political and administrative executive.

Politician refers to a person who holds public office and whose career is within the political arena.

Presidential appointment refers to an official who has been appointed to a position by the President.

Public or civil servant, official, bureaucrat and administrator refers to a person who is employed in the public service.

Public or civil service is the sector of the economy that serves the public and delivers public services and goods.

Reform refers to a process of improving and amending an unsatisfactory situation or institution.

Senior public service refers to the strategic decision making echelon of the public service.

In the South African context it would be Directors, Chief Directors, Deputy Directors General and Directors General.

Spoils system is the reward of a position, usually in the public service, by a victorious political party or politician.

Transformation refers to a process of fundamentally changing the processes, structure, appearance, procedures and state of affairs of a given situation or institution.

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Programme
CSSB	Civil Service Selection Board
DG	Director General
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
ENA	Ecole National d' Administration
FOSAD	Forum for South African Directors General
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
JMC	Joint Management Centres
MEC	Members of Executive Council
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSMS	National Security Management System
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PRC	Presidential Review Commission
PSCBC	Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council
PSRRC	Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission
PSTI	Public Service Training Institute

RAS	Recruitment and Assessment Service Agency
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAMDI	South African Management and Development Institute
SAQA	South African Qualifications Authority
SCOPA	Standing Committee of Public Accounts
SSC	State Security Council
TASO	Top Amptenare van die Staatsadministrasie
TQM	Total Quality Management
USA	United States of America
WPSTE	White Paper in Public Service Training and Education
WTPS	White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service
WTPSD	White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery

Tables, Graphs and Figures

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METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this research is qualitative, and involved the analysis of literature, documents and interviews.

The research process began by analysing relevant literature in libraries, reviewing numerous national and international books, journals and government documents. This process also involved research beyond libraries by examining issues on the Internet as well as obtaining government documents that are as yet unpublished.

The second phase of the research was to consult with various stakeholders in the field of public administration to assess whether this research was feasible. In this regard Chairpersons of the Portfolio and National Council of Provinces' Committees for Public Administration were consulted, as well as the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). During this process, these legislative, statutory and government institutions gave their support for the research undertaking.

The third phase of the research was based upon interviews with Directors General at national level. The reason for focusing on the national sphere of government was the importance of Directors General in the national polity. The national Directors General are

more intimately involved in national policy making and it is also this level of senior management that was affected by transformation.

However, to provide a more holistic perspective of transformation and the role of Directors General both current incumbents and those retired or released from service were included in the study. It was decided that Directors General who served from 1984 to present would be interviewed. The reasons for choosing a longitudinal study of Directors General from 1984 to 1999 are as follows:

1. The reforms of senior management began in the early 1980's with the commencement of the executive presidency in South Africa and the new designation of Director General,
2. A longitudinal study provides a wealth of information about the role of the Director General in South Africa during apartheid and in the post-apartheid years, and
3. A longitudinal study would address the research questions.

Research Sample

In order to determine the research population for Directors General from 1984 to 1999, the researcher had to review each annual report for each national government department for each year from 1984 as no record of this nature was kept or maintained by any government department. Thus, reviewing each annual report was the only option for developing a database of current and previous Directors General and thereby the population for research purposes. This proved to be a labour intensive and time-

consuming task. A database was developed cataloguing each Director General for each year in each national government department (*see Appendix I*). However, some portfolios and national departments changed, but the database is an accurate account of Directors General for each year and in each department since the early 1980's to the present. It was further decided that departments that arose from the Tricameral Parliament such as House of Representatives would not be included in the study. The Tricameral system was not recognised with any legitimacy by all South Africans and lacked genuine authority of power. It was amalgamated into national departments after 1994 and therefore became defunct.

Once the population was compiled in a database, Directors General who served different portfolios were counted as one to avoid duplication in the total count for the population. The total population for Directors General from 1984 to 1999 is one hundred and seven (107). However, because of practical constraints the entire population could not be interviewed and a sample was therefore selected.

The sample was also categorised into pre-and post-1994 Directors General. There were three exceptions to this categorisation, that is Directors General who served before 1994 and then after 1994 as well. They were categorised as Directors General pre-1994 as they started their service before the democratic dispensation. The sample consisted of pre-selected and randomly selected Directors General. A list of Directors General was pre-selected according to the following criteria:

1. Is a current Director General since transformation initiatives such as presidential appointments affected them directly,
2. Served longer than the five-year contract,
3. Was head of a department for more than one portfolio, and
4. Resigned or was released from service after a much publicised debacle.

This pre-selected sample comprised of thirty-seven Directors General, eight of whom served before 1994 and twenty-nine after 1994, inclusive of the twenty-four current Directors General. The thirty-seven pre-selected sample of Directors General were excluded from the population, and then another sample of Directors General was generated. This sample was randomly selected using Microsoft Excel. The random sample consisted of sixteen Directors General that served before 1994 and eight Directors General that served after 1994. In total sixty-one Directors General were selected for the research study comprising of twenty-four randomly selected Directors General and thirty-seven pre-selected Directors General which is inclusive of twenty-four current Directors General. Thus 57% of the population was sampled. The following table illustrates the sampling of Directors General.

Table 1: **Research Sample**

	Random Selection	Pre-Selection	Total
Pre-1994	16	8	24
Post-1994	8	29*	37*
Total	24	37 *	61 *

* inclusive of 24 current Directors General

The researcher began the interviews in April of 2000 and completed the interviews at the end of October 2000. The researcher managed to interview eight of the sixteen pre-1994

randomly selected Directors General, and seven of the eight pre-1994 pre-selected Directors General. Fifteen interviews out of a total of twenty- four of the pre-1994 Directors General were completed. The researcher completed four interviews with Directors General who were randomly selected and served after 1994, two Directors General who were pre-selected and served after 1994, and nine of the current Directors General. Thus in total the researcher interviewed fifteen Directors General that served after 1994. The total number of Directors General that were interviewed from the randomly selected list was twelve and the total number of Directors General that were interviewed from the pre-selected list was eighteen. In total thirty Directors General were interviewed, that is 28% of the population. The following table illustrates the Directors General interviewed per category.

Table 2: **Completed Interviews**

	Random Selection	Pre-Selection	<i>Total</i>
Pre-1994	8	7	15
Post-1994	4	11	15
<i>Total</i>	12	18	30

Contacting Interviewees

Once the researcher had the sample of Directors General, each had to be contacted. This proved to be a research process in itself. The researcher contacted each department and through corporate services attempted to gain the telephone numbers and mailing addresses for the sample of Directors General. The researcher encountered numerous problems in gaining the contact details of former Directors General. The first problem was in communicating with government departments. The researcher was usually

telephonically transferred from one public official to the next and often received little or no assistance. The second problem was the large turnover in staff after 1994. Many new public servants were not aware of who the previous Director General for that Department was. The researcher resorted to requesting the name of a public official who was the longest serving public servant in the department or corporate services and then requested his or her assistance in gaining the contact details of the previous Director General for that department. In most cases this strategy proved fruitful. It should be noted that the anonymity of Directors General was not compromised as it was still the prerogative of a Director General to participate in the research. Another problem that was encountered was due to privacy concerns, corporate services would not release the information of public servants who had left the department. In this case, the researcher requested that a public servant from that department's corporate services contact the Director General in question and gain permission for his or her contact information to be released for research purposes. This strategy also proved to be productive. Although it was suggested that a more expedient strategy would be for the researcher to use the Pensions Administration to gain the contact details, the researcher thought it unethical to peruse the personnel and pension files of Directors General.

On obtaining the mailing addresses for both past and current Directors General each Director General was sent a letter outlining:

1. The researcher's credentials,
2. Nature and purpose of the research study,
3. Significance of the research,

4. Assurances of confidentiality and anonymity if desired, and
5. The request for a personal interview. (*see Appendix II*).

The response rate was initially slow and the researcher subsequently made follow-up telephone calls. The response rate improved, however the current Directors General proved to be the most difficult in securing interviews. It should be mentioned that in some cases the researcher had to fax and re-send letters many times and make numerous telephone calls in order to obtain some information as to whether the Director General had read the letter. The researcher also had to resort to informal channels in order to contact Directors General and enlisted the assistance of the Public Service Commission and Parliament. It should be noted that enlisting the assistance of others in making contact with Directors General, the anonymity of current Directors General was not compromised as it was still their prerogative to participate in the research study. Once a Director General agreed to participate in the research an appointment was established for the personal interview to take place at a convenient time and venue for the Director General.

Research Instrument

The researcher chose to conduct personal or face-to-face interviews as opposed to a self-completion questionnaire for the following reasons:

1. The questionnaire may not have been completed adequately if at all,
2. The response rate would be low,

3. The questionnaire would be lost in bureaucratic red-tape and correspondence,
4. Probing and clarification of questions could take place,
5. The researcher could develop a rapport that would make interviewees feel more at ease when answering certain questions,
6. The researcher could observe body language in response to certain questions,
7. The researcher could observe the interviewees' environment such as the office,
8. Answers to questions in a self-completion questionnaire would be closed and limited as opposed to a wealth of information gained when answering a question *ad lib*, and
9. Responses would not be rehearsed or edited.

The interviews were non-scheduled, structured interviews. The researcher developed a questionnaire with open and closed questions to obtain information that would add value to the research (*see Appendix III*). The first section of the questionnaire related to personal information of the Director General. It was hoped that this section would shed light on the social backgrounds of Directors General. The second section dealt with the educational background of Directors General and the last section related specifically to their role as Director General.

The first draft of the questionnaire was given to various authoritative persons in the field of public administration, polling, sampling, interviewing and research design. These persons included academics, journalists such as Mr. R. Friedman, persons from the non-governmental-sector such as Dr. Robert Mattes from the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and stakeholders in government such as the Chairs for the Portfolio and

National Council of Provinces Committees for Public Administration and the Public Service Commission. Their feedback was then included in the questionnaire design and the questionnaire was subsequently revised. The questionnaire was then piloted with some public service senior managers in the Western Cape. The questionnaire was once again revised and then given to the researcher's supervisor for approval.

Interviews

Once a Director General agreed to be interviewed, the researcher conducted the interview at a time and venue convenient for the interviewee. After introductions, the researcher requested permission to use a tape recorder to ensure accuracy of responses. All of the interviewees agreed to the use of a tape recorder. The researcher also made personal notes as the interview proceeded. Before the commencement of the actual interview the researcher informed the interviewee of the nature of research, guidelines for answering the questionnaire, the format of the questionnaire and the interviewee's rights in participating in the research (*see Appendix IV*). At this stage interviewees were given the right to confidentiality and to assert their right to anonymity. Each interviewee stated on record that they understood the nature of the research and were voluntarily participating in the research. Only in one instance was an interview terminated. After informing the interviewee of his rights he declined to participate in the research. As requested by Directors General their names are not published, and references to Directors General in this paper reflect the place and date of interview, and not their names.

Interviewees were also given the right to abstain from answering any question and although most interviewees completed all the questions, a few preferred not to answer certain questions, specifically those questions relating to a Minister's or President's leadership/management style. Although the questionnaire was structured the researcher allowed interviewees to answer questions at length. However, depending on answers the researcher would probe certain issues further. Probing was limited to certain circumstances such as the researcher required clarification, the interviewee did not answer the question adequately, the question made the interviewee uncomfortable, or the interviewee raised another issue that deserved exploration. In certain interviews some questions were discarded as they were not appropriate to the circumstances or applicable for the interviewee. Such questions might have inquired about serving a particular President when the Director General was appointed after that presidency and therefore had no knowledge of that President's leadership/management style. However, in approximately 90% of the time the researcher was consistent in asking the questions as per the questionnaire. Most interviewees completed the questionnaire in an hour, one interviewee completed it in approximately forty-five minutes, while a few interviewees took three hours to complete the interview.

Limitations and Problems

The personal interviews proved to be time-consuming and expensive. It often required the researcher to travel to various urban or remote rural areas. Although the researcher received a generous scholarship, the funds were always expended by the purchase of

airline tickets, accommodation and car hire. The researcher attempted to be efficient by securing more than one interview for certain destinations. It should also be noted that on a few occasions money was wasted when an interview was scheduled but then cancelled just before the interview was to take place. Some of these cancelled interviews were rescheduled while others were not. This proved to be a frustrating experience. Another frustration was the attempt to contact Directors General. It was difficult to contact past Directors General as there was seldom any information on their forwarding addresses after they retired from public service. In terms of contacting current Directors General the researcher would often have to use resources to re-send letters and telephonically attempt to gain a response from the office of the Director General. To date many Directors General have not responded or replied to the correspondence.

Another limitation was the accessibility to government documentation and the lack of government records. Government documentation was either poorly maintained or could not be found. The researcher struggled to gain documents from government and had to use informal channels to gain access to certain documents.

The research often presented a safety risk to the researcher. It required the researcher to travel to unfamiliar places meeting unfamiliar interviewees, which presented concerns over safety. In one instance the researcher escaped a car hijacking but was robbed of personal belongings and some research data (anonymity of subjects was not compromised). On other occasions the researcher met interviewees beyond office hours and in unfamiliar environments.

An attempt was made to control biases such as personal, history, test effect, instrumentation, selection and reactive effects in order to ensure internal validity. However, the researcher could not control the reactive effects and sexism of some interviewees to the researcher being a young woman. As Dingwall (1980:881) has noted, "It is quite clear that certain sets of data are made more readily available to personable young women ...it is always a temptation to engage such a person, particularly in studies of older men." Bearing this in mind the researcher controlled this by always being cautious and being aware of this gender dynamic. Also, since this is a uniquely South African research exercise the researcher cannot claim that the research has external validity. However, this research, in one form or another, could and should be replicated in other countries, as the study of senior management in public service deserves attention.

Another limitation was the lack of literature in the area of senior public service management. Although there are a few publications in this area, most focus on the United States of America and Europe while literature on Permanent Secretaries and Directors General in developing countries are few.

Experiential Learning

When conducting research in government it is first useful to inform senior officials of the research and to develop rapport. The researcher therefore informed the Office of the Presidency, the respective Chairs of the Portfolio and National Council of Provinces for

Public Administration, the Public Service Commission, and the Ministry and Department of Public Service and Administration. This strategy proved useful, as individuals in these organisations would introduce the researcher to other individuals interested in the research. This had a snowball effect and soon the researcher developed an information and supportive network. This network provided the researcher with access to government documents, information and interviewees. The support of these individuals and government institutions also carried weight in securing interviews.

The second important aspect when conducting research in government is always to keep a journal of interaction. In other words, every telephone call or letter that is sent should be recorded, detailing the date and public official that was spoken to or handling the correspondence. This is useful in that it holds the support personnel for a Director General accountable as to the progress of the matter and expedites further correspondence or interaction. The researcher also found it useful to develop a rapport with the personal assistants of the Directors General as they are the information channel to the Director General and managers of the Director General's schedules. However, the research proved to be extremely difficult as it depended on working with government, which at times was not responsive in terms of gathering information or securing interviews.

As already mentioned the researcher, as a woman, faced difficulties ranging from sexism to safety concerns. Scott (1984:169) has noted that the role of women in social science research is often overlooked. Scott (1984:165-178) also provides an account of her fieldwork research and expresses the same concerns as the researcher of this paper. It is

imperative for women conducting fieldwork research or personal interviews to ensure that there are safeguards to ensure their personal safety.

University of Cape Town

LITERATURE REVIEW

There have been a few published works on the role of senior management in public service, and most of these publications are focused on developed countries. However, these books and journal articles did provide a theoretical framework for analysis, and a comparative understanding of issues and concepts.

The first major research that describes the interface between politicians and bureaucrats, and the role of senior bureaucrats is Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman's (1981) book entitled *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Aberbach et al (1981) described the interaction between senior bureaucrats and politicians according to four perspectives. The first perspective or what Aberbach et al (1981) calls "image" is the *policy-administrative dichotomy*. Although this will be discussed at length in following chapters, the first image describes the nature of the relationship between politician and bureaucrats in dichotomous terms, that is politicians make policy and bureaucrats implement the policy. The second image Aberbach et al (1981:6-9) describes is *facts-interests* where both politicians and bureaucrats participate in policy formulation, but make different contributions according to their different roles. In other words bureaucrats bring facts, knowledge and technical expertise while politicians bring values, interests and constituency concerns to the formulation of policy (ibid). The *fact-interests* image therefore requires articulating, balancing and mediating between facts and interests which are often diverse in nature. The third image is referred to as *energy-equilibrium* where both bureaucrats and politicians are involved in policy making and both are concerned

with politics (Aberbach et al, 1981:9). However, the distinction is that politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganised individuals whereas bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organised individuals (ibid). According to this interpretation, the role of politicians is to be partisan, satisfy diverse constituency interests, idealistic and sometimes ideological whereas bureaucrats are practical, pragmatic, manage incremental adjustments in a demanding environment, and provide policy equilibrium (ibid). The last image which Aberbach et al (1981:16-19) refers to is *pure hybrid*, which is the convergence of roles between politicians and bureaucrats. Aberbach et al (ibid) describes this as the bureaucratisation of politics and the politicisation of the bureaucracy. According to Aberbach et al (ibid) the last part of the century has seen the virtual disappearance of the political-administrative dichotomy and the overlap of roles between politicians and bureaucrats. Aberbach et al provides evidence of this thesis by analysing the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in various countries.

In France there is a regular turnover between political and administrative careers. A public servant that is identified as having a bright future may enter the ministerial cabinet as a policy advisor, where his or her political skills are honed, and may later enter politics (Aberbach et al, 1981:17). The outcome of this career path is that it not only results in the blurring of roles between politicians and bureaucrats but also creates a political-administrative elite. In most cases the senior echelons of the French public service and their political counterparts form an “old-boys-network” with ambitious bureaucrats playing by the rules and adhering to a culture of the elite. Britain attempted to introduce a system that resembled the *hybrid* image and Aberbach et al (ibid) cite the Central Policy

Review Staff introduced by Prime Minister Heath as evidence of the convergence between politicians and bureaucrats in Britain. However, this system was not particularly successful and eventually became defunct in 1983 under Margaret Thatcher. The Thatcher government showed evidence of a move towards a *hybrid* system of political-bureaucratic interaction. Although Thatcher could not interfere with the career system of the British public service she nonetheless introduced a number of reforms in the British bureaucracy. She also made a number of appointments of persons from outside the public service as advisors who were sympathetic to her reforms and policies. The most notable appointment was Derek Rayner of Marks and Spencer who was given the title of the Prime Minister's Advisor on Efficiency in order to facilitate Thatcher's policy on public sector reform, and other partisan Thatcher supporters to the Policy Unit. Although it may be argued that this is not a *hybrid* system, Thatcher nonetheless set a precedent and refashioned the British public service for more co-operation between the bureaucracy and politicians within the executive.

In the United States of America there is substantial evidence for Aberbach et al's *hybrid* image. A political appointment to senior management positions in the public service makes for substantial convergence between politicians' and bureaucrats' roles. According to Aberbach et al (1981:19) the political appointments of senior managers results in bureaucrats being bound to the political environment and their political patron, the President. In other words, the nature of political appointments blurs the distinction between the political executive and the senior public servants.

Aside from describing these images or perspectives of the political and administrative interface between senior public servants and politicians, Aberbach et al (198:86-88) also describes the role that senior public servants play in terms of policy. Aberbach et al's research (ibid) discovered that senior public servants' and politicians' jobs required:

1. *Technical* aspects which focus on solving policy problems and applying specialised expertise,
2. *Advocacy* aspects which require the representational interests of a social group, class or cause,
3. *Brokering* aspects which focus on mediation and the resolution of conflicts which may be an interest or political conflict,
4. *Facilitator* aspects which focus on protecting the interests of specific group or constituency,
5. *Partisan* aspects which require engagement in the political environment and in particular the politics of the ruling party,
6. *Policymaker* aspects where the senior public servant and politicians are involved in policy formulation,
7. *Trustee* aspects which focus on the representation of interests of the public in general,
8. *Legalist* aspects which require a focus on the legal responsibilities and requirements of the position, and/or
9. *Ombudsman* aspects that require the undertaking of cases in order to protect the interests of the public in general and/or individuals.

According to Aberbach et al (1981:87-88) these roles are not mutually exclusive and their research discovered that some senior public servants and politicians displayed one or more of these roles. What is interesting to note is that some of these roles may produce conflict for senior public servants within a given context and for a particular role-player. For example the partisan aspects may conflict with brokering aspects, the trustee aspects may conflict with advocacy aspects, etc. Aberbach et al (1981) used factor analysis to encode the roles between politicians and bureaucrats and discovered that there are three basic dimensions to this relationship. The first is the *politics/technics* dimension where politicians are involved in advocacy, partisan politics and the defence of constituencies whereas senior public servants behaved in a more technical role (Aberbach et al, 1981:88). This dimension sharply contrasted the roles between politician and bureaucrat. This dimension resembles Aberbach et al's *facts-interests image* (ibid). The second dimension Aberbach et al (ibid) describes is the *authority/responsiveness* dimension, which resembles the *energy-equilibrium image*. In other words both politician and senior public servant broker conflict, formulate policy, and have concerns for the interests of the public (ibid). This dimension does not distinctly distinguish the roles between politicians and bureaucrats. The third dimension is *passive/active* role and is even less clear on the role distinction between politicians and bureaucrats (ibid). Politicians and bureaucrats, according to this dimension may either play an active or passive role with regards to their above-mentioned roles.

Although it is not the intention of the author of this paper to replicate the Aberbach et al (1981) study, the researcher will nonetheless incorporate questions during interviews to

ascertain whether the political-administrative interface in South Africa follows the *policy-administrative*, *facts-interests*, *energy-equilibrium*, and/or *the pure hybrid images*.

Furthermore, this research will provide an analysis and critical discussion of the roles that Ministers and Directors General play in South Africa and the nature of their interaction.

A study commissioned by the Brookings Institution in 1984 also sought to analyse the higher levels of public service in Europe and Canada in order for the United States to assess its performance of senior public servants. The study culminated in the publication, *The Higher Civil Service in Europe and Canada: lessons for the United States* edited by Bruce Smith. According to Smith (1984:5) the assessment of senior public servant performance to some uniform standard of measurement is difficult. This is due to the actions of public servants who are too embedded in the institutional context, and that policies, programs and administrative agencies vary (ibid). Moreover, Smith (1984:8-9) states that it is difficult to conduct a comparative analysis because of different national and political systems, the nature of appointments to senior public service, the generalist and specialist expertise of senior officials, and training and education. For example, in Britain there is a strong parliamentary system where the parliamentary authority came before the bureaucratic state resulting in public servants assisting Ministers in dealing with Parliament (ibid). The policy, submitted to Parliament is held up to scrutiny, and public servants' scope of authority is limited because of consensus building between politicians and the articulation of interests in order to facilitate the acceptance of the policy (ibid). Likewise in the United States there is a strong legislature, but other political systems vary which affects the scope of the senior public servants (ibid). In Britain senior

public servants pride themselves on their political neutrality, whereas in the United States there have always been political appointments, often resulting in tension between career public servants and political appointees (Smith, 1984:9). In fact the United States has the most political appointments out of all the countries that participated in the study as illustrated below:

Table 3: Comparative Political Appointments.

United States	United Kingdom	Canada	Germany	France
Secretary	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister
Deputy Secretary	Permanent Secretary	Deputy Minister	Staatsekretar	Secrétaires-generaux
Under Secretary	2 nd Permanent Secretary	Assoc. Deputy Minister	Ministerialdirektor	Directeur-generaux
Assist. Secretary	Deputy Secretary	Assist. Deputy Minister	Ministerialdirigent	Sous-directeurs
Deputy Assistant	Under Secretary	Director General	Miniterialrat	Administrateurs
Chiefs, Directors	Assist. Secretary	Director		
Senior Executives				

(below the line ---- are career officials)

(Source: Smith, 1984:9)

However, Smith (1984:7) puts forward four propositions that are common to all senior public servants:

1. The general esteem of senior public servants affects their performance and political attacks on the public service have ramifications which invite the deterioration in the quality of service.
2. The quality of people at the senior public service level, and the performance of public servants throughout the general ranks, are improved if career public servants achieve positions of higher rank or political power, either appointed or elected, and if higher-level policy making routinely involves senior public servants.
3. Career public servants should be allowed to participate early in the process of policy making.

4. The complete political neutrality of senior public servants is fiction and strict adherence to this notion clouds judgement.

The study examines the senior public service in a number of countries, that is Britain, Canada, Germany and France with some concluding lessons for the United States. The main arguments of this study for each of these countries will be summarised in the following paragraphs.

The British senior public service has two main characteristics, that is (1) it is a life time career occupation, and (2) most have generalist skills and are involved in all aspects of policy (Plowden, 1984:20). Parliament does not have real authority in the public service, and recruitment and promotion are based upon rules as defined by the Civil Service Commission (Plowden, 1984:21). Entrance to the public service requires the successful completion of a university degree, a written examination and subsequent interviews (Plowden, 1984:22). After the hurdle of the written examination and interviews, the candidate faces a final interview conducted by a selection board which consists of two senior public servants, two non-public service members and the head of the Civil Service Commission (ibid). The public servant is then posted to a department with a vacant post and where the public servant's skills are needed (ibid). Rules regulating the public service is centrally determined, but implementation is delegated to departments (Plowden, 1984:23). The public servant during the course of his or her career may be seconded to the private sector, but for the most part remains within the public service (ibid). Appointment to senior levels, in particular at the Permanent Secretary level, results from

an interdepartmental discussion between other Permanent Secretaries who provide recommendations to the Prime Minister. An appointment is made in consultation with the head of the civil service and the Ministerial head of the department (Plowden, 1984:24). All public servants receive their training through the Civil Service College (ibid). A report in the early 1980's summarised the necessary skills for public servants as strategic planning and management, advising skills on policy planning and implementation for the Minister, and managerial skills which includes management of people, money and other resources (Plowden, 1984:25). There are mandatory requirements to complete certain courses, including induction training, before a public servant can be promoted to another position (ibid). According to Plowden (1984:28) generalist skills are prominent in policy formulation because specialist public servants provide advice to generalists, but it is the generalists who advise the Minister. However, Plowden (1984:29) criticises the British public service for its elitism because of a middle-class and educational bias towards Oxford and Cambridge graduates. Plowden (ibid) argues that the British public service is not representative and is out of touch with the public (ibid). Most public servants have an education in humanities and subsequently have generalist skills, and as early as 1968 The Fulton Report criticised the generalist public servant as obsolete in dealing with the modern world (Plowden, 1984:30).

According to Campbell (1984:53) the Canadian public service model borrows from the British and United States system. The Canadian system has inherited the British system of governance but incorporates the United States system of federal and provincial government (Campbell, 1984:42). There had been few changes in government with

Liberal Party dominance and continuity in this extensive system of governance (ibid). Over time Ministers have worked closely at one time or another with a diverse array of senior public servants (Campbell, 1984:44). Many have become trusted, loyal senior public servants who have served with a Minister in another department, developing strong personal loyalties over time (Campbell, 1984:44). The Canadian public service is a highly structured system of government by committees due to the federal nature of governance (Campbell, 1984:44-45). Ministers cannot attend all committee meetings and subsequently deputise officials to attend these meetings or bring public servants along in attendance (Campbell, 1984:45). This results in not merely representation, but access to the highest decision making committees, and senior public servants therefore participate in the policy making process (Campbell, 1984:45). Subsequently there is a high degree of personalisation and elitism between senior officials and the political elite (Campbell, 1984:46).

As in the United Kingdom the senior career officials advise the Prime Minister on appointments of chairs to a committee of peers that review senior personnel policies and nominations for top vacancies (Campbell, 1984:47). Most public servants also have had exposure to the private sector before an appointment to a senior position (Campbell, 1984:48). According to Campbell (ibid) most officials who have changed departments and moved in and out of the private sector, frequently advance quickly to senior positions. However, most Canadian officials view the public service as a means for advancement and work within the public service to acquire knowledge of the system (Campbell, 184:50). The result is relative inexperience and rapid mobility of senior

officials with senior public servants more motivated by personal advancement (ibid).

Most senior public servants receive their first university degrees from elite central Canadian universities such as Queens, McGill and Toronto while others study at Oxford on Rhodes Scholarships (Campbell, 1984:51). Most senior public servants have homogenous backgrounds, but there are a few with French socio-cultural heritage (ibid). A provision does allow for ministerial political appointments as members of the Minister's advisory staff, who are allowed to apply for senior positions within the public service after completing three years service (Campbell, 1984:52). The Canadian public service can be characterised by an erosion of public service neutrality, a fragmentation of responsibilities and poor recruitment.

In Germany, because of the federal constitutional arrangement, policy is formulated at the central or federal level with the implementation of the policy left to the states within the German Federation (Mayntz, 1984:55). The political executive therefore relies upon and places an importance on the higher public service to ensure the formulation of policy is in sync with implementation (Mayntz, 1984:56). All senior posts are tenured with only a few senior public servants being "outsiders" or lateral entrants (Mayntz, 1984:57). Most public servants have a generalist education in law and after their first academic degree they must enlist in a special preparatory service that provides them with both the theoretical and on the job training (Mayntz, 1984:58). The course is introductory in nature, providing training for the few non-legal officials (ibid). The training involves economics, planning, decision making, organisation, personnel management and leadership (Mayntz, 1984:59). It is therefore generalist rather than specialist training

(ibid). Promotion is based on periodic written evaluations by seniors and promotion to senior positions is based on length of service which can be interdepartmental (Mayntz, 1984:60). The German senior public service is characterised by:

1. Senior public servants playing an important role in policy making, enjoying power in their own right and not functioning as temporary aides to the political executive but rather as tenured advisors (Mayntz, 1984:67). This in turn provides continuity, but the continuity of these senior public servants creates a power bloc (ibid).
2. The senior public service is highly trained and experienced (Mayntz, 1984:68). The political executive can therefore choose from a large pool of talent, but are in some sense limited because they cannot select “outsiders” or those that do not meet the educational and promotional requirements for the senior position (ibid).
3. Although the public servants are well trained, the training is generalist and lacks specialised knowledge for specialist policy formulation (ibid).
4. Although both officials and the political executive are involved in policy making, the difference in role conception maintains a functional differentiation which restricts the fusion of roles (ibid).

The French system is also somewhat complex with its vast nationalised public service and many rules and extra-legal practices (Gournay, 1984:69). Most senior positions are occupied by career officials and most politicians have had experience in the public service as a career (Gournay, 1984:70). Conflicts do arise between politicians and senior career officials which is sometimes about the content of the decisions and often about the functional role each plays (ibid). However, most conflicts are resolved amicably in face-

to-face discussions and most of the interaction is co-operative with relative efficacy (Gournay, 1984:71). The reason for this relationship of conflict and co-operation is that senior public servants and politicians have their origins in the general public service (ibid). Appointments to senior public servant positions are made after Cabinet Ministers propose candidates from the higher public service and the candidate is accepted by the Prime Minister and President (Gournay, 1984:72). All public servants have their origins and are recruited from the National School of Administration (*Ecole Nationale d'Administration*) (ibid). Thus, loyalty does not depend on political party patronage, but rather personal contacts, friendships and departmental contact, which develop from an education in the same institution to departmental familiarity (Gournay, 1984:73). Nominations to senior public servant positions are achieved not only on merit but on personal contact as well (Gournay, 1984:76). The education and training that public servants receive at the national school is generalist, but in departments public servants receive specialist training through in-service training and experience (Gournay, 1984:79). The French senior public service can be described as elitist due to public servants' social and educational backgrounds which create personal bonds of friendship and also co-operation (ibid).

David Stanley (1984:93-104) concludes the study of British, Canadian, German and French senior public service by analysing three issues which the United States can learn from. The first issue is the relationship between senior bureaucrats and politicians (Stanley, 1984:93). Stanley (1984:94) concludes that senior public servants need and deserve respect for the role that they play in policy formulation and implementation.

Politicians and media should emphasise the positive achievements and difficult tasks of senior public servants (ibid). Senior public servants should in fact make a contribution and participate in policy making (ibid). There exists an informal cadre of “public careerists” who do serve the Minister as advisors, but serve the public as well rather than a political party, although they are political appointments (Stanley, 1984:95). However, there should be a higher degree of career public servants than political appointments (ibid). The second issue is the mobility and career patterns of senior public servants. Incentives and procedures should be established to encourage interdepartmental mobility (Stanley, 1984:97). Also, senior public servants should receive adequate monetary compensation, but what is equally important is that senior public servants appear to be motivated by appreciation and encouragement from political leadership and by the recognition of the important public service that they render (Stanley, 1984:99). The third issue concerns the generalist versus specialist debate. Stanley (1984:98) states that the generalist public servant in Europe and the specialist public servant in the United States is exaggerated and what is needed is a broad specialist with some generalist skills (ibid). Therefore what is also needed is senior executive training in order to equip senior public servants with the skills they are lacking (ibid). Stanley (1984:102-103) concludes that the senior public service has not received much attention and deserves institutional, political and financial support as well as recognition.

Although the Brookings Institution’s study of European public service systems is insightful and provides a basis of understanding for this paper it is nonetheless dated; the Cold War is over, Germany has become a unified federation, the European Union has

been established, Thatcherite public service reforms have taken place, and trade, technology and globalisation have changed Europe itself. Thus, it is worth reviewing a more recent comparative analysis of senior public service officials in Europe. The publication, *Bureaucratic Elite's in Western European States*, edited by Edward Page and Vincent Wright (1999) draws the same conclusions as Brookings Institution's 1984 study of the European public service. In fact Page and Wright (1999:1) argue that the public services' *modus operandi* in Europe is somewhat anachronistic. Page and Wright (1999:1) argue that public service institutions are "stuck" in the nineteenth century. Page and Wright (ibid) argue that the French public service is still being educated at the *Ecole Nationale d' Administration* (ENA) which was established during the French Revolution. Furthermore, the British public service still follows the principles of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms with recruitment still favouring Oxbridge graduates (ibid). In many Western European countries security of tenure and the seniority principle for promotion has endured (ibid). Page and Wright (1999:6) agree that the study of senior public servants is an important area in public administration, but is an area that has been neglected. They attempt to redress the lack of focus on the role of senior public servants by analysing senior public servants' political status and role in the changing environment of the twenty-first century (ibid). Page and Wright (ibid) refer to "political status" as the character of the bureaucratic elite and its position within the machinery of government, with "political role" referring to the function that senior public servants assume such as co-ordination of policy and intermediaries with interest groups.

Page and Wright (1999) attempt to analyse the changing status and role of senior public servants in light of the changing social, economic and political environment, the rise of special interest groups (possible eroding of the senior public servant monopoly on policy formulation), the decentralisation and privatisation of government functions, and Europeanisation. In order to conduct this comparative analysis the publication includes a critical description of the Greek, Spanish, Italian, French, Austrian, Belgian, German, British, Dutch, Danish and Swedish public services. Recruitment patterns, social status, career structures, internal status differentiation, politicisation and political subordination for senior public servants in each of these countries are described and analysed.

Recruitment patterns shape the culture of senior public servant officials as they emanate from a common or predominant education such as law in continental Europe, a *grandes ecoles* education in France, or an Oxbridge degree in Britain (Page and Wright, 1999:7-8). The result is that because of this elitist education, the social status of French and British public servants is higher than that of other European countries (Page and Wright, 1999:8). The career structures of British and French public servants are mobile (interdepartmental careers) and public servants regard themselves as part of a government-wide elite with bonds of solidarity between various senior public servants in various departments (ibid). In the Netherlands, Germany and Italy officials tend to remain in one department for much of their careers and therefore the interdepartmental bonds are weak (ibid). Internal status differentiation refers to a bureaucracy such as the Treasury in Britain receiving a higher status than lower ranking ministries (ibid). The politicisation of the public service refers to the degree to which elected politicians are involved in partisan

appointments to senior public service posts (ibid). Political subordination on the other hand refers to institutions by which politicians seek to exert control over the activities of the bureaucracy. The British, Danish and Dutch public service for the most part are politically neutral, there is no spoils system, no political appointments, and the notion of political neutrality is entrenched in every recruit thus making it part of the public service culture (Page and Wright, 1999:270-271). In France, Sweden and Germany appointments to senior levels of the public service are under political control (Page and Wright, 1999:271). Senior appointments are under direct partisan influence with many not being career public servants (ibid). In other countries such as Spain, Greece and Austria, senior appointments range from rewarding political support (spoils systems) to securing a degree of political control over the public service (ibid). Italian senior public servant posts are reached through age and length of service and are therefore not integrated into the political class or economic structures (Page and Wright, 1999:272). However, in Italy, Belgium and Austria personal political connections do facilitate promotion to senior public servant posts (Page and Wright, 1999:8). Page and Wright (1999:8) argue that politicisation of the senior public service is endemic in most bureaucratic systems, with the exception of Britain, with most systems falling along a continuum. This paper incorporates elements of the Page and Wright study (1999) by describing and analysing the impact of transformation on the South African senior public service as well as describing recruitment patterns, social and educational backgrounds, career path, politicisation and roles of the Director General.

The Brookings Institution's (1984) study and the Page and Wright (1999) analysed European public services. The review of the Page and Wright (1999) study will not repeat the description of these countries' public services. However, the researcher will focus on countries' public services that are relevant to South Africa. Once again the British public service will be reviewed, as it is this public service that forms the basis for the South African public service, and has experienced many managerial reforms, which South Africa has borrowed. The reform of the German public service will also be described as it experienced an amalgamation, similar to the South African public service. The Spanish public service will also be included as it proves an interesting comparative case for the South African in light of a military dictatorship during the 1970's and the fact that the new political dispensation purged the public service of the old guard. Although the Page et al (1999) study provides more of a contemporary description of the French public service than the Brookings Institution's study (1984), it nonetheless arrives at the same conclusion that is, the French public service has not experienced any real change.

The characteristics of the British public service are that it is permanent, unified, non-political and anonymous (Dargie and Locke, 1999:178). Security of tenure ensures the public service's permanence which facilitates the separation of administration from politics (ibid). The public service prides itself on being non-political that is, it is not dependent on political patronage for existence (ibid). It is the Minister who accepts responsibility for the outcome of policy and is accountable to the electorate through Parliament thereby ensuring the anonymity of the public service (ibid). The modern British public service can be traced to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 (ibid).

This transformed the public service to the one that exists today along the principles of permanence, competitive recruitment, merit, political neutrality and unity (ibid).

However, it is the combination of elite education, socialisation, and structured learning and experience that provides a set of common values that exist in the British public service. Dargie and Locke (1999:192) agree with Plowden (1984) that the education of public servants, particularly at senior level, tends to be elitist with most senior public servants having graduated from private schools, and from Oxford and Cambridge. Most senior officials, approximately sixty percent, tend to be male, white and middle class. Recruitment procedures, cognitive tests and personal interviews favour these candidates. Social and educational background therefore favours the cohesion of elites and British public service values, which is argued to be incongruent with the populace (Dargie and Locke, 1999:192-194).

From the 1980's to 1997 the British public service, particularly at senior level, came under threat (Dargie and Locke, 1999:179). The Conservative government began to initiate reforms which could be categorised as follows:

1. Managerialism, that is the introduction of private sector principles and management style (New Public Management),
2. Marketisation, that is the introduction of market forces in the supply of public services,
3. Agencification, that is the decentralisation of public service departments into separate functional units,

4. Politicisation, that is the breaking down of barriers between political and non-partisan tasks in government (Dargie and Locke, 1999:179).

The British senior public servant can be described as a public servant that provides policy advice to Ministers, represents and implements policies, manages public resources, and serves the government of the day (Dargie and Locke, 1999:182). The values of senior public servants are integrity, political impartiality, objectivity, selection and promotion based on merit, and accountability through Ministers to Parliament (ibid). Senior public servants represent continuity despite a change in government and this is the cornerstone of senior public service in Britain. Dargie and Locke (1999:182) question this ability and expectation of senior public servants to change in order to suit a new political dispensation when they represent continuity.

In 1993 the Oughton Report made recommendations on the career planning of senior public servants (Dargie and Locke, 1999:183). The Report signalled a change in recruitment and promotion of senior public servants (ibid). The Report drew upon practices in other countries and the private sector (Dargie and Locke, 1999:186).

Traditionally it is the public servant that has received a general education, as opposed to a professional education such as lawyers, accountants, economists, etc., that dominates the British public service (Dargie and Locke, 1999:184). Nearly two-thirds of the senior public service are generalists (ibid). A significant number of senior public servants are now recruited from the fast stream (ibid). The fast stream refers to a process of recruitment of graduates to the public service with the opportunity for fast track training

and promotion (ibid). Graduates are centrally recruited through the Recruitment and Assessment Service Agency (RAS). The recruitment process involves rigorous aptitude tests, followed by interviews, and a panel interview with the Civil Service Selection Board (CSSB) (ibid). The outstanding public servants are selected by departments, remain in the public service throughout their careers and are groomed for senior positions (ibid). Appointments to Permanent Secretary level are made centrally by the Prime Minister on the advice of the Head of the Home Civil Service who is supported by the Senior Appointments Selection Committee that sifts through proposals from departments (ibid). The appointment system relies upon the Prime Minister who can be proactive or passive, that is the Prime Minister can merely rubber-stamp the appointment or in the case Margaret Thatcher remove a senior public servant (Sir Ian Bancroft was removed from his position to combine the posts of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service) (Dargie and Locke. 1999:185). Although this is in the power of the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher effectively gained control over senior appointments by combining the two positions, as the Cabinet Secretary is accountable to the Prime Minister (ibid). However, appointment procedures have not changed, except that the Senior Appointments Committee must include a woman, an outsider, and the Committee now decides whether an appointment is internal or open to competition (ibid). This is an attempt to open the public service to more diversity as white male career officials have dominated the senior public service (ibid). Only nine percent of Permanent Secretaries are women (ibid). However, most senior posts are publicly advertised, senior public servants are recruited for fixed contracts and their performance is evaluated against set performance targets (Dargie and Locke, 1999:186) The training of senior public servants

was traditionally done by gaining experience and moving up the ranks (Dargie and Locke, 1999:189). Fast track public servants learn and train through mobility as they are moved from position to position to develop a range of skills in various policy areas (ibid). Fast track public servants are moved horizontally across different departments, vertically between central departments and other agencies, and there is also external mobility between the public service and private sector (ibid). The mobility or interchange supports the generalist over the specialist, incorporates the notion of managerialism, encourages elitism through the creation of common values, but does facilitate the acquisition of diverse skills (ibid).

These changes in recruitment and promotion patterns are part of the managerialism applied to the British public service. The Oughton Report (1993) recommendations created a leaner, flatter management structure, fast track mobility for outstanding public servants to senior positions, written contracts with a fixed period of notice, and flexible pay to reward and retain high performers (Dargie and Locke, 1999:186). The nature of change in the British public service is gradual (Dargie and Locke, 1999:200). There has been an 'evolution revolution' in the British public service, but this has to a large extent affected the manner of service delivery (Dargie and Locke, 1999:200-201). The change brought about by the political will of Margaret Thatcher has not really affected the senior public service (Dargie and Locke, 1999:201). The central characteristics of an elite, permanent, impartial and objective senior public service, which is selected and promoted on merit, currently remains (ibid).

The general transformation of the Spanish public service and in particular the senior public service has been influenced by a combination of factors including the recent transition to democracy, regional decentralisation, European Union membership and a long uninterrupted government by the Socialist Party (1982 to 1996) (Cienfuegos, 1999:32). In 1986 the Spanish government established a Ministry for Public Administration and in 1984 passed two Acts with the aim of curtailing corruption, institutionalising democracy after the 1970's dictatorship, and modernising the public service (Cienfuegos, 1999:33). The Spanish government like most European governments faced the challenge of economic austerity, transformation of markets, technological developments and globalisation (ibid). The Spanish government responded by incorporating private sector principles (New Public Management), total quality management (TQM), management by objectives, a new budgeting system (Programme, Planning Budgeting Systems), and changed recruitment procedures by having open competitive examinations (ibid).

There are fourteen Ministries which are divided into sectoral junior Ministries (Cienfuegos, 1999:34). These junior Ministers do not attend the Council of Ministers, but assist the Minister (ibid). After this level of political assistance there is an intermediate echelon of politico-administrative elites composed of under secretaries, general secretaries and directors general (ibid). These posts are characterised by political appointments and technical expertise, but most are recruited from the public service (Cienfuegos, 1999:35). However, the most senior level of the career public service is the post of assistant director general which is always filled by a career public servant (ibid).

The Spanish public service is somewhat elite and young (77% of assistant directors general are under 54) (Cienfuegos, 1999:42). This can be linked to the socialist government's attempt to modernise the public service by retiring senior public servants who served under the Francoist regime (ibid). The public service is dominated by men and most share a common background (ibid). Most have the same academic degree, passed identical examinations and belong to the same social class (ibid). Most senior public servants originate from Madrid and Castille-Leon which results in a feeling of loyalty to the central power (Cienfuegos, 1999:42-43). Senior public servants and the general public service are not generalists as most hold degrees in law which contributes to a legalistic administrative culture (Cienfuegos, 1999:43). There is no dominant university in Spain such as Oxford or Cambridge from which the government recruits graduates, but rather the recruitment methods provide an elite core of public servants (Cienfuegos, 1999: 43-44). The recruitment methods involve examination for which the candidates prepare over a period of three years and once the candidate passes the examination he or she goes to administrative schools for training (ibid). The career path is promotion by meritorious competition and appointment (ibid). Since 1984, senior management positions are occupied by a specialist core of public servants who have the monopoly over the managerial function of departments (Cienfuegos, 1999:47).

Cienfuegos (1999:49) argues that the 1984 reforms have not seriously challenged the culture of the senior public service and that legislation alone will not reform the status quo. Cienfuegos (ibid) suggests that legislation as well as political clout will reform the senior echelon of the Spanish public service (ibid). The socialist government has over a

long period of time produced results in service delivery (ibid). The political appointments of directors general and secretaries general have led to the gradual replacement of senior officials by loyal bureaucrats (Cienfuegos, 1999:50). This of course involves the risk of patronage, lack of independence and objectivity, and instability with each change of government (ibid). There is difficult balance between politics and administration. The victorious political party appoints advisors who may be career public servants (Cienfuegos, 1999:50-51). However, the victorious political party appoints these advisors according to a criteria of loyalty (ibid).

The conservative government (Popular Party) victory in 1996 has not brought about the dismantling of the senior public service (ibid). This is because senior public servants have become a power bloc (ibid). They are powerful in the political system and occupy senior positions in political parties, the core executive of the administration, Parliament and the economic system (Cienfuegos, 1999:52). Cienfuegos (ibid) argues that Spain will continue to combine a political process of promotion to senior posts with a high degree of collusion among the politico-administrative elite. The profile between politicians and the administrative elite is similar and it is therefore not surprising that reforms have not produced substantial change (Cienfuegos, 1999:51). The demands for public service transformation continue (ibid). However, over two centuries government has been incapable of any real change as it is the powerful political-administrative elite that supports the status quo (Cienfuegos, 1999:52).

Reforms in the organisation, and the political and administrative roles of senior public servants in Germany have been a consequence of shifts in the political-institutional context (Goetz, 1999:147). In the mid 1980's this context has changed due to increasing party politicisation, parliamentarisation, and federalisation of public policy (ibid). This has had a profound impact on the senior public service affecting its relations with the political authority, its cohesion, career paths, roles and qualifications for admission and promotion (Goetz, 1999:148). According to Goetz (1999:148-150) these consequences are as follows:

1. Politicians have gained importance in policy formulation while the role of senior public servants has declined. Public policy has become more politicised than bureaucratised. Thus there has been a gradual shift of policy from the administrative to the political arena.
2. Political co-ordination units within the Federal government have been strengthened which has encouraged a dual informal differentiation in the public service. Political control over departments has tightened, and policy co-ordination now takes place within units. The Chancellery, the principal institution for policy and political-administrative co-ordination, has increased its authority over ministries which has curtailed departmental autonomy.
3. The role of senior public servants has therefore changed from agenda-setter and policy initiator to politically sensitive policy co-ordinator.
4. Political craft has therefore become an essential characteristic of a competent senior official. Political craft involves the ability to assess the political implications of policy proposals, to consider a specific issue within a broader context of the government's

program, to anticipate and influence the reactions of actors in the policy formulation process, and to design processes that maximise the realisation of the Minister's objectives.

Goetz (1999:172) argues that the German federal arrangement of government has resulted in a duality between the functional elite of senior public servants with immediate access to the political executive at the federal level, and a decentralised public service in the 'administrative backwaters' of Bonn. There appears to be an unavoidable trend of differentiation between the elite senior officials with close links to the political leadership and those without (Goetz, 1999:173). This growing politicisation, and in fact attractive aspect of public service, will provide challenges for the German government (ibid).

Page et al (1999:267) conclude that recent public management reforms, the attempt to increase diversity in the workforce (through gender equity and expansion of recruitment from other educational institutions) has changed neither the culture nor the character of the senior public service in Europe. The public service is still the preserve of the middle class and elite (ibid). The impact of management reforms appears to be limited in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, France and Sweden where public authority is relatively high (Page et al, 1999:275). The notion of public authority is where the senior public service sees itself as part of a distinctive service which enjoy rights, duties, privileges as distinct from other sectors, most notably the private sector (Page et al, 1999:272). Two factors appear to influence the notion of public authority, that is the importance placed on seniority and experience, and an elite education in law

(Page et al, 1999:274). There appears to be a correlation between the limited impact of public management reforms and the perception of the senior public service that they are a distinct sector of society beyond reproach. The following table illustrates the notion of public authority according to these two factors.

Table 4: Comparative Public Authority

Country	Relative importance of seniority	Lawyers
Austria	High	High
Belgium	High	High
Britain	Low	Low
Denmark	Low	High
France	Low	High
Germany	Low	High
Greece	High	High
Italy	High	High
Netherlands	Low	Low
Spain	High	High
Sweden	Low	High

(Source: Page and Wright, 1999:274)

Page et al (1999:278) also argue that there appears to be an increasing political influence in senior appointments and subsequently a decrease in the “neutral” public service. Even in Britain when senior appointments were made, Margaret Thatcher would question whether the senior public servant was “one of us” (ibid). Although the notion of “one of use” referred to a state of mind rather than political party membership, Page et al (1999:278) argues that this nonetheless indicates a growing political influence over the senior public service. It appears that during most transitions in government, whether it is due to democratic process of elections or an entirely new political dispensation, politicians seek to shape to a greater or lesser extent the relationship between politicians and the public service in favour of the politicians (Page et al, 1999:269). Thus changes in the public service are inevitably linked to much wider political changes (Page et al, 1999:279). Page et al (1999:278-279) conclude that to understand the question of change in the public service one can point to the decreasing confidence in traditional patterns of

public service as the single most important feature of change which has resulted in different reactions from countries in Europe. In Italy and Greece there appears to be an isolation and stalemate between political and administrative elites (ibid). In Britain and Denmark the decreasing confidence in traditional patterns of public service has produced new management structures and greater political sensitivity by senior public servants (ibid). In Spain it produced extensive party politicisation of the public service, and in Sweden and Germany decreasing confidence in traditional patterns of public service have subtly served to change the way in which public servants manage their careers (Page et al, 1999:279).

A study that also follows a similar methodology to the Brookings Institution (1984) and Page et al (1999) is the Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000) study of administering the core executive in developed countries entitled, *Administering the Summit*. Although Peters et al (2000) once again describe and analyse various countries' public services, some interesting arguments are made, which are relevant to this research. According to Peters et al (2000:13) senior public servants in every country have a number of common roles; political in order to operate within a political environment, a policy role, a technical advisory role and a role of representing a government institution. Senior public servants have to contend with two rationales that is (1) professionalism, hierarchy, due process, jurisdictional and input-output logistics, and (2) efficiency, democracy, responsibility, leadership and accountability (Peters et al, 2000:14). According to Peters et al (2000: 14) public service reforms have resulted in an increase in institutionalisation, centralisation and the politicisation of senior public servants (Peters et al, 2000:15).

Politicisation has a number of possible dimensions. Firstly, a politician such as a Prime Minister or President appoints officials to the public service (ibid). Secondly, there are appointments of public servants with identifiable party affiliations (ibid). Thirdly, there is a clear subordination of neutral public servants to partisan policies, and fourthly a mixture of all three in the public service (ibid). However, there are three types of senior public servants that exist in all countries, that is administrative generalists, technical experts, and personal or political appointments by the political executive (Peters et al, 2000:16). Peters et al (2000:18) argue that the manner in which senior public servants influence policy formulation is dependent on the constitutional and political opportunity to influence political leadership, administrative structures, and the institution's own opportunity structure (Peters et al, 2000:18).

The constitutional and political opportunity for senior public servants to influence political leadership relates to the following:

1. Constitutional position of the head of the political executive,
2. The control exerted by the head of the political executive over Cabinet,
3. The nature of appointment of Ministers,
4. Whether power is vested in a presidential, prime ministerial, bicephalous, collegial cabinet or coalition government,
5. The power of the legislature,
6. The nature of the political system, and
7. The nature of the relationship between the head of the political executive and senior staff (Peters et al, 2000:18-19).

The administrative structure relates to:

1. The nature of the channel (formal or informal) between the senior public service and the general public service, and
2. The nature of the relationship between the senior public service and the general public service (whether it is integrated, isolated, hierarchical or participative, impositional or bargained, or confrontational or consensual) (Peters et al, 2000:19).

The institution's own structure includes a number of complex factors:

1. The nature of the link between the political leadership and administrative staff,
2. Alternative sources of support available to the political leader,
3. The prestige and legitimacy of the institution,
4. The political leader's conception of the role of administrative staff,
5. The quality, prestige and experience of administrative staff,
6. The resources available to the institution,
7. The nature of the relationship between politicians, technical specialists and generalists, and
8. The degree of internal cohesion (Peters et al, 2000:20-21).

Peters et al (2000:265) conclude that institutional structures have grown around the focus of Presidents and Prime Ministers. Whether or not the political executive is considered powerful or weak, there has been a considerable growth of institutional support and resources that assist the political executive to exercise power over the public service

(ibid). Thus, there appears to be a consolidation of power of these institutions and a waning of power from other institutions (ibid). This power may be formal or informal and the actual basis of power may vary (ibid). These institutions co-ordinate legislative initiatives, prepare legislation, monitor and control public expenditure, and perform a host of other public functions (Peters et al, 2000:266). The personnel in these institutions exploit their power and position to advance the political goals of the executive and ultimately their own interests (ibid). This is true whether recruitment is through meritocratic or personal connections (ibid). This provides the political executive with “tentacles” that extend throughout the public service (ibid).

The Brookings (1984), Page et al (1999) and Peters et al (2000) studies all provide a comparative description and analysis of various countries’ senior public service, which has its utility. An analysis of these studies indicates that the role and status of senior public servants may not have changed, while in other countries the role of senior public servants have declined favouring politicians in the political-administrative interface. These studies are useful and provide a framework for understanding the arguments of this paper.

Another study that deserves mention is by Peter Larson and Amanda Coe (1999) who examine the evolving role of top public servants in Commonwealth countries. According to Larson and Coe (1999:1) the role of the Permanent Secretary has changed and these officials are being “stretched” to meet the increasing demands of the changing world. Many countries are reforming the public sector and senior public servants, in particular

Permanent Secretaries, play a crucial role in this reform process (ibid). Moreover, Permanent Secretaries are at the apex of the structure they are reforming and are at the crossroads between political power and public administration (ibid). Permanent Secretaries are therefore facing increasing responsibilities and new demands which require continuous skill improvement and evolving relationships with Ministers, staff, the public and other organisations (Larson and Coe, 1999:2). According to Larson and Coe (1999:6) Permanent Secretaries have three basic roles: providing policy advice to a Minister, leading a department of which he or she is the administrative head, and participating in the collective management of the public service. As a policy advisor the Permanent Secretary is expected to provide advice on policy issues, on government's options to address these issues, and the implications of each option (ibid). This role requires a complex understanding of technical, managerial, legal and financial issues (ibid). This has important political implications, as it is the Permanent Secretary who plays a central role in recommending a certain course of action or inaction by gathering and analysing evidence to support the policy option proposed to the Minister (ibid). As head of a department a Permanent Secretary must within legal, financial and human constraints, manage and direct a department of government (Larson and Coe, 1999:7). The Permanent Secretary also has to ensure that the department responds to ministerial priorities and that the department carries out the policies of the government of the day despite the fact that the Permanent Secretary may have reservations about a policy (ibid). As a member of the public service senior management team, the Permanent Secretary is expected to play a corporate role on behalf of government, which requires a level of collective governance and co-ordination of governmental objectives (ibid).

According to Larson and Coe (1999: 27) most Permanent Secretaries interviewed for the study agreed on these three basic roles, but due to the changing role of the state, these roles are becoming increasingly complicated. The Permanent Secretary, as policy advisor, is now required to consult with a wide range of groups in civil society and government in order to assess all options, implications and anticipate likely outcomes (ibid). The Permanent Secretary must therefore have a holistic view or systems approach to policy advice. The effects of globalisation also require the Permanent Secretary to consider policy options not only in a departmental, sectarian and national context, but within international dimensions (Larson and Coe, 1999:28). The role as administrative head is also becoming complicated as Permanent Secretaries are expected to maximise the utilisation of limited resources while at the same time focus on more outputs and public satisfaction (Larson and Coe, 1999:29). There is more of a focus on efficiency, effectiveness and performance improvements (ibid). In fact many countries have placed Permanent Secretaries on performance contracts (ibid). Permanent Secretaries are therefore required to be exceptional managers and inspirational leaders (ibid). According to Larson and Coe (1999:33) the Permanent Secretary's role as corporate manager is becoming increasingly onerous. Permanent Secretaries no longer head hierarchical departments that were vertical silos and considered as a separate domain (ibid). Problems can no longer be considered the domain of one department and as a result Permanent Secretaries find that their roles have changed from administering a vertical department to creating linkages across departments, moving from a culture of hierarchy to collaboration in order to address society's increasingly complex problems (ibid).

Larson and Coe (1999:37-38) conclude that the increased complexities of Permanent Secretaries' roles have resulted in Permanent Secretaries being "stretched" beyond personal and organisational capacities. They recommend that further research needs to be conducted in this important area of public administration and management (Larson and Coe, 1999:40-41). Furthermore, Larson and Coe (1999:40-41) suggest the following:

1. The roles and responsibilities between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries need to be clarified,
2. The Permanent Secretaries' job needs to be re-examined given the changing role of the state,
3. Permanent Secretaries need regular feedback and information with regards to improving their job performance, and
4. Permanent Secretaries need continuous training and development focusing on leadership, the global economy and understanding the private sector.

A study that examined the role of senior management in developing countries' public service is John Montgomery's 1986 research entitled "*Life at the apex: the functions of Permanent Secretaries in nine Southern African countries.*" Montgomery's methodology was the critical incident approach, which required Permanent Secretaries or their deputies to complete diaries describing activities over a seven to ten day period that took more than an hour of their time. Montgomery's research provided an insight into the managerial function of the most senior managers in the public service and more specifically within a Southern African context. According to Montgomery (1986:212)

Permanent Secretaries spend most of their time as “resource handlers,” which refers to managing scarce financial and human resources. The importance and time-consuming function of resource management and allocation is not surprising given that many of these countries in the sample (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are some of the poorest countries in the world (Montgomery, 1986:213). The second function that consumed much of these Permanent Secretaries’ time was a “liaison” function that focused on information flow and influence (ibid). Liaising with donor agencies, Ministers, other departments such as the finance, staff and organisations from civil society, formed an intricate part of the Permanent Secretary’s function (Montgomery, 1986:214). Analysis and planning was the third important function of Permanent Secretaries, which related more to development administration and analysis to improve performance (ibid). The fourth important function that Permanent Secretaries engage in is monitoring the performance of those who act on behalf of the department (Montgomery, 1986:215). Another function is that of spokesperson where the Permanent Secretary acts on behalf of the department in order to make the position of government formally known (ibid). An entrepreneurial function required Permanent Secretaries to be innovative in developing programmes and attempting to find additional resources for programmes (Montgomery, 1986:216). Montgomery (ibid) also discovered that very little time was devoted to negotiation other than those involved in the liaison, spokesperson or entrepreneurial functions, and most negotiation related to personnel matters.

Montgomery's (1986:217-218) study also discovered that Permanent Secretaries in these countries appear to be politically neutral, but are not political eunuchs. According to Montgomery (1986:218) the notion of senior public servants being "guardians of administration", the "conservator", and politicians being innovators has little relevance in Southern Africa. Montgomery suggests that this may be due to the fact that these countries are developing and changing, and that both politicians and senior public servants form an elite corps (ibid). Thus, the precise role differentiation between politician and senior public servants may be not relevant for the African context, but the sharing of concerns does not weaken functional distinction between administration and politics (ibid). However, Montgomery (ibid) does mention that there were incidences when politicians became involved in administrative matters, but there was no overt pressure of Permanent Secretaries to become involved in politics or to further the aims of a political party.

Montgomery (1986:220) concludes that Permanent Secretaries play a largely predictable role in the sample countries, but that their function and roles are far from identical to their counterparts in Western democracies. The possible reason for this discrepancy is that the economic environment and management of resources keeps these Permanent Secretaries close to the "administrative grindstone" and thus politics and policy is left to the politicians (ibid).

Although an interesting paper, Montgomery's methodology is problematic as he uses a critical incident approach to determine Permanent Secretary roles. The methodology

requires Permanent Secretaries to keep a journal of an incident that took more than an hour of his or her time over a week. Permanent Secretaries function in a dynamic environment, have a demanding role in the executive of government and may be required to make important decisions in less than an hour. Thus this methodology is not entirely an accurate reflection of the role and responsibilities of Permanent Secretaries.

Another paper that also focused on Permanent Secretaries in the African context is by Lungu (1998). According to Lungu (1998:1) the changing state of post-independent Africa and its public administration environment has compounded the role ambiguity of the most senior public management position. In Africa, Permanent Secretaries experience considerable role ambiguity and ambivalence due to conflicting and contradictory expectations of their office and the political context in which they work (Lungu, 1998:3). Lungu (1998: 11-15) examines three roles of Permanent Secretaries, that is:

1. Political appointee in a neutral role,
2. Chief executive officer or Ministerial clerk, and
3. Responsible officer or rubber-stamp.

Lungu (1998:6) argues that political appointments of Permanent Secretaries in Africa have been partisan and with a disregard for merit. According to Lungu (ibid), political instability in post-independent Africa has resulted in a variety of regimes interfering with the integrity of the public service. However, African public administration has never been a model of integrity since the colonial and post-independence era saw political, ideological and racial interference in the public service. Lungu (1998:7) cites as examples

the capricious political appointments of the Idi Amin regime and more recently the Chiluba government which dismissed Permanent Secretaries and replaced them with more partisan supporters. Lungu (ibid) agrees that the South African situation is more complicated. Although after South Africa's first democratic elections Director General positions were advertised, giving the impression that appointments were based on merit, the reality was that incumbents were appointed on a partisan basis (ibid). According to Lungu (1998:10-11) political appointments contribute to the role ambiguity of Permanent Secretaries because their neutrality and objective technocratic role of a Permanent Secretary is compromised as their loyalty is more towards the political party in power.

In most African countries Permanent Secretaries are relatively independent. They liaise with the Secretary of the Cabinet for co-ordination purposes and are therefore responsible to the head of the public service and in terms of financial responsibility report to a public accounts committee of the legislature (Lungu, 1998:11-12). In South Africa the equivalent of the Permanent Secretary, that is the Director General, reports to the Minister with regards to policy and administrative matters and a parliamentary accounts committee with regards to financial matters (ibid). In African countries where the Permanent Secretary enjoys relative independence from Ministerial oversight, the Permanent Secretary is more like a chief executive officer working in tandem with the Minister. However, in African countries where there is political instability or a lack of experienced politicians and a few skilled Permanent Secretaries the result is a weak mutual working relationship between politicians and senior public service managers (Lungu, 1998:13). According to Maheshwari (as cited in Lungu, 1998:13-14) Ministers

lack the ability to comprehend public policy and find it easier to become involved in routine administrative decision making. Thus, Ministers tend to usurp the Permanent Secretary's role as chief executive officer and as a result the Permanent Secretary becomes a ministerial clerk (Lungu, 1998:14).

Due to the nature of political appointments and the interference by Ministers in procedural matters, in extreme cases Permanent Secretaries merely become rubber stamps for ministerial decision (Lungu, 1998:16-17). Lungu (ibid) illustrates his point by citing financial management and accounting in some under-developed African countries where budgetary matters are a *fait accompli* and Permanent Secretaries have little or no control over financial matters.

This study will analyse various aspects of the arguments and debates, as reviewed in this literature, to provide a more substantive debate on the role of the Director General, and the nature of the relationship between the political and administrative executive in South Africa. These arguments and debates include:

1. Changes in the last part of the twenty-first century have resulted in a change in the role of the state, and thereby necessitated a change in the role of senior public servants.
2. There has been a convergence between politics and administration in favour of politicians with the role of senior public servants becoming more politicised and the political executive gaining more influence in the formulation of policy.

The research question of the role of the Director General relates to the first argument and the second argument relates to the research question of the political-administrative interface in South Africa. The findings of this paper will attempt to address the research questions and whether these arguments have relevance to South Africa.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER ONE

Traditional Models of Public Administration

“An official who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honour to carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference.” – Max Weber²

The role of the Director General in the political-administrative interface and the impact of transformation on that relationship needs to be contextualised within the traditional models of public administration. A discussion of the traditional models of public administration will provide an understanding of modern public sector reforms. Moreover, the following discussion describes the emergence of the political-administrative dichotomy and places the changing role of the administrative head of government within this context.

The traditional model of public administration is drawn from the Woodrow Wilson theory of political-administrative dichotomy, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Max

² Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: Oxford University Press (first published in Germany in 1922)

Weber's theory of the "ideal type bureaucracy." These models are characterised by the idea of political neutrality and impartiality, hierarchical control, policy implementation and administration, careerism and professionalism, and a high regard for public as opposed to political interest. These models are considered as reform initiatives in the nineteenth century and were the most pervasive form of administration in the public sector. These models of public administration formed the foundation for the modern public service, but became increasingly anachronistic with the changing role of the state in the late 1970's.

Prior to the traditional model of public administration, administration was based on patronage and loyalty to a monarch or elected official. These early forms of administration were based on personal relations with consequent misuses of public office for personal gain, nepotism, corruption and maladministration. In most cases administration was not based on competence or professionalism, but personal connections to those in authority.

The most influential model of public administration was that of Max Weber's "ideal type bureaucracy." Weber (1947:333-334) distinguished between three types of rule; the traditional, charismatic and rational-legal types. The traditional type of rule was based upon a ruler's authority believed to be derived from a tribal, clan or some divine right (ibid). The charismatic ruler derived his or her authority from the personal appeal and characteristics believed to be exceptional by the followers (ibid). The rational-legal type rule was based upon the acceptance of formal legal authority bestowed upon the ruler to

which the ruler and ruled must adhere (ibid). The bureaucracy or administration of rules is therefore a form of the rational-legal type of rule. Weber (ibid) believed that rule of law or the governance of society is best administered by a bureaucracy. According to Weber (ibid) the “ideal type bureaucracy” is characterised by:

1. The official being appointed on the basis of a legal contract, remunerated with a salary and pension for years of service,
2. The position being the official’s sole occupation,
3. The appointment of an official and subsequent promotion being based on merit and qualifications,
4. Each official having a fixed area of jurisdictional expertise,
5. The official having certain characteristics ensuring compliance with the rule of law and administering rules dispassionately,
6. The official is subject to discipline and control in the conduct office and execution of duties,
7. The structure of the bureaucracy consisting of positions that clearly define responsibilities and operating within a hierarchical relationship,
8. The hierarchical arrangement of offices and the levels of authority reflecting an ordered system of super-and-subordination,
9. The official being separated from the means and ownership of production, and
10. The rule of law being maintained through the preservation of written documents that keep account of the application and precedence of law.

Weber (1947:333-334) stated that the most efficient form of government was one which was based on this normative model of the “ideal type bureaucracy.” The incorporation of merit and technical expertise, as opposed to patronage, was believed to instil professionalism and competence in the public service. Weber hoped that this “ideal-type bureaucracy” would avoid patronage and a politicised public service with its consequent inefficiencies, corruption, nepotism and incompetence (Savoie, 1994:26). According to Weber (1947:333-334) the hierarchical arrangement with jurisdictional expertise of each office also ensured lines of responsibility and accountability and would result in efficiency (Savoie, 1994:25-26). The remuneration and career system of the “ideal type bureaucracy” ensured loyalty and continuity, and the avoidance of corruption (Savoie, 1994:26-27). Continuity was maintained through a career public service as well as the preservation of written documents (ibid). Weber states that the existence of documents ensured the consistent application of rules,(ibid). Therefore, organisational activities could be learned following general rules for whoever occupied a particular position in the hierarchy. Weber also made the distinction between politicians and bureaucrats or administrators. He believed that administrators would not perform effectively should they function as politicians. Weber (1947:337) stated that,

“...officialdom has been brilliant whenever it had to prove its sense of duty, its impartiality and mastery of organisational problems in the face of official, clearly formulated tasks of a specialised nature. But here we are concerned with political, not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves provoke the recognition which nobody can truthfully deny. That bureaucracy failed completely whenever it

was expected to deal with political problems. This is no accident, rather, it would be astonishing if capabilities inherently so alien to one another would emerge within the same political structures."

Weber therefore argued that administration was a specialised function for which technical qualifications and competencies were important for the effective functioning of the public service. Moreover, politics was not the realm of administrators and the relationship between the administrator and politician would be described by Weber as subservient (Savoie, 1994:27). Weber (as cited in Savoie, 1994:27) described the relationship between politicians and administrators as:

"An official who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honour to carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference."

Thus, Weber believed that administrators served the government of the day with political impartiality (Savoie, 1994:27). The elected politician represented the interests of the public through an electoral process and hence serving the politician would be serving the public. The policy directives received from elected politicians would therefore be implemented as if the official were serving any other government. Weber's "ideal type bureaucracy" presupposed a democratic system of frequent elections with a turnover in

government and the administrator serving the victorious political party that formed the government of the day.

Weber would have agreed with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report's criticism of the British public service. The report was published in 1854 and described the British public service as inefficient, corrupt and incompetent. Northcote and Trevelyan argued that;

"Admission into the civil service is eagerly sought after, but it is for the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable that it is highly desired. Those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions, where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries, and those whom indolence of temperament...are placed in the civil service, where they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour, and with no risk" (as cited in Savoie, 1994:44-45).

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (as cited in Savoie, 1994: 45) proposed the following:

1. The appointment to the public service should be based on open competition and examination.
2. Appointments and promotion should be based upon merit and proper assessment by superiors.
3. A distinction and specialisation should be made between intellectual and mechanical labour.
4. Measures should be adopted to ensure uniformity of service.

The recommendation that the British public service should be “...carried out by the admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected body of young men...through the establishment of a proper system of examination before appointment...” (Hughes, 1998:25) signalled the abolishment of the patronage system in the British public service and adoption of a meritocracy. However, the reforms recommended by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report were met with scepticism. It is reported that the aristocracy, and in fact Queen Victoria, feared that the opening of the public service to public competition would open it up to commoners without the necessary aristocratic breeding and would see the rise of republicanism in government (Savoie, 1994:45). It was not until there were many British casualties during the Crimean war that Britain recognised the cost of patronage and incompetence (Savoie, 1994:46). Reforms in the British public service were expedited and a concerted effort was made to educate young men through liberal education so as to “...produce citizens who were morally good and such it was that would succeed in examination” (Savoie, 1994:45). Appointees were recruited from institutions such as Cambridge and Oxford universities (Savoie, 1994:46). The Northcote and Trevelyan Report sought through education to unify the public service by favouring appointees from the “proper” education and subsequently appointments to senior positions would be made from within the public service (ibid). The Report also gave impetus to the centralisation of decision making. The most senior position, the Permanent Secretary, in the Treasury was formally recognised as the head of the British public service. The head of the public service would advise the Prime Minister on who should be appointed to senior positions in the public service. The Prime Minister and advisors would therefore survey departments to identify promising Permanent Secretaries (Savoie,

1994:49). Appointments to the most senior positions in the British public service were therefore in some sense political, but were based on merit rather than patronage as selection was from within the public service. Moreover, appointments by the Prime Minister were made in consultation with advisors who are senior administrators (Page, 1985:19). It is *fait accompli* who would be appointed to the next Permanent Secretary position. In 1983 Margaret Thatcher rejected the advice of senior public servants in her appointment of Peter Middleton as Permanent Secretary of the Treasury ahead of others for the position (ibid). This marked an increase of political input in the appointments of Permanent Secretaries.

By World War I much of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report's recommendations had been adopted within the British public service. The public service developed a culture of its own. It was highly centralised and hierarchical, its values shaped by an elitist education, cliquish, with a detachment in the implementation of policies emanating from political masters. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report also defined the nature of the relationship between administrators and politicians. Political patronage was previously the key to employment and promotion, but the reforms brought about a public service that was less attached to elected politicians, but loyal to the "Service" (Savoie, 1994:48). The non-partisan and impartial public service was therefore responsible for the implementation of policy and some advisory capacity by senior administrators in the formulation of policy, but it was the elected politician, in this case the Minister, who was ultimately responsible and accountable for the policy. Thus, the notion of ministerial responsibility entered into the public administration debate. Ministerial responsibility is based on the presumption

that administrators would remain vigilant and prudent in their advice and implementation of policy irrespective of the government of the day.

In the United States of America during the 1800's the spoils system defined its public service. The spoils system was the custom of appointing persons to public office based on their loyalty to the victorious political party. The result was a public service that changed concurrently with the victorious political party, was elitist, corrupt, and lacking in the necessary expertise. The American public service during the nineteenth century was neither efficient nor effective. According to Mosher (1982:65) "...among the consequences of the spoils system run rampant, were: the periodic chaos which attended changes of administration during most of the nineteenth century; the popular association of public administration with politics and incompetence; the growing conflicts between executive and legislature over appointments."

The impetus to reform the spoils system was the increasing tension between the legislature and the executive over appointments which led to the 1868 impeachment trial of an American President, and then the assassination of President Garfield in 1881 by a disappointed office seeker. The spoils system was eventually reformed with the adoption of the Pendleton Act of 1883. The Act established a bipartisan Civil Service Commission which was responsible for:

1. Ensuring competitive examinations for all applicants for certain public service positions,
2. Selecting the best candidates from their examination performance,

3. Overseeing an effective probationary period before making the appointment permanent, and
4. Ensuring the representivity of several states in the federal public service (Hughes, 1998:26).

The Pendleton Act of 1883 substantially removed patronage and nepotism from the American public service. Senior appointments in the public service were and still are the prerogative of the President to ensure a check and balance of the executive arm of government. The second important consequence of the Pendleton Act (1883) was that it introduced a permanent public service with security of tenure based on merit and professionalism. The Act also attempted to deal with elitism by introducing representivity according to states and a public service open to appointments at various levels of government rather than a career public service. In other words the American public service was not entirely based upon selection of senior officials after a long public service career. The American public service was a combination of a career public service as well as a public service with political appointments at various levels of government. The American public service therefore has two systems; a career path and political appointments. However, political appointments have become less a reward for political allies, but rather persons the President can trust to deliver on policies and campaign promises. The political party has also become less dominant in appointments and it is rather the President in consultation with advisors who makes the appointments based on merit (Page, 1985:26). Since the 1960's and in the Carter and Reagan administrations most of the persons appointed were regarded as policy experts in their respective fields

and shared the same ideals as the presidential incumbents (ibid). The respective public service department in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission selected career public servants until 1978. In 1978 the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection Board was established which essentially retained the principle of the departmental selection of candidates provided the candidate had the necessary qualifications for the position as defined by these two bodies (Page, 1985:18).

An ardent critic of the spoils systems was Woodrow Wilson who in 1886 described a normative model for the role of politicians and administrators:

"Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices...Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of general law is an act of administration. The assessment and raising of taxes, for instance, the hanging of a criminal, the transportation and delivery of the mails, the equipment and recruitment of the army and navy, etc., are all obviously acts of administration, but the general laws which direct these things to be done are as obviously outside of and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative" (Wilson, 1941:197).

Wilson believed the spoils system fused the political and administrative realm of government resulting in administrators acting in an overtly political manner and thereby serving the interests of a political party as opposed to those of the public. Wilson therefore believed in a separation of powers within the executive and legislature, that is between elected politicians and administrators, based upon the separation of powers doctrine between the legislature, executive and judiciary. Wilson believed that there had to be a system of checks and balances where the political sphere of government made policy and laws, which was separate from the administrative function of implementing policy and legislation. This belief became known as the political-administrative dichotomy and was given further impetus by scholars such as Goodnow (1900) and Appleby (1949). From this model of the political-administrative dichotomy developed the idea that administrators advise political leadership on the formulation, implementation and review of public policy while remaining politically neutral in their advisory capacity. The primary function of administrators was therefore to implement the policy for whichever political party was in power and manage resources in order to achieve the aims of the political party's policies. The distinction between the political and administrative roles also had another ramification. Elected politicians were therefore responsible and accountable for policy in formulation and implementation while the administrators, presumed to be neutral in the dispensing of advice, were not to be held publicly accountable.

According to the traditional model of public administration, in a democratic system the government is accountable to citizens primarily through the act of voting. It presupposes

that the voter will assess the competence of government, both in a political and administrative function, and vote for the political party that the citizen favours. It is assumed that the voter firstly has access to information to make an assessment, secondly that the political party has some degree of control over the bureaucracy, and thirdly that actions of the bureaucracy could be traced through a political system of accountability to the voter (Hughes, 1998:231). In the United Kingdom the public service is accountable through its hierarchy to the Minister who is then accountable to the Cabinet and to Parliament and ultimately to the people (ibid). Therefore the Minister is responsible for the ministry and department under his or her portfolio. Ministerial responsibility according to the British system of governance can be described, *inter alia*:

1. The Minister and the Cabinet are collectively responsible for the actions of the Minister's department or administrative agency to Parliament, but for reasons of political expediency the Cabinet places the burden of responsibility on the Minister,
 2. The Minister is answerable to Parliament on a given issue relating to his or her portfolio, ministry and department,
 3. The Minister is responsible for policy, in formulation and implementation,
 4. A Minister is obliged to resign if he or she, or a public servant, has made an error of judgement in the execution of duties,
 5. Should a error be detected a Minister is obliged to inform and fully explain the action or inaction,
 6. Should a Minister knowingly mislead Parliament he or she is obliged to resign, and
 7. The Minister must keep Parliament abreast of developments in his or her portfolio
- (Wessels and Pauw, 1999:233).

The Minister and his or her department are therefore regarded as one entity since the actions of the administrator reflect that of their political master. The most contentious issue of ministerial responsibility is the resignatory obligation of a Minister accepting responsibility for the actions of public servants in his or her department. This resignatory obligation, known as vicarious responsibility, has to some extent been a myth. In reality, should there be a serious error in judgement, it is the Minister that informs Parliament and provides assurances that the error will be rectified with the Minister accepting responsibility for the rectification without resigning (Wessels and Pauw, 1999:239). It is therefore the Minister's responsibility to keep Parliament informed about his or her department and to take the necessary corrective action when a serious error occurs (ibid). Failure to do so or to blatantly mislead Parliament is grounds for resignation (ibid). The only Minister in British modern history to accept vicarious responsibility was Lord Peter Carrington, who resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1982 for the failure of public servants to provide the necessary information on the Falklands War (Wessels and Pauw, 1999:250). However for the most part, misdemeanours and errors of judgement by public servants are dealt with internally through the hierarchical structure of the department.

In the United States the separation of powers according to the constitution makes for judicial and legislative oversight of the executive branch of government. The American public servant is therefore accountable to the Chief Executive Officer, that is the President in the federal system and the Governor at state level. The American constitution also makes a distinction between the responsibilities of the federal and state government

which therefore affects the level of accountability. Technically, the public servant is accountable to the President or Governor through the hierarchical structure of federal and state structures, but there is another sphere of accountability. Legislative decrees establish an executive agency, its functions and responsibilities, its funding and appropriations, and its procedures. The public service through its senior management could therefore be held accountable to the legislature, through legislative oversight committees, for its actions or inaction, its spending and any issue which the legislature deems important. The public service is also in some sense accountable to the judiciary for violations in terms of the constitution and laws. Thus, accountability of the American public service is through the executive, legislature and judiciary.

The traditional model of public administration attempted to de-politicise the public service by redressing the patronage partisan system. The realm and responsibilities of politicians and administrators were distinct and in fact distinct fields of study emerged, that is public administration and political science. As Caiden (1982:81) noted about the traditional model;

“Simply put, politicians should rule; public officials should do their bidding. Political offices should be filled competitively in the political arena; bureaucratic offices should be filled competitively in the bureaucratic arena. Political officials should be selected on the basis of their political competence; bureaucratic officials should be selected on the basis of their bureaucratic competence. The separation of political and career routes should be institutionalised by legal or constitutional prohibition on

concurrent office holding and interchange. Politicians should be judged by the electorate or their political peers; officials should be judged by their political overseers or their bureaucratic peers. Political office should be of limited tenure and subject to frequent elections; bureaucratic office should be unlimited tenure, subject to good behaviour."

The theory of the separation between politicians and administrators was integral to the traditional model of public administration and most countries fashioned their public service according to the traditional model. However the political-administrative dichotomy was in reality a myth (Hughes, 1998:32). This was particularly true at the apex of the administrative hierarchy, that is between the most senior public servant and the politician responsible for the portfolio. The interface between the two is often a source of tension and problems (Hughes, 1998:232). According to Weber's "ideal type bureaucracy" every public servant has a specific role and is accountable to his or her superior. Issues of roles and performance are accounted for through a hierarchical structure by proceeding up the hierarchy. At the apex of the hierarchy, the most senior public servant confronts the political head responsible for that portfolio of which the senior public servant is administrative head. Hughes (1998:233) argues that roles, responsibilities and issues of accountability according to the traditional model is not possible because the interaction between politician and senior public servant is always problematic and although plausible in theory, a failure in reality.

The interaction between politicians and the most senior public servant, Permanent Secretary or Director General, became increasingly onerous as demands were placed upon the state. The increasing demands as a result of changes to the modern state placed more pressure on politicians and public servants to deliver. Politicians required more of Permanent Secretaries or Directors General and the role of the most senior public servant began to change.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER TWO

PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSFORMATION:

International Perspectives

"(Today)...demands institutions that empower citizens rather than simply serving them" -

Osborne and Gaebler³

The word "transformation" has been attributed different meanings (Vil-Nkomo, 1999: 87). According to Vil-Nkomo (1999:87-88) transformation is not a once-off process or an end to a country's public service problems. Transformation is a long-term process to achieve the best outcomes through approaching issues and problems in fundamentally different ways (ibid). Vil-Nkomo (1999:88) argues that in order to achieve transformation there needs to be a commitment of political, social and economic resources. Reform is incremental change while transformation is a more fundamental change (ibid). Although these notions may seem contradictory, reform is integral to transformation (ibid).

Transformation is therefore a fundamental change in appearance, structure, function, processes and the manner in which activities are undertaken. It is a long-term process of continuous change and improvement. Although the intention of transformation is to

³ Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing Government: How Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming The Public Sector, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley

achieve the best outcome, there may be negative outcomes. Reform is the improvement or amendment of a condition that is unsatisfactory. Although change is the outcome, it is an incrementalist approach rather than a fundamental change. Reform measures such as affirmative action, rightsizing, performance management and budgeting, etc. lend themselves to incremental changes (Vil-Nkomo, 1999:93-94). For example a government may rationalise the public service, but the process may not necessarily change the way in which the public service functions. Reforms may lead to transformation, but transformation requires a paradigm shift in how the public service functions. It may be argued that increasing the diversity of the public service is a reform measure. This may be the case, but if as a consequence, diversity changes a public organisation's appearance as well as the manner in which it functions then the organisation has experienced a fundamental change, that is transformation. The multiplier effect of reforms may result in a transformation of government and their societies (ibid).

Transformation and reform of the public service is not a new phenomenon as many countries, in particular the United States of America and Britain, have attempted to align its public service with the evolving and changing role of the state. Whether it is the onset or end of war, the collapse of communism, the demands of the populace, the development and crisis of the welfare state, economic imperatives, decentralisation or the introduction of technology, states face the challenge of adapting to these dynamic factors.

According to Massey (1993:2) these dynamic changes emanated from technological innovation, public pressure to redefine the role of the state, the development of

supranational institutions and rapid global economic advances. Hughes (1998: 8-19) largely agrees with this analysis as the imperatives that necessitated change in the public sector. Technological advances improved information services which enabled global trading, the decentralisation of hierarchical organisational structures, a reduction in time and other resources, and the ability to share information more efficiently (ibid). However, government could not keep abreast of these developments. As Osborne and Gaebler (1992:12) noted, government does not function well in the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990's.

Government was also criticised for being too large and wasteful. Many politicians began to articulate these sentiments in their election campaigns during the 1980's and 1990's. These criticisms were also levelled not only at the scale of government but also the scope of government activities, that is government was involved in too many activities and not doing any of these activities particularly well (Hughes, 1998:9). The methods and processes that government used to conduct activities were increasingly being seen as inefficient and ineffective. The world was also facing demographic and environmental changes. Government in any country faces the dilemma of unlimited needs with limited resources. The pressure on the welfare state was fast becoming an issue that appeared on policy agendas. In the modern welfare state this pressure was increasing with the poor, young and aged demanding the delivery of quality social services, jobs and welfare entitlements. An imperative to change was the increasing globalisation of world economies. This required countries to become more efficient and competitive. According to Porter (1990:625-626) there is a link between the quality of public service delivery and

national economic performance. It stands to reason that the quality of education and training, health of a workforce, efficiency of tax administration and the enabling environment for entrepreneurs increases a country's competitiveness on the global market. According to Rockman (1998:22) the modern welfare states began to realise that they were deeply mortgaged and unless there was some intervention these states faced deficits, which ultimately affected their competitiveness. The modern welfare states therefore had to continually find ways of doing more with less⁴. The response has been the elimination of waste, a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, the cutting of welfare programs such as the American Assistance to Dependent Children, privatising public services and generally transforming the public service so that it became more efficient.

According to Wessels (2000:311-312) the broad pressures on the state and public servants that have resulted in a re-examination of the role of the state and policies can be summarised as follows:

1. The growth of the world population especially in developing countries.
2. The rapid urbanisation of the population, related to the population growth, will affect the delivery of services.
3. Industrialisation has resulted in amongst other things, environmental degradation.
4. Technological developments which impact on job security and economic activity.
5. National economies have become more integrated into global markets with the emphasis on competition which has resulted in unemployment, poverty and changes in domestic economic policies.

⁴ President William (Bill) Clinton of the United States of America during the federal government re-inventing process used the term "doing more with less".

6. The threat of new epidemics such as HIV/AIDS has compelled government to adopt new methods of health care.
7. War and social instability continue which impact upon the global market and require government to find solutions.

According to Wessels (2000:313) these factors indicate the enormity and variety of changes that confront the modern state and public servants. Thus, many countries, in an attempt to confront these challenges have begun to re-assess the capacity of the public service to deliver services in an increasingly complex environment. The movement of reforming, transforming or re-inventing government has attempted to transcend the traditional model of public administration. As the demands on the modern state began to increase, the traditional model became increasingly anachronistic. The traditional model was seen as rigid, rule-bound and more concerned with the execution of a function according to a rule, which may or may not be rational, than the outcomes of the rule. The hierarchical arrangement also resulted in impersonal relations, blind obedience to authority, a lack of accountability and responsiveness, red tape, diffusion of responsibility, and secrecy.

Literature describing the problems of the traditional model of bureaucracy is numerous. Herbert Simon in 1945 began to question the generally accepted principles of administration. According to Simon (1957:20-21) these principles were:

1. Administrative efficiency is increased by a specialisation of tasks among a group of individuals.

2. Administrative efficiency is increased by arranging the members of the group in a hierarchy of authority.
3. Administrative efficiency is increased by limiting the span of control at any point in the hierarchy to a smaller number of individuals.
4. Administrative efficiency is increased by grouping individuals for the purpose of control according to (a) purpose, (b) process, (c) clientele or (d) place.

Simon (1957:21) criticised the administrative principles as contradictory and ambiguous. According to Simon (1957:22) the principle of specialisation, that is different persons are doing different things according to their expertise, contradicts the second principle of unity of command. In other words if an organisation consists of individuals doing specialised work and those individuals receive inputs from other specialists workers, which specialist's authority does an individual follow? For example, a worker that deals with machines and certain materials receives these as inputs from other specialised areas in the organisation, then there exists a contradiction as there is no unity of command because the worker is commanded by various specialised divisions within the organisation (Simon, 1957:22-23). Furthermore, decisions of an individual at any point in the administrative hierarchy requires expertise in more than one area of knowledge which contradicts the principle of specialisation (Simon, 1957:23).

The third administrative principle, span of control, also presents a dilemma. A large organisation with a number of interrelations inevitably produces red-tape because each decision among organisational members is carried up the hierarchy until a common

superior is found (Simon, 1957:28). In other words decisions that are carried up the hierarchy will involve several levels of officials making decisions which then have to be carried down again in the form of orders and instructions (ibid). This cumbersome and time-consuming process does not advance the principle of efficiency (ibid).

The last administrative principle of organising individuals according to (a) purpose, (b) process, (c) clientele or (d) place to advance efficiency is also contradictory (ibid). Simon (1957:30) defines purpose as the objective or end for which an activity is carried out, and process as a means to accomplish the purpose. The first dilemma is that an organisation may have a multiplicity of purposes which may not be within its area specialisation (ibid). For example, a health department's purpose may involve health education to prevent diseases, but education is a department of education's specialisation and purpose (Simon, 1957:29). The second dilemma is that if both organisations have the same purpose then the process is duplicated which does not enhance the principle of efficiency (Simon, 1957:31). In other words if both the health and education departments embarked upon health education this would not only result in duplication, but also raises another dilemma of which organisation is best suited to achieve the purpose (Simon, 1957:34). The last dilemma is that if an organisation is situated within a particular place then it is only the clientele within that geographic area that is served (Simon, 1957:32). The dilemma is such that organising according to purpose, process and place is at the sacrifice of clientele (Simon, 1957:28, 32). Simon (1957:32) illustrates this inefficiency by using the following example: a department of health providing medical services to children in area X might be considered to be (a) an "area" organisation because it is providing a

service within a particular area, (b) a “clientele” organisation because it is providing services to a particular section of society, and (c) a “purpose” and “process” organisation if it were part of the education department. Simon (1957:28) therefore argues that “purpose”, “process”, “clientele” and “place” are inconsistent and competing bases of an organisation, for any advantage given to three principles must be sacrificed to the advantage of the fourth principle. Even if an organisation had a consistent “purpose” and “process”, and served a particular “area” and “clientele” the organisation would be so specialised that it would not enhance efficiency.

However, Simon (1957:39) argues that if efficiency is the attempt to rationally maximise the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce resources, then there will always be limitations to administration. An individual in an organisation has limitations in terms of his or her ability to perform and to make the correct decisions (*ibid*). According to Simon (1957:39-40) if an organisation can remove these limitations then the organisation approaches its goal of maximum efficiency. However, individuals are always limited in terms of skill, values and knowledge (*ibid*). Therefore, there are always “limits to rationality” and the achievement of the principles of administration (Simon, 1957:40).

Knott and Miller (1987) also examined dysfunction that occurs in bureaucracies. According to Knott and Miller (1987:171) bureaucratic dysfunction occurs in two ways; that is individual cognitive limitations, and rational individuals but irrational structures. The first explanation of cognitive limitations borrows from Simon’s theory of “limits to rationality”. The theory is based on the premise that individuals are confronted with

various uncertainties and make decisions based upon their limitations and organisational constraints. The bureaucrat, faced with these limitations, will make a choice which may not be the optimal decision. The organisational constraints may be due to limited resources or the culture of standard operating procedures that the bureaucrat has become accustomed to (Knott and Miller, 1987:172). The standard operating procedures determine the sequence of attention and how the problem is analysed (ibid). The culture of following standard operating procedures interacts with the individual's trained incapacity (ibid). The interaction results in bureaucrats learning to manage problems in a particular way and learning a new paradigm or managing a problem in a different or creative way becomes displaced (ibid). The result is goal displacement where a bureaucrat accepts the culture of the organisation and its standard operating procedures, and will not rethink the system given the bureaucrat's limited rationality and trained incapacity (ibid). The organisational culture therefore becomes true for the bureaucrat and he or she does not question the system nor has the capacity to do so. Knott and Miller (1987:173) believe that the first explanation of bureaucratic dysfunction is that the culture guides the bureaucrat to make wrong decisions. These bureaucrats in a sense receive training (whether through experience or actual training) which facilitates incapacity and encourages uncritical thinking of the problem. Trained incapacity therefore limits these bureaucrats' cognitive ability to discern between rational choices.

Knott and Miller's (1987) second explanation is that individuals may be rational but that the organisational structure limits their rationality. In other words organisational rules limit incentives that shape the behaviour of somewhat rational individuals (Knott and

Miller, 1987:173). The bureaucrat is rational in the pursuit of his or her goals and works within the limited organisational system to secure his or her interest (Knott and Miller, 1987:174). The consequence of this is that organisational culture creates bureaucratic dysfunction where the bureaucrat serves his or her self-interest at the expense of the organisation (ibid). In the previous explanation of bureaucratic dysfunction, the bureaucrat would merely follow standard operating procedures because he or she does not know any better, whereas the rational bureaucrat will work within the standard operating procedures and use the rule-following behaviour to further his or her own interests.

According to Kissinger (1971:26) most bureaucracies devise standard operating procedures to cope with problems which it handles routinely, but bureaucracies become an obstacle to change when what is defined as routine does not address a problem or when its *modus operandi* becomes irrelevant to the problem. Bureaucracies tend to follow directives of the top echelons of a hierarchy and are more concerned with what is expected of them than actually solving the problem (ibid). The preoccupation of following orders, rules and procedures displaces the bureaucracy from actually defining the purpose and solving the problem (Kissinger, 1971:27). Bureaucracies are therefore more concerned with fulfilling a rule or policy mandate than actually questioning the merit of the rule or policy decision (ibid). Certainty and adherence is therefore purchased at the cost of creative problem solving (ibid). According to Kissinger (1971:27), in societies where the bureaucracy is based on an ideology (as in the case of the South

African apartheid state) a doctrine is institutionalised and exegesis takes the place of innovation (ibid).

Internationally, many political leaders won election campaigns on the ticket of reforming government. Margaret Thatcher's 1979, 1983 and 1987 election campaigns sought to reform the public service. In the run up to her 1979 election and throughout her eleven years in office she consulted Leslie Chapman who published the book *Your Disobedient Servants* in 1978 (Duggett, 1997:10). Chapman's public service career spanned three decades. His book not only demystified the British public service, but also severely criticised the government for waste and the inability to deliver services effectively and efficiently (ibid). The BBC television series *Yes Minister* was partially based on his book (ibid). Margaret Thatcher together with a dynamic team of academics, political loyalists, and private and public sector experts began to reform the Whitehall establishment. Stephenson (1980:29-30) described this impact as "...the biggest jolt that the Civil Service had experience in living memory... For a while the whole Whitehall system almost visibly juddered...It was a cultural shock."

In 1987 Margaret Thatcher initiated a watershed programme for improving management in the British public service. She requested Sir Robin Ibbs, head of the Efficiency Unit, to evaluate what had been achieved in terms of public service reform and what would be the next steps to take in order to ensure continual improvement. The findings were published in February of 1988 and became known as the *Next Steps* Report. The findings can be summarised as follows:

1. Ninety-five percent of the public service was delivering services and the management changes were viewed as positive,
2. Senior management was dominated by policy personnel that had little experience of service delivery,
3. Senior public servants were ruled by ministerial and parliamentary pressures,
4. Ministers were overloaded and inexperienced in terms of management,
5. Departments focused on activities rather than service delivery results,
6. There were insufficient incentives to improve performance, and
7. The public service was too large and diverse to manage effectively (Efficiency Unit, 1988).

Thatcher then appointed a Minister for the Office of the Civil Service assisted by a Permanent Secretary. They embarked upon the Next Steps Project which would ask each department the following questions:

1. Does the work or activity need to be done at all?
2. Could it be done in the private sector?
3. Could it be done by the private sector under contract?
4. If it is to be done by government, can it be separated from policy function?
5. Is there already a degree of autonomy between various functions in departments in order to establish agencies based upon a particular activity? (Duggett, 1997:16)

Positive responses to these questions indicated whether the department was viable or not.

The Next Steps project team would then develop a framework that defined the

relationship between departments and their agencies (ibid). Thatcher in effect streamlined the British public service according to the necessity of function with defined activities. Thatcher's legacy was the reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, providing value-for-money to taxpayers, stemming inflationary public spending, privatising public services, implementing the best experiences from the private sector, and introducing management and efficiency into the public service (Duggett, 1997:11). Prime Minister John Major continued with the *Next Step* programme and expanded upon the reform process by introducing a *Citizen's Charter* in 1991. John Major wanted to increase public service responsiveness and accountability to the public. Each agency had to function according to a set of guiding principles with the chief executive officers of agencies under contract with Ministers to meet performance standards. The principles for the *Citizen Charter* included:

1. Standards that were set in order to monitor and publish what citizens could expect in terms of service,
2. Openness in order to disclose full and accurate information on how services were delivered, how much it would cost, and who was responsible for delivery of services,
3. Choice of services in consultation with those who receive the service,
4. Courtesy and helpfulness to all citizens, who were to be treated as customers,
5. Putting things right where services did not meet the standard and apologies for mistakes, and procedures for complaints, and
6. Value for money in terms of efficient delivery of services within affordable resources and validation of performance against set standards (Duggett, 1997:18).

After two decades of public service reform in Britain most scholars of public administration agree that the British public service has experienced a change from a bureaucratic, rule-bound culture to one that encompasses private sector notions of customer responsiveness and business-style management for efficient and effective delivery of services.

Similarly, in the United States the federal government underwent a change in the manner in which it delivered services. President Clinton during his election campaign announced that “the era of big government is over.” The election of President Clinton in 1992 saw Vice-President Gore embark upon a program of re-inventing the United States federal government. Although the problem with the USA federal government appeared manifold, the main problems were over-regulation and red tape. In order to avoid maladministration, nepotism and unlawful employment practices there were more than 100 000 pages of personnel rules and regulations defining in detail how to hire, promote, or fire federal employees (Gore, 1993:1). The USA government also created procurement processes that required various time-consuming authorisations to ensure that employees or private companies did not engage in corruption (ibid). There was also a large amount of regulations that dictated precisely how much could be spent, which was meant to ensure that tax dollars were used for approved purposes (ibid). State and local government were also regulated in terms of how they could use federal funding even to the point of detailing how to run programs (ibid).

Clinton and Gore borrowed their reformist ideas from David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's (1992) book, *Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector*. The main thesis of the book was the possibility of transforming the public sector from a rule-bound and outmoded bureaucracy to a result-orientated, market-orientated, mission-focused and competitive organisation that responds to the needs of "customers", that is the public. Osborne and Gaebler's definitive book marked a new paradigm in public administration and management. It was a break from the traditional approach of public administration theory, as well as being descriptive and prescriptive of how to enhance public sector performance. Osborne became a special advisor to what is now known as the *National Performance Review* initiative. Osborne (1993:264) in the first National Performance Review Report stated that "...to change basic behaviour within the federal government, we must change the basic incentives that shape the behaviour. We must create a new set of dynamics through the use of competition, the measurement of results, the decentralisation of authority, and the creation of real consequences for success and failure."

The USA public sector reform strategy had one goal which was to shift systems that held people accountable for process, to systems that held people accountable for results (Gore, 1993:3). The reinvention of the USA federal government focused on six steps:

1. Streamline the budget process by reducing restrictions and waste,
2. Decentralise personnel policy,
3. Develop an efficient procurement process,
4. Re-orientate the role of Inspectors General to ensure improved performance,

5. Reduce the amount of regulations, and
6. Empower state and local government (Gore, 1993:3).

President Clinton embarked upon a budget process that set broad policy priorities and then allocated funds to each agency by function. The main purpose of this was to realign the budget with policy objectives and function rather than focus the budget on process issues. The other initiative in terms of the budget was to institute biennial budgets and appropriation to facilitate planning (Gore, 1993:5). President Clinton also instructed departments, agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to minimise budget restrictions (*ibid*). The aim of decentralising personnel policy stemmed from the belief that managers of departments and agencies knew what skills and personnel were needed for certain jobs. President Clinton therefore instructed the Office of Personnel Management to deregulate the selection and employment of personnel (*ibid*). He also requested that Congress pass legislation that would give departments and agencies the authority to conduct their own recruitment, selection and examining of positions, reduce the time required to terminate employment as well as simplify the pay classification system (Gore, 1993:6). Agencies were also allowed to design their own performance management and reward system with the objective of improving individual and organisational performance (*ibid*). The Clinton administration streamlined the procurement procedures by rewriting regulations from rigid rules to guiding principles, improved information technology, increased the purchase of commercial products instead of products designed to government specifications, and updated federal procurement laws (Gore, 1993:8). Inspectors General were seen as agents for change in the USA federal

government. President Clinton sought to broaden their role from strictly auditing departments and agencies to evaluating the management of goods and services (Gore, 1993:10). The elimination of regulations was to be achieved through an internal review of government regulations over three years with the goal of eliminating 50% of the regulations (ibid). Agencies were also requested to co-ordinate the reduction of unnecessary red tape and establish a process by which agencies could obtain exemptions from certain regulations.

Internationally, the reform and transformation of the public service and the new public management paradigm have a number of common principles:

1. An emphasis on management skills to complement policy skills,
2. A shift from bureaucratic reliance on rules and inputs to quantifiable output measures and performance targets,
3. The decentralisation of management and development of new systems of reporting and monitoring,
4. A preference for privatisation,
5. The separation of large hierarchical bureaucratic structures into more flat semi-autonomous divisions,
6. The incorporation of private sector management practices such as strategic planning, mission statements and performance contracts, and
7. A preference for efficiency and cost-saving (Kamensky, 1996:251).

Pollitt (1998:53) argues that there are a number of assumptions surrounding the new public management paradigm. The first assumption is that there is a proven body of evidence that private sector management principles can bring about desirable changes in the public sector (ibid). The second assumption is that efficiency in terms of the input-output ratio is also a desirable state (ibid). However, in government there are other criteria to consider, such as equity and intended or unintended policy outcomes. The third assumption is that flexibility allows for efficiency and responsiveness to the “customers” needs (Pollitt, 1998:54). However, there has been no study on the correlation between flexibility and efficiency. In fact, Pollitt (ibid) argues that the move from rule-bound management to more “flexible” management has resulted in uncertainty, weakening of job tenure and working unsociable hours. Pollitt (ibid) also takes issue with the frequent use of the term “customers” to define members of the public. This once again incorporates the private sector idea of responsiveness and accountability in order to remain competitive. Pollitt (1998:55) argues that supermarket shoppers are not quite the same as members of the public who “consume” social security benefits as the public sector agency responsible for this function has the monopoly in the provision of this service. Pollitt (1998:55) also criticises “quality” rhetoric, which he argues gives a greater emphasis on procedural rather than substantive issues. An example of this point is the concern for outputs, that is whether an income-support beneficiary’s claim is dealt with within a few days (as opposed to months), rather than outcome concerns, that is whether the beneficiary can live a decent (quality) life from the stipend (ibid).

Other countries within the Commonwealth such as Australia and New Zealand have also borrowed from the British and American experience. However, Africa's public service reform process is complex and has to be analysed on a case study basis, but common elements are evident. Countries in Africa followed the traditional model of public administration. Colonial governments used bureaucratic means to administer and often subjugate colonies. Bureaucracies often consisted of indigenous public servants at the lower levels of the public service to interact with the general population, while the senior positions in the colonial public service remained the domain of expatriates or public servants from the colonial countries (Hughes, 1998:209). Colonial powers transplanted their form of administration during colonialism. In post-colonial Africa the legacy of the colonial administration continued. This was partly due to inertia, no administrative alternative and a lack of skills. Public servants who were skilled, were usually trained in the former colonial country. During the transition to independence most senior public servants returned to the colonial home country, retired from service, some remained, and/or lower level public servants trained by the colonial power became senior public servants because of the skill vacuum. According to Ankomah (as cited in Mokgoro, 1989:2) the colonial public service system of governance remained largely unchanged because:

1. Bureaucrats who occupied senior positions in post-colonial Africa were selected, groomed, trained, socialised and assimilated in the culture of the colonial powers, and
2. Departing colonial governments systematically manipulated the public service to strengthen the power of these bureaucrats in order to maintain colonial interests in the independent states.

In post-colonial Africa most countries adopted an interventionist approach in the economy to address poverty and the inequalities of the colonial legacy. As the World Bank (1997:23) argued:

“The new interventionist credo had its counterpart in the development strategy of the day, adopted by many developing countries at independence, which emphasised the prevalence of market failures and accorded the state a central role in correcting them. Centralised planning, corrective interventions in resource allocation, and a heavy state hand in infant-industry development were part and parcel of this strategy.”

In order for the state to play such an interventionist role it needed the bureaucracy to implement development and interventionist policies. Bureaucracies therefore began to play an increasingly active role in post-colonial Africa. The problem was that independent states were trying to implement development policies using a colonial public service system of governance. The pervasive colonial culture inhibited the implementation of development policies. The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians was marked by mistrust, hostility and a lack of mutual co-operation (Mokgoro, 1989:1). The problem was exacerbated as bureaucrats were the sole source of expertise and would dominate politicians (Hughes, 1998:210). In addition to this problem, post-colonial political systems were weak and ill equipped for the role of politicians as policy makers. As Smith (as cited in Hughes, 1998:210) argues, the common feature of post-colonial countries was that the bureaucracy was more developed than the legislature,

political parties and other bodies which could maintain control and accountability of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy grew in size, scope and importance without political constraint and public accountability. For example, public employment accounted for over 50 percent of non-agricultural jobs in Africa and in 1986 the wage bill for Guinea's public servants accounted for 50 percent of total expenditure (Hughes, 1998:208). In independent states the separation of politics and administration was lacking due to the under-development of the political system and reliance on the bureaucracy (Hughes, 1998:210). Hughes (ibid) argues that most independent states were governed by bureaucracy. Bureaucracies were the sole employer of professional experts trained in former colonial countries, increasing in size and scope to administer interventionist and development policies, imposing their expertise in policy formulation above a weak political system, becoming elitist and a ruling class unto themselves (Hughes, 1998:210-211). As Smith (as cited in Hughes, 1998:211) argues:

"Development planning has consequently tended to be highly centralised, technocratic and of top down variety, where experts at the top make the decisions about what the masses need in terms of programmes of development... This feature of the bureaucracy reflects the concept of a specially recruited group appointed on the basis of merit to produce rational and efficient methods of working. A system of recruitment that admits only those that can demonstrate the required level of expertise and competence is bound to produce organisations which lay politicians find it difficult to dominate."

The result was a powerful bureaucracy; an elite group that dominated the administrative system of governance and the consequence of corruption, nepotism and patronage were evident. By the 1980's there was a recognition that "...development failures and disappointments were now seen not simply as a result of inappropriate policy choices but also because state institutions were performing poorly" (World Bank, 1997:105).

Reforms of the bureaucracy were initiated by the demands of donor agencies or structural adjustment programs, which were invariably borrowed from developed countries' public service reform experiences. Developed countries' reform experiences were exported on a global scale and are evident in many developing countries. Kaul (1997) adds credence to this argument by stating that many developing countries have the salient reform features of the more developed countries within the Commonwealth. According to Kaul, (1997:22-24) the Commonwealth public service reform process has a number of common themes, which include:

1. Redefining the political and administrative interface

Countries sought to clarify the roles between political policy makers and administrative policy implementation in order to distinguish between strategic policy objectives and operational processes.

2. Selection of appropriate reform options

Countries evaluated various options from the private sector and other countries to select the best practice. Countries therefore hoped that similar perceived success would occur in their country.

3. Emphasis on accountability

Countries sought to increase accountability to the public by initiating performance measurement, devolution of resource control, improving monitoring and evaluation techniques, clarifying incentives, and aligning functions with strategic objectives.

4. Building private and public sector partnerships

Countries incorporated the private sector into the public sector transformation by learning from successes, management practices, and responsive culture to customers as well as outsourcing and privatising various public sector activities.

5. Emphasis on efficiency

Countries realised that inefficiencies within government resulted in a hindrance to national productivity and development. The emphasis was therefore placed on the public service to achieve developmental priorities.

6. Review of traditional personnel policies

Countries had to review personnel policies to audit the total number of staff, costs and skills in order to develop and initiate reforms.

7. Effort to reduce corruption

Although corruption exists in all countries, there was a particular concern that corruption was more endemic in African countries and that it was an impediment to development. Some countries therefore sought to reduce corruption through various reform initiatives.

8. Effort to change public sector values

Countries attempted to instil in public servants the value of quality services, commitment to their job and serving the public, problem solving, reducing waste and

corruption, and the view that citizens should be regarded as customers of a public service.

Case studies of public service reform in both Anglophone and Francophone Africa are worth summarising to illustrate the complexities of reforms that face various countries in Africa.

Case Study 1: Public Service Reform in Uganda

Since independence in 1962, Uganda has faced dramatic changes from civil rule to military rule, dictatorships, civil war and democracy. Likewise its public service has faced dynamic changes as well. Uganda, under its new dispensation, recognised the need to reform and established the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP). Uganda has shown some successes based on ten factors:

1. The degree to which reforms are 'home-grown', that is the involvement of people from grassroots level in identifying public service problems and becoming stakeholders in setting the reform agenda. Although this may seem an insurmountable task, Uganda established a Public Service Review and Reorganisation Commission (PSRRC) which polled thousands of people about their views before issuing recommendations for public service reform.
2. The degree to which government is willing to take an active part in an innovative and adaptive process. Uganda pioneered several changes and policy instruments for advancing policy formulation leading to improvements in service delivery.

3. The strength and sustainability of support from top policy makers reflects the depth of commitment of Uganda's political leadership which is crucial to enduring successes and initiatives. There was a recognition that bottom-up strategies will only work if leaders make a concerted effort to take the recommendations seriously and initiate appropriate policy instruments.
4. The extent of consensus about the vision of reform and its implementation is imperative so that Ugandans are not only in agreement about problems, but also solutions. The vision outlined the future role of the public service and was developed from the 255 specific recommendations made by the PSRRC.
5. The extent of synergy among reform programmes is essential for success so that each programme compliments the other. This required Uganda to co-ordinate its public service, decentralisation, privatisation, constitutional and economic reform programmes.
6. The introduction of a minimum living wage for public servants introduced equity into the Ugandan public service, but also helped to communicate the government's commitment to improving employment conditions in the public service and improve service delivery.
7. Service delivery orientation placed an emphasis on results and the commitment to improving service through designing and monitoring the implementation of programmes.
8. The ability to enhance ethics, accountability and transparency by establishing a Code of Conduct and Discipline, political leadership commitment and the Anti-Corruption

Programme has been the first step for Uganda in achieving a professional public service.

9. The co-ordination of donor support.
10. The clarity regarding the desired role of the state was articulated in a vision which became policy objectives.

(case study source: Langseth, 1995:365-390)

Case Study 2: Public Service Reform in Cote d'Ivoire

Since independence in 1960 Cote d'Ivoire has undertaken a number of changes to its public service. Cote d'Ivoire embarked upon a development strategy in the 1960's to the 1980's with the introduction of five-year plans and with each plan attempting to improve upon the development administration of the past. However there were a number of constraints namely the colonial heritage, financial limitations, cultural factors, poorly formulated development policies, and demographic factors. Cote d'Ivoire's public service reform has been a continuous process. However, the co-ordination of government activities and reforms has not been systematic. Budgetary considerations have played a key role in determining decisions and have overshadowed other dimensions of reform such as equity, institutional, psychological and service delivery considerations (Hibault, 1996:95). The emphasis on budgetary consideration and fiscal discipline is a result of international donor and/or banking institutions' influence on Cote d'Ivoire's reform programmes, most notably its five-year plans. For example the International Monetary Fund 1984 agreement stipulated the following:

1. Halting public sector recruitment,

2. Freezing public sector salaries, promotions and replacement of retired staff,
3. Reducing technical staff, and
4. Conducting a census of the public service.

There has also been a lack of a strong political environment to articulate the needs of the populace. This has affected the framework for public service reform as there is no clear vision or strategy for reform. This has also contributed to the lack of co-ordination between various institutions and some ministries have carried out their version of reforms unilaterally (Hibault, 1996:101). After years of public service reform programmes and five-year plans, Cote d'Ivoire still needs to develop a coherent strategy to transform its public service, but "at present numerous constraints show limitations of mode of thinking and strategies so far adopted" (Hibault, 1996: 102).

(case study source: Hibault, 1996: 79-102).

A number of problems arose when transplanting reform initiatives from developed countries which were inevitably former colonial powers. Firstly, public sector reforms were based on market principles. Developing countries had little experience in market principles let alone the development of open markets and the required reduction of government (Hughes, 1998:220). Markets are ineffective without the rule of law, which bureaucrats, the most threatened by reforms, were responsible for implementing. Secondly, the privatisation of state enterprises inevitably saw foreign investors buying the enterprise with the inherited problems of administrative incapacity (ibid). Thirdly, the bureaucratic elite still maintained control of the reforms since they had the monopoly of

expertise. Fourthly, the opening of markets that were under-developed, saw corruption becoming endemic (ibid). In short, developing countries are beset with problems and it will take more than just the reforms, borrowed from developed countries, to address its socio-economic problems.

In evaluating the public sector reform and transformation initiatives of various governments over the past fifteen years, Savoie (1998:394) concluded that reforms are essentially political and social experiments which makes the measurement of success subject to multiple and conflicting interpretations. Perceptions of reforms are largely a function of partisan or organisational politics. Individuals whose interests are hampered by reform are likely to perceive the initiatives as ineffective and seek evidence to prove their point (Savoie, 1998:396). Those whose interests (whether political or self-interest) are enhanced, are likely to view reforms as positive (ibid). Even defining what success is in government proves to be problematic. At one level success could be measured by the implementation of a reform strategy and whether the strategy met its stated purpose (ibid). However, reformers do not necessarily have a clear idea of reform objectives. There are often unintended outcomes of reforms and the intangibility of some government services does not lend itself well to measurement. Thus it is difficult to assess whether there has been any improvement in the quality of the service. Savoie (1998:397) believes that successful reforms start by generating action and instilling in organisational members that the status quo is anachronistic. This may lead to a change in organisational culture, but reformers have to realise that transformation is a long-term process and should not be dependent on political agendas and calendars. Reform that is

dependent on political agendas rather than a commitment to transformation will result in a perception that the reforms are political rhetoric. One of the reasons for the British and American reform success is the commitment by leadership and the longevity of both Thatcher and Clinton's terms of office. The long-term commitment of reform in itself makes the measurement of success difficult. One reform initiative may lead to another or may have spillover effects on other initiatives. On the one hand reforms may have appeared to have failed, yet on the other hand the reform may have given impetus to another or may have become institutionalised and thus appear to be accepted government operations (Savoie, 1998:399). The other problem of classifying public sector reform successes is that what might be successful in one country may not be successful in another. In fact this highlights a development of public sector reform, that is countries are borrowing various initiatives from countries that are perceived to be successful in public sector reform without attempting to develop their own initiatives based on their local experiences. South Africa is no exception to shopping for public sector panacea reforms. In July and October of 1997 the South African Ministry and Department for Public Service and Administration undertook study tours to Britain, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia. What is quite remarkable is that the South African White Paper on the Transformation of Service Delivery (*Batho Pele*) is identical to Britain's Citizen Charter and the new management framework for the South African public service is similar to the British and New Zealand model.

Governments over the past fifteen years have implemented reforms to improve performance in response to internal and external pressures. The demands for efficient and

effective delivery of quality services within a global economy require fundamental changes, which cannot be rapidly achieved because the demands involve institutional and cultural changes (The World Bank, 1997:13). Institutional transformation involves far-reaching changes in the manner in which government functions and makes decisions, and often requires an overhaul of long established systems (ibid). It requires the formulation of good policies and capable public institutions to implement the policies in order for countries to develop (ibid). Comprehensive reforms and ultimately transformation therefore takes time, considerable effort and political will, and successes may vary from country to country.

Public sector reforms and transformation initiatives have affected the administrative heads of government in a number of ways. Firstly, there has been an increase in the focus on results (Larson and Coe, 1999:23). There has been a realisation by the public and politicians that government can spend large amounts of money without having any results to show for it (ibid). Thus, there is a pressure on government to deliver value for money and quality services (ibid). Secondly, power has been dispersed by separating policy from service delivery through the increased use of public-private sector partnerships, decentralised agencies, and contracting out (Larson and Coe, 1999:24). As a result the Permanent Secretary's power has been dispersed to various levels of government (local, provincial or regional), various organisations (private and non-governmental sectors) and even to international agencies (donor agencies) (ibid).

Thirdly, issues are more interrelated and do not fit within one government department (ibid). The demands placed on the modern state require solutions to be co-ordinated

between more than one department (ibid). Permanent Secretaries must therefore find new and horizontal ways of identifying interrelated problems and finding common solutions (ibid). Fourthly, decision making has become globalised which has resulted in political and practical problems for both politicians and Permanent Secretaries (ibid). International organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, regional trading blocs, and transnational partnerships are slowly limiting independent options for each country (ibid). This places pressure on Permanent Secretaries to keep abreast of global issues and provide policy options within this global context (ibid). Fifthly, government is under increased public scrutiny which has placed pressure on Permanent Secretaries to comply with the demands for public information, transparency and public consultation (ibid). Lastly, there has been an increased focus on economic development (Larson and Coe, 1999:26). The era in which the state was seen as the principal lever of economic development has yielded to one in which the role of the state is to create the conditions for economic development (ibid). Thus with fewer resources at the state's disposal, the state has had to focus on "steering" rather than "rowing" (ibid). The implications for the Permanent Secretary is that his or her role as policy advisor has become more complicated, and the role as administrative head of a government department is more complex and onerous (Larson and Coe, 1999:27-34).

Permanent Secretaries in terms of their policy role have to take a broader view of issues facing society with the increasing demands and pressures. Permanent Secretaries are now obliged to consult more widely with various organisations before formulating policy (Larson and Coe, 1999:27). Permanent Secretaries now have to adopt a systems approach

administrative heads of departments (ibid). This requires a high degree of involvement and delegation of management processes, and the ability to motivate and develop staff (Larson and Coe, 1999:33). As managers of government departments, Permanent Secretaries historically sat at the apex of the organisational pyramid with departments hierarchical in culture and autonomous from other departments (ibid). Departments were vertical “silos,” but now problems cannot be contained within one department (ibid). Permanent Secretaries are now obliged to develop linkages between departments and co-ordinate solutions to these problems (ibid).

The modern state is shifting from the traditional model of public administration to find innovative, efficient and effective ways to deliver quality services in order to compete in the global market. This has resulted in a number of reforms and new models of public management. The result is that senior public servants are expected to change concurrently with numerous demands being placed upon them. They are now expected to not only implement reforms but are also recipients of reforms. Thus, according to Larson and Coe (1999) the role of the most senior public servant is changing. To embark upon an analysis of the role of most senior public servant in South Africa, the Director General, one first has to discuss the changes that has occurred in the South African state, the imperatives for public service transformation and the impact these changes have had on the Director General.

CHAPTER THREE

INSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE:

Apartheid's Public Service

"The relationship between South Africa's political and administrative elite's is signally influenced by similarities in their socio-cultural and value characteristics."

- Robert Schrire⁵

A discussion of the impact of reforms and transformation initiatives on the role of the Director General, needs to be understood within the apartheid and post-apartheid context. Thus, to embark upon an analysis of the impact of reforms and transformation on the role of the Director General, the culture of the apartheid public service needs to be understood. The following chapter therefore provides a context for understanding the role of the Director General within the apartheid public service and political context. This chapter also provides an understanding of the institutional culture that the post-apartheid dispensation inherited and the need for transformation. The apartheid public service therefore deserves analysis.

⁵ Schrire, R. (1989) "Bureaucracy and the process of Reform" in Critical Choices for South African Society, No. 11, p.p. 1-9

Since the union of South Africa in 1910 there has been a proliferation of government departments and institutions for various reasons. The growth in government departments was not only due to demographic trends and socio-economic problems, but South Africa's attempt to create welfare opportunities for poor whites and deal with race relations. The government of 1924 focused on using the public service as a sector to provide employment for whites. The preference for and indeed the systematic employment of whites in various sectors became known as the "civilised" labour policies. These policies also included a major effort to train and uplift whites by providing them with the skills for socio-economic mobility. In 1921 there were 4705 unskilled white employees in the state's railway enterprise (Hugo, 1996:221). However, by 1928 the number of white employees had increased to 15 878. In 1910 there were 12 national departments and by 1984 there were 22 national departments with a further 26 departments dealing with Indian, Coloured and African affairs (Hanekom, et al, 1986:221).

The National Party's victory in 1948 saw a more rigorous application of excluding blacks from fully participating in the South African economy and society. Blacks were denied access to education thereby excluding them from more skilled positions, which ultimately restricted blacks to unskilled menial work. Various draconian policies ensured that blacks were trapped in a cycle of poverty and denied human rights while whites were ensured of their socio-economic development. The "colour bar" labour policy, for example, included various restrictions on public and private sectors in order to ensure the employment and advancement of whites, but in particular the Afrikaner. The Afrikaners were regarded as

a poor white problem, often caught between the more educated and enterprising English-speaking population and the cheaper black labour force (Ottaway, 1993:31). The National Party, in addition to excluding blacks from skilled positions in the public and private sectors, also began to systematically reduce the number of white English-speaking South Africans from the public service. The National Party believed that English-speaking South Africans' loyalties were with the British Crown and this was not consistent with the interests of Afrikaner nationalists (Seegers, 1993:477). Evidence of this policy was the early retirement of English-speaking military and police personnel and the increased employment of Afrikaners in the public service (ibid). In 1946 only 29% of Afrikaners were in white-collar employment, 30% were farmers of which many were poor, and 40% had blue-collar jobs, but by 1977 Afrikaners in white-collar jobs had increased to 65% (Ottaway, 1993:31). The per capita income among Afrikaners in 1946 was less than half of English-speaking South Africans, but by 1976 it had increased to over two-thirds (ibid). By 1988, one-third of the white economically active population was employed in the public service with Afrikaners constituting the largest number of public employees (ibid). Thus, according to Ottaway (ibid), the socio-economic advancement of Afrikaners can be attributed to their employment in the public sector. Welsh (cited in Seegers, 1993:478) expresses a similar view that the growth of the Afrikaner middle class was a result of their employment in the public service. Most Afrikaners who entered the commercial or industrial sectors usually had their first employment opportunity in the public service where they received training and necessary skills for further advancement.

The most important consequence of the Afrikanerisation of the public service was the lack of representation of the South African population. The lack of representation of all South Africans in public service would have serious implications for the future. Firstly, the public service was the unresponsive to the needs of the black population. Secondly, a distinct culture of deference and conservatism became entrenched in the public service. Thirdly, the lack of diversity resulted in a public service that did not incorporate innovative and creative ideas for addressing problems. The post-apartheid dispensation was therefore faced with the challenge of increasing diversity in the public service as well as addressing an Afrikaner institutional culture and value system.

Another consequence of systematically employing Afrikaners in the public service is that the public service was not necessarily seen as a civic duty of serving the community, but as an employment opportunity. Understaffing and the lack of skills in the public service were further outcomes of the Afrikanerisation of the public service. By 1950 approximately 15% out of a total of 106 956 public service posts were vacant (Hugo, 1993:220). By 1978 the number of vacant posts reserved for whites continued to increase with a 83% vacancy rate in clerical, 88% in professional and 72% in technical positions (ibid). The government's response to these shortages was various racially exclusive and ineffectual "remedies." These "remedies" included vigorous recruiting, relaxing entry and promotion requirements, intensive training, employing white women on a contract basis, increasing remuneration, raising the retirement age to 65 years, and increasing incentives such as bursary schemes (ibid). These "remedies" of course had spillover effects on the South African society. The government spent an enormous amount of

resources in ensuring a racially exclusive public service. The lowering of entry and promotion requirements affected the quality of public services. The post-apartheid dispensation faced a dilemma of having to increase the diversity of the public service and thereby the staff component to the salary and benefit levels of public servants who served during apartheid. This would result in an increase in the wage bill and overall public expenditure. The post-apartheid dispensation introduced a number of initiatives to address this dilemma which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Another problem for the post-apartheid dispensation was the issue of homelands. It was the racial reasoning of the National Party that the fate of the black population lay in separate development and hence the establishment of homelands and self-governing territories. Although an elaborate discussion of homelands and separate development is not relevant to this research, it should be noted that for the South African democratic dispensation homelands and self-governing territories were an administrative quagmire. The belief that Africans of certain ethnic origin should have their “own” territories gave rise to the creation of homelands with their own administrations. This system was part of the grand apartheid belief in separate development. The system was enforced upon an unwilling African population and was justifiably regarded as illegitimate. Thus, although homelands had their own system of governance and administration, they did not enjoy popular support. By the 1970’s homelands such as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei had become “independent states” while Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdbele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa were “self-governing territories.” These “states” were never recognised by the international community and were seen as an extension of the

apartheid state. Quality of life and service delivery was poor with the economy and system of governance of these “states” dependent on resources transferred from apartheid South Africa. Most inhabitants lived in impoverished conditions.

By 1993 there were approximately 1 187 600 public servants employed in South Africa and these ten “states” (Public Service Commission, 1996:5). There were essentially eleven different administrations (the South African national public service, and ten independent and self-governing administration) that had to be rationalised into one national South African public service. This proved to be a mammoth task that required the rationalisation of structures, systems, procedures, personnel and conditions of service (Public Service Commission, 1996:3-4). The rationalisation process presented a challenge for the post-apartheid dispensation as each of these states and territories had its own body of statutes and legal prescripts regulating its public service. South Africa alone had a multiplicity of laws, all of which had to be reviewed. Each territory and state also had its own personnel systems, terms and conditions of service, Public Service Acts, public service commissions, and structure (ibid). The grading systems for remuneration were also different and in the final year leading to the democratic dispensation, grading systems were manipulated to increase salaries (Public Service Commission, 1996:4). The amalgamation and rationalisation of eleven public services required extensive legal drafting, a comprehensive restructuring of personnel systems, and the establishment of a uniform personnel structure and conditions of service.

The militarisation of the public service during the 1980's also presented a challenge for the democratic dispensation as it had to address a culture of secrecy and authoritarianism. The militarisation of the public service was in response to what the apartheid government perceived as a total onslaught against the state. The apartheid government was a fierce opponent of any form of communism which it viewed as a threat to its political and economic system. The state also believed that the ascendance of a communist black government in South Africa would be the end of the Afrikaner and white supremacy in Africa. The South African government perceived the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) as communists supported by "communist" African countries where they were exiled and sought sanctuary. The ANC, PAC and SACP embarked upon a guerrilla war to destabilise the apartheid state. The South African government responded by embarking on a covert war to the north of its borders to stem the tide of "communism." In 1978 P.W. Botha, the then Minister of Defence, became Prime Minister of South Africa. This heralded a major reformulation of apartheid policies and the militarisation of the public service.

The militarisation of the public service culminated in the National Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS was a shadow public service system, with a complex and elaborate structure of committees. The NSMS developed out of the security concept of "total strategy" as a response to what was perceived as the total onslaught on South Africa. The total onslaught was a belief that South Africa was confronted by a multi-dimensional threat co-ordinated by South Africa's enemies, that is the exiled ANC,

SACP, PAC, and “communist” states north of South Africa’s borders. The threat was believed to be an attack on South Africa politically, economically and socially. It was therefore the conviction of the government that the threat could only be met with a counter “total strategy.” The 1977 Defence White Paper emphasised the interaction and the interdependence of the military and the public service to counter the total onslaught (De Klerk, 1998:115). The result was a fusion of political, military and public service resources in governance. In effect the Defence Force gave up the role as a neutral guardian of peace and became an active participant in policy. The policy goal of countering the total onslaught and preserving apartheid was therefore to be achieved through military means in conjunction with the public service. The NSMS therefore organised the public service into a security system of committees. The NSMS had a four-fold purpose. Its first purpose was to counter the total onslaught, and in order to achieve this purpose it had to suppress all opposition, co-opt black agents, and contain political resistance (Cape Times, 9/7/1987). It also co-ordinated a “hearts and minds” campaign to improve the social and material conditions in black areas in order to gain legitimacy and undermine community support for opposition organisations (ibid). Its last purpose was to act as an early warning system for anticipating potential problems and dealing with them on a military and material level before the problem erupted into a revolt (ibid).

The NSMS formulated as well as implemented policy from the highest levels of the public service down to local authorities. The NSMS was answerable only to the State Security Council, which was at the apex of the hierarchical NSMS structure. The State Security Council met fortnightly and made policy decisions in conjunction with the

Cabinet and the President (De Klerk, 1998:115-116). The State Security Council consisted of senior Cabinet members, military and security personnel with the President at the helm of the Council (De Klerk, 1998:115-118). Senior public servants of government departments worked within the Cabinet Committees of the NSMS and Work Committee of the State Security Council (Seegers, 1990:110). The Work Committee co-ordinated the activities of the Directors General of government departments and chairmen of other work committees of Cabinet (ibid). Thirteen Interdepartmental Committees of the State Security Council brought together representatives of all government departments at lower levels of the NSMS (ibid). At the regional level there were Joint Management Centres (JMC) which co-ordinated local strategies to deal with security problems (ibid). There were 60 sub-Joint Management Councils, which exerted influence on Regional Service Councils (ibid). Regional Services Councils were authorities that controlled regional areas encompassing smaller local authorities (ibid). At the lowest level there were 448 mini-Joint Management Councils that worked at the level of local authorities (ibid).

P.W. Botha's style of governance resulted in the militarisation and increased centralisation of the public service. The formulation of policy was developed at the top of the hierarchy and based upon security concerns. This resulted in a bureaucratic culture of centralised decision making within committees, secrecy and a belief that "military things are better" (Schrire, 1990:77 and Seegers, 1990:115). The committee style of management was authoritarian in nature with decisions made in committees carrying inordinate weight, especially those decisions made at the top of the NSMS's hierarchy.

Security Council decisions were therefore not questioned, but were followed with blind obedience. The inhibition of free and open debate, reverence to security decisions and deference to leadership played a role in obedience to authority. De Klerk (1998:68) described P.W. Botha as dictatorial and domineering towards Cabinet and committees. P.W. Botha's managerial interventions such as team building exercises resulted in a cohesive and secretive system of committee governance (De Klerk, 1998:69-69). The committee meetings were for the most part secret and lacked transparency even to those within the bureaucracy. The militaristic nature of the public service, with its top-down management style, centralised control and authoritarian management limited, accountability and responsiveness to superiors within the hierarchy of committees.

The South African public service is unique as it experienced systematic political, ideological, military and racial interference. The consequence was a public service that lacked racial representation, was elitist, partisan, militaristic and racially unrepresentative. Thus, the result was (1) policy formulation was the domain of white male Afrikaners who were sympathetic to the National Party, (2), the political-administrative interface and the scope of policy formulation were elitist, and (3) policy formulation was not open to diverse perspectives, but was narrowly defined by Cabinet which included the political and administrative elite (Schrire, 1989:7). Moreover, the separation of powers between legislative and administrative roles of government, and hence the distinction between policy formulation and administrative implementation became blurred. Thus, one can argue that in South Africa during the 1980's a political-administrative dichotomy did not exist.

The scale of policy making and the organisational structure of the public service was hierarchical. The chain of command flowed from the top, and under Botha's style of governance the President, Cabinet and the upper echelon of the public service exercised enormous power over the policy agenda. The hierarchical nature of the public service and military style of management resulted in an authoritarian, rigid and rule-bound bureaucracy responsive to senior public officials rather than the public. In addition to this, information in the public service was tightly controlled (ibid). The hierarchical and secretive nature of the public service therefore created a culture where transparency and accountability to the public were lacking. This culture resulted in considerable inefficiencies and extensive corruption. Another factor that contributed to this culture was the notion that as long as there was loyalty to the National Party ideology and apartheid policies, inefficiencies were tolerated. The relative longevity of a public servant's career, the comfort of security of tenure, acceptance of meritocracy and political conformity resulted in a public service that lacked innovative ideas, had difficulty in adapting to change or even foreseeing the change, and was rigid to the point that it would resist change. The organisational culture of the apartheid public service can therefore be described as hierarchical, authoritarian, uncritical adherence to rules and procedures, and conformist. This culture presented a further challenge for the post-apartheid dispensation in its effort to transform public service into one that was creative, innovative, representative, transparent, professional, efficient and effective in its endeavour to deliver quality services.

According to De Klerk (1998:69), P.W. Botha did much to improve the effectiveness of government and departments, *albeit* for draconian purposes. However, the intrusive role of the security establishment in government became a source of irritation for most Ministers and Directors General (ibid). De Klerk (ibid) stated that he quietly vowed to change the South Africa's system of governance should he ever become President. After De Klerk's inauguration as President in 1989 he restructured Cabinet and began to dismantle the intrusive security establishment in government's daily activities. De Klerk's era was marked by more civil governance and a desire to reform not only government structures, but also the nature of politics in South Africa. In the first months of his presidency De Klerk began to dismantle the powerful structures of the NSMS and attempted to normalise the role of security forces (ibid). On 28 November 1989, De Klerk announced that the NSMS would be dismantled and replaced with more conventional and civil-orientated co-ordinating structures. De Klerk thought it imperative for political transformation and good governance that the role of the security forces be normalised and that the authority of non-security departments be re-established (ibid). De Klerk in fact made personal visits to the security institutions explaining their new role of impartiality and refraining from political involvement (De Klerk, 1998:153). De Klerk received much resistance from the security establishment not only due to their reduced role but for De Klerk's reform initiatives as well (ibid). De Klerk's style of governance was more relaxed with an emphasis on policy reform and political transformation rather than military solutions to South Africa's problems. Roelf Meyer (interview, Cape Town: 15 November 1999) described the De Klerk presidency as a "breath of fresh air...and far more relaxed."

De Klerk also broke with the past not only in terms of presidential style, but with apartheid policies as well. A watershed moment in South Africa's history was on the 2nd February 1990. De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP, the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, and the government's commitment to negotiating with extra-parliamentary opposition for a new political dispensation. The negotiations took place in the forum known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Although the negotiation process is beyond the scope of this research, it is important to note developments that now impact upon the current public service. The most important aspect of the negotiations in terms of the public service was the agreement that all public servants would be granted security of tenure for five years. This agreement became known as the "sunset clause." The importance of this sunset clause cannot be understated. The negotiations had reached a stalemate with many issues unresolved (Philip Dexter, interview, Cape Town: 10 August 2000). In October 1992, Joe Slovo wrote an article in the *African Communist*, which suggested a transitional period of governance as well as security of tenure for public servants during the transitional period (Philip Dexter, interview, Cape Town: 10 August 2000). This proposal opened the door to continued negotiations and the resolution of outstanding issues (ibid). The job guarantee of five years for public servants and security personnel ensured support by white public servants for the National Party (De Klerk, 1998:257). It also ensured continuity and stability of service delivery. However, it was a major concession on the part of the ANC alliance (Philip Dexter, interview, Cape Town:

10 August 2000). Although the sunset clause paved the way for a new constitutional framework, it nonetheless retained an apartheid public service.

Problems with the public service internationally were described in the previous chapter. These problems, such as red-tape and over-regulation, are evident in the South African public service, but are compounded by the fact that the South African public service is reflective of South Africa's history of apartheid and ideological interference. South Africa's democratic dispensation therefore inherited not only a public service with the characteristic problems of rigidity, red-tape and poor performance, but a public service that is accustomed to apartheid and an institutional culture supportive of Afrikaner ideology. The impact of apartheid has created a public service that lacks legitimacy, professionalism, representation, a democratic and development culture, and the capacity to deliver quality services to all South Africans. The challenge for the democratic dispensation is to change the culture of the public service so that it entrenches the democratic principles of the Constitution (1996) and instils in public servants the culture of professionalism and prudence in serving all South Africans.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSFORMATION:

South African Perspective

"It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state's constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries... and because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience." - Niccolo Machiavelli⁶

South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994 marked a watershed moment in the country's long history of struggle. However, the post-apartheid dispensation is fraught with struggles from delivering essential services with limited resources, addressing poverty, promoting development and economic growth, encouraging reconciliation among South Africa's diverse population, to transforming the institution responsible for these functions, the public service.

⁶ Machiavelli, N. (1935) The Prince.
London: Oxford University Press (translation by Luigi Ricci)

Most people believe that reforms of the South African public service started in 1994. However, the process of public sector reform in South Africa began in the early 1980's. As discussed in the previous chapter the then Prime Minister P.W. Botha began to align the public service with the security objectives of the total strategy. In order to embark upon such an elaborate system of security management of the public service, that is the National Security Management System (NSMS), Botha had to rationalise the public service and make it more efficient.

This process of rationalisation and reform of the public service began in 1979 and culminated in the Public Service Act of 1984. Rationalisation was described as a deliberate renewal of government to ensure efficiency (Heunis, 1980:47). The process focused on the internal reorganisation of national government in order to achieve effective utilisation of government services for broader political aims. The rationalisation process was aimed at creating an effective system of government for the functioning of the central decision making authority, that is Cabinet and Cabinet Committees (ibid). The rationalisation process was implemented in phases according to the political and constitutional developments of South Africa at the time (ibid). In 1979 Botha requested that the Commission for Administration identify problem areas and needs in the public service (Heunis, 1980:48). A Director General who served during this era recalled the meeting between the Commission for Administration and the then Prime Minister Botha. He stated that Botha wanted to reorganise the public service in order to make it more manageable and have a more centralised and smaller Cabinet (anonymous, personal

communication). Thus, Botha's objective for reforming the public service into an efficient one was threefold. Firstly, he wanted to ensure that the public service could meet the objectives of the total strategy as mentioned in the Defence White Paper (1977). Secondly, Botha wanted to reform the public service into an efficient one by incorporating private sector principles and curtailing expenditure. Thirdly, to ensure that the public service was aligned to the constitutional framework of the 1980's and that Botha would be able to manage a smaller Cabinet.

The White Paper on the Rationalisation of the Public Service as tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Interior on 8 May 1980 summarised the factors that were a catalyst for the rationalisation:

1. The total onslaught which necessitated the prioritisation of government services and measures,
2. The adaptation of government services to various population groups ("own affairs"),
3. Developments in the international community such as the energy crisis and pending sanctions, requiring an adjustment in government priorities,
4. The proliferation of government institutions and problems of co-ordination,
5. The recruitment and retention of (white) staff, and
6. The volume and complexity of laws which had to be aligned with the envisaged constitutional framework (Heunis, 1980:48-51).

After several discussions between Botha and the Commission for Administration during 1979, Cabinet decided on 28 August 1979 that the Commission for Administration would implement the rationalisation plan according to the following guidelines:

1. The importance of service to the public,
2. The maintenance of law and order,
3. Concern for efficiency,
4. The plan should be implemented rapidly without disruption to services, and
5. Government services would be limited to the minimum to ensure efficiency (Heunis, 1980:50).

The main aims of the rationalisation process included:

1. The reorganisation of national government into a smaller number of government departments according to functional responsibility,
2. The deletion, amendment and abrogation of legislation in order to simplify and consolidate the rules and regulations governing the public service,
3. The systematic improvement of the public service personnel system in order to attract and retain staff, and
4. The improvement of the public service image (Heunis, 1980:50-51).

The rationalisation of the public service saw the restructuring and integration of government functions into fewer departments. The number of government departments was reduced from thirty-nine to twenty-four and a total of eight transfers of functions and

reattachments were made (Commission for Administration, 1980:13 and van Zyl, 1981:160). At national level the rationalisation process resulted in twenty-four national government departments based on the principles of efficiency and functional affinity (Hanekom, 1986:222). A Director General who served during this period stated that this was quite a dramatic period for the South African public service (interview, George: 1 June 2000). Staff was re-deployed and departments, services and projects were made defunct. For example, there had always been a rivalry between the Water and Forestry Departments because the Department of Water Affairs' main function was to preserve and maintain South Africa's water supply and the Department of Forestry's function was to expand South Africa's wood supply thereby utilising water (ibid). It was purposefully decided to combine these two departments into one so that they could deal with their problems and rivalry internally before it reached Cabinet level (ibid). Other Departments such as Welfare and Health were also combined because of functional affinity and to meet the objectives of the "hearts-and-minds" campaign of the total strategy.

Another important aspect of reform during the 1980's was the recognition that there was inefficiency and poor service delivery mainly due to a skills shortage in the public service (Commission of Administration, 1980:5). The employment of blacks in the national public service would be counter to the policy of "own affairs", and as such the Commission for Administration was obliged to encourage the utilisation of women on a part-time basis (Commission of Administration, 1980:7). Inadvertently, the Commission of Administration was increasing the diversity of the public service *albeit* merely to white women. In order to encourage the retention and attraction of people to the public service,

remuneration of public servants was improved (ibid). There were also reform initiatives at Director General level such as the increase in remuneration and the introduction of five-year contracts. These initiatives will be discussed in the following chapter.

The rationalisation process culminated in the Public Service Act (1984), which entrenched many reform initiatives. The salient features of the Public Service Act (1984) included:

1. Heads of departments (Directors General) holding office according to a fixed term contract,
2. Heads of departments having authority over personnel and budgets,
3. More powers being assigned to the Commission of Administration in terms of recommending remuneration, personnel procedures and improvements in the public service,
4. A new classification of personnel,
5. Closer co-operation between government departments,
6. Further reasons for the discharge of public servants such as those posing a security risk,
7. Further reasons for the charge of misconduct, that is, the contravention of the prescribed code of conduct,
8. Procedures in dealing with grievances and requests, and
9. The Public Service Staff Code becoming part of the Act.

The rationalisation process attempted to achieve:

1. Centralisation and co-ordination of government,
2. A smaller and more manageable Cabinet,
3. Consolidation of legislation,
4. More control over the public service, and
5. An improved system of remuneration to attract and retain public servants.

The analysis of this rationalisation process reveals a number of paradoxes. The first paradox is that there was no fundamental change in the manner in which the public service functioned. The racial staff component remained the same, services were delivered in the same manner, and the culture of departments did not change either. In fact, the rationalisation process took the form of amalgamating smaller departments into larger departments. Thus, a Minister and Director General had a larger department with the consequent increase in functions and responsibilities. The rationalisation process resulted in a centralisation of government services and in effect, made government and Cabinet more manageable and co-ordinated. This then aligned the public service with the envisaged constitutional framework and National Security System (NSMS). The consolidation of legislation as applicable to the public service, and more effective control over the public service added to the security aims of the NSMS.

The second paradox lies in the delegation of functions to Directors General and the Commission for Administration. According to the Public Service Act (1984) Directors General would be responsible for financial and human resources, and the powers

assigned to the Commission for Administration provided it with more control over the public service. However, the delegation of powers and responsibilities to Directors General and the Commission for Administration allowed for more control by the political executive.

The third paradox lies in the aim of creating a minimalist state through rationalisation. The increase in remuneration to retain and attract (white) public servants lies contrary to the rationalisation of the public service, that is the reduction in the staff component and consequently the wage bill. Related to the third paradox is that the rationalisation process was a means to an end in terms of streamlining national government to align itself to the total strategy and accommodate the proliferation of “own affairs” departments and personnel. During the period 1985 and 1988 the number of security personnel increased by 21% (Pottinger, 1988:276).

The fourth paradox is the rationalisation process borrowed from Thatcher’s attempts at reforming the British public service. The rationalisation process attempted to incorporate efficiency and private sector principles, but the South African public service reform process had draconian outcomes. In other words, it was problematic to expose the South African public service to market principles (which is in itself a difficulty) while attempting to maintain a security culture and maximum control.

The fifth paradox of the rationalisation process in the early 1980’s is that it was a reform process, but not a transformation. In other words, it was not a fundamental change in

public service functioning or the crossing of the Rubicon. The reforms were aligned to the constitutional framework of the time. There was no extension of services to all South Africans and it remained a public service that did not represent all South Africans. The changes that did take place were incremental with an improvement in remuneration and service conditions of white public servants, and the rationalisation or rather restructuring of the white public service, although there was a proliferation of “own affairs” for the black populace. The situation was far from ideal and certainly not a transformation that saw a fundamental change in the way public services were delivered in South Africa.

The more fundamental changes took place with the negotiation for a constitutional settlement in South Africa. Among other issues this highlighted the importance of the public service and its future role in a democratic South Africa. The negotiations during CODESA paved the way for an Interim Constitution, which included principles and provisions regarding the public service. Principle XXX of the Interim Constitution (1993) stated that “There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-orientated public service broadly representative of the South African community, functioning on a basis to serve all members of the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions.” The Interim Constitution (1993) also established a Public Service Commission for the maintenance of an effective and professional public service.

The principle was retained and developed further for the final constitution. The set of values that guide the public service is entrenched in Chapter 10 of the final Constitution (1996). These values included the following principles:

- (a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.
- (b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.
- (c) Public administration must be development orientated.
- (d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.
- (e) People's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making.
- (f) Public administration must be accountable.
- (g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.
- (h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.
- (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation (Constitution of South Africa, 1996).

Section 197 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) further states that:

- (1) Within public administration there is a public service for the Republic, which must function, and be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which must loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day.

- (2) The terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be regulated by national legislation. Employees are entitled to a fair pension as regulated by national legislation.
- (3) No employee of the public service may be favoured or prejudiced only because that person supports a particular political party or cause.

The above principles emphasise a number of good governance and democratic values such as impartiality, professionalism, transparency and accountability, as well as development discourse such as efficient and effective use of resources, participation, development of human potential and in fact mention that the public service has to be development orientated. Chapter 10 of the Constitution (1996) elevates the public service to a constitutional status and therefore recognises the importance of the public service as an institution of governance. Moreover, all public servants, policy and national legislation applicable to the public service must be guided by these principles. Although the notion of “career-orientated public service” in the Interim Constitution (1993) was excluded from the final constitution, the principles of Chapter 10 of the Constitution (1996) nonetheless incorporates elements of a Weberian bureaucracy such as professionalism. The reference to loyally serving the government of the day, impartiality and a non-partisan public service also entrenches the Woodrow Wilson theory of political-administrative dichotomy and is in keeping with the British tradition of public service.

The Government of National Unity further entrenched these principles in a policy document for transforming the public service. The White Paper on the Transformation of

the Public Service (WTPS)(1995) outlined a number of strategic changes in order for the public service to comply with Chapter 10 of the Constitution as well as fulfil its developmental role. The vision for the post-apartheid public service was that the government was committed to improving the lives of South Africans through a representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive public service in line with Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) priorities (WTPS, 1995:14). The mission was to transform the public service along a development course so that it would be people centred with an emphasis on equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics (WTPS, 1995:14). In order to achieve this vision and mission it was realised that the public service had to be,

1. Restructured and rationalised,
2. Institutions and management's capacity had to be improved,
3. The public service had to be representative of all South Africans,
4. Human resource development was essential to the transformation process,
5. Service delivery had to be improved,
6. Professionalism had to be instilled in public servants, and
7. Labour relations had to be enhanced (WTPS, 1995:14-15).

Rationalisation and Restructuring

The restructuring and the rationalisation of the public service had three objectives. The first of which was the creation of a unified and integrated public service. This encompassed the transfer of powers, functions and resources from the eleven previous

administrations, including the former homelands, into the new national and nine provincial administrations. However, this integration has been fraught with problems. As mentioned in the previous chapter the administration of former homelands and self-governing territories functioned according to different legal prescripts, procedures and systems, organisational culture, and personnel systems (Public Service Commission, 1996:3-4). Thus, in 1994 the new democratic dispensation faced a multiplicity of laws, statutes, regulations and systems that governed all the territories in South Africa. There were problems of organisational rationalisation, the division of powers and functions, staffing and remuneration. According to the Presidential Review Commission's report (1998:15) "...considering the abiding self-interest built into these former administrations, the mere achievement of bringing them together is no mean feat." The problem of poor governance, personnel conflicts, corruption, incompatibility of systems and a low capacity to deliver quality services are manifestations of the amalgamation of these administrations.

The second objective was the restructuring of the senior management echelon. In 1994 (table 5) and then in 1997 (table 6) the diversity profile of senior management (Director-General to Director) in the South African public service was as follows:

Table 5: Profile of Senior Management (1994)

1994	African	Coloured	Asian	White	Male	Female
% of Management	2.0	1.0	3.0	94.0	95.0	5.0
National Population	76.0	8.0	3.0	13.0	49.0	51.0

(Source: Presidential Review Commission Report, Annexure 2)

Table 6: Profile of Senior Management (1997)

1997	African	Coloured	Asian	White	Male	Female
% of Management	46.1	6.4	5.1	42.4	86.8	13.2
National Population	76.7	8.9	2.6	10.9	49.0	51.9

(Source: Presidential Review Commission Report, Annexure 2)

An analysis of these tables indicates progress in the restructuring of the senior management echelon in the public service, despite the “sunset clause” of the negotiated settlement that secured public servants' positions for five years. However, most Directors General of the previous dispensation have retired. Most have left public service due to their five-year contracts expiring, retiring voluntarily before the end of their contract, or resigning. According to the Presidential Review Commission report (1998:16) the appointment of new senior personnel has been political in nature with many of the appointees lacking the necessary skills and experience. The appointments are often five-year contracts, which are problematic in terms of loyalty of service, and stability and continuity of South Africa's senior management echelon (ibid). The Presidential Review Commission (ibid) stated that political appointments, while a buffer against unsupportive senior public servants, cannot be a permanent feature of the public service since skill and experience rather than loyalty to a particular Minister, should be the guiding norm. Executing authorities, that is Ministers and Members of the Executive Provincial Councils (MEC's), also employed consultants which increased rather than reduced the wage bill. The restructuring of the senior management echelon has highlighted another

problem of political and administrative interface. In South Africa there appears to be a role conflict between senior public servants and elected political officials. Elected officials act as managers, micro-managing departments of their respective portfolio's. This is due to a suspicion of public servants from the apartheid and homeland administrations, a lack of faith in the competence of public servants in implementing policy as it was intended, and/or the lack of experience on the part of the elected officials in terms of their duties. Senior public servants act as politicians involving themselves in the political and policy formulating process by providing subjective advice. This is firstly due to the lack of faith in the competence of the elected official by senior public servants who served during apartheid. It cannot be ignored that race plays a dominant role in the poor relationship between senior public servants and executing authorities. The second problem is that many appointed Directors General and recruited senior manager have an anti-apartheid or struggle history. It cannot be ignored that many share the ideological values as their political counterparts. The role of this important echelon of the public service and in the political-administrative interface is the focus of this paper and will be analysed and discussed in the following chapters.

The final objective in restructuring and rationalising the public service is the creation of a leaner and more cost-effective service. The goal was to reduce the wage bill as a proportion of the public service expenditure over four years and thereby reduce the size of the public service (WTPS, 1995:45). The strategy envisaged to achieve this was rightsizing of the public service through optimal allocation of human and other resources in order to deliver quality services (ibid). It was also envisaged that steps would be taken

to improve productivity, efficiency and eliminate waste through the introduction of improved procedures (ibid). The adjustment of remuneration structures, early retirement, retrenchment and redeployment was believed to also produce further savings and achieve the objective of a cost-effective public service (ibid). However, the achievement of a leaner public service was also not without its problems. Staff morale, motivation, retention and productivity declined as anxiety and uncertainty increased due to announcements of retrenchments, redeployments and rightsizing (Presidential Review Commission Report, 1998:89). Service delivery was also affected through staff turnover, the subsequent loss of skills and the inability to redeploy staff to areas with greater need (ibid). The strategy to increase the representivity of the public service through affirmative action was also affected as ceilings were placed on new staff and the inability to retrench staff as a result of the “sunset clauses” (ibid), and strong trade unions. The inconsistent nature of rightsizing strategies created a number of uncertainties which made strategic planning an arduous task (Presidential Review Commission Report, 1998:90). In general the objective of a cost-effective public service generated much resistance from public servants due to a number of vested interests not only in terms of job security but also the elimination of corruption (ibid).

Institution Building and Management

To achieve the goal of institution building and management requires a transformation in management practices and organisational culture. It was believed that changing management practices would enhance performance, responsiveness and accountability of

the public service (WTPS, 1995:48). It was envisaged that in order to make managers leaders in directing change instead of following rules and procedures, managerial responsibility had to be decentralised and devolved while ensuring accountability for their performance against specified objectives (ibid). It was therefore proposed that the employment contracts of Directors General be linked to the achievement of specific performance objectives while at the same time giving Directors General the flexibility to manage human and financial resources to achieve the departmental objectives (WTPS, 1995:49).

In order to enhance the devolution and decentralisation of managerial responsibility a more open, flexible and participative managerial structure at all levels of the public service was seen as a necessity (ibid). These structures would concentrate on the creative use of consultation and participation in teams rather than adherence to rules from higher authorities in the hierarchy (ibid). A new public management strategy, Total Quality Management (TQM), has been adopted internationally and will be implemented in the South African public service. TQM is a managerial technique designed to improve organisational effectiveness, efficiency and quality in service delivery. It is a process that involves employees focusing on continually improving service delivery through creative teamwork. The public, as recipients of public services, are regarded as “customers” with the goals of satisfying the customer’s needs as in the private sector.

TQM therefore requires organisations to define both internal and external customer needs, plan and strategise on how to meet the customers’ needs, address customer

dissatisfaction and ensure continuous improvement. In order to continually improve and meet customers' needs, organisations need to empower employees with the necessary skills, enabling structures, clear goals and objectives as well as quantifiable data and information in order to problem solve. A team culture is therefore required for participative problem solving with respect for diversity of opinions and multiculturalism.

TQM is based on Edward Deming's (1982) managerial paradigm that was implemented in the private sector. According to Swiss (1992:358) TQM is ill suited for government because it was designed for the routine processes of manufacturing rather than the delivery of public services. This makes the quantification of service output and evaluation of the service provider difficult to measure (ibid). In other words, quantitative measurement of public services are complex and sometimes impractical (ibid). The issue of measuring a service according to a benchmark also becomes problematic because government norms are unclear and legislative mandates are just as unclear. The private sector can usually define its customers with relative ease because it chooses its own market niche and targets its customers (ibid). For many public organisations defining the customer is difficult and politically controversial (ibid). Government often has customers with different demands, and has an obligation to serve all customers within a democratic political culture. Thus, customers could be the general public as well as immediate customers such as students in an education system, the elderly in a welfare system or prisoners in a correctional system. Sometimes there is a conflict between a public organisation's immediate customers and the ultimate customers, for example the customers of a police department, in addition to the general public, includes criminals.

Public organisations serve a wide variety of customers with diverse and contradictory needs with a result that public servants often compromise between unlimited needs and limited resources. Quality services are often constrained in government because the general public prefers that costs be minimised in order to pay less tax (Swiss, 1992:359). It is the payment of taxes that distinguishes the public from the private sector.

Accountability and responsiveness to customers or the public is therefore not determined by profit, but ideally by political processes and structures as well as a sense of civic duty. Political processes such as budgetary constraints and compromise politics inhibits the implementation of TQM. Elected officials often establish ambiguous and unclear policy goals. The quantification of outputs and establishment of targets also exposes the elected official to political opposition. Despite these criticisms of TQM applicability to the public sector, some public organisations in the United States have had successes. Many local, state and federal agencies from the City of Phoenix, to the state of Ohio, to the U.S. Department of Defence implemented TQM.

The change to a more participative and democratic style of management such as TQM would require training and development of human resources, the appreciation of diversity, the management of information and a continuous learning environment. However, as explained in the previous chapter, many South African public servants are more inclined and accustomed to an authoritarian, hierarchical and rule-bound organisational culture. Creativity and innovative problem solving in teams is a new paradigm for South African public servants. Moreover, the appreciation of diverse

opinions in a multicultural team-working context has generated resistance and in some cases increased personnel conflict.

Representative Public Service

An aspect of the transformation process that has met much resistance is the implementation of affirmative action to increase the representivity of the public service. The government has introduced a White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service (1998) as well as the Employment Equity Act (1998) to provide further weight to ensure that the public service is non-racist, non-sexist and non-discriminatory. While much progress has been made in some government departments with regards to increasing representivity of blacks (African, Asian and Coloured), women and persons with disabilities, the progress has been made at the lower ranks of the public service. The problem is that many previously disadvantaged persons did not have access or the opportunity to further their education. Thus there is a lack of appropriately skilled blacks and women for positions in the management echelons of the public service. Government departments are also constrained by financial considerations and an already bloated public service. Other challenges of affirmative action include alienation of the previously disadvantaged, tokenism and workplace conflict. The challenge is to change the organisational culture where diversity is appreciated and valued as a contribution to the organisation's goals.

Human Resource Development

Another challenge that the democratic dispensation faces is the lack of skilled public servants. The training and education of public servants is viewed as a necessity to equip public servants with the necessary skills, knowledge and competencies to deliver quality services efficiently and effectively (WTPS, 1995:64). Training and the development of human resources would also enhance the representivity of the public service through equipping those public servants who have been denied opportunities in terms of education. As mentioned earlier, training public servants in new public management paradigms would re-orientate public servants from values acquired during previous administrations. The development of human resources as envisaged by the WTPS would also instil in public servants a sense of professionalism and responsiveness to the public's needs. Training and human resource development is therefore seen as a leverage for change and to this regard the WTPS (1995:64) envisaged that training would be,

1. Strategic and based on needs,
2. Linked to institutional transformation and building,
3. Viewed as an interactive process with trainers and practitioners from various sectors of society,
4. Related to recruitment, promotion, career development and remuneration,
5. Required to bring about a redefinition of the role of trainers, and
6. Linked to the policy-making process so as to enhance the strategic importance of human resource development.

The importance of human resource development was emphasised in the White Paper on Public Service Training and Education (WPSTE) (1997). The objective of the WPSTE was to provide a policy framework for the implementation of new procedures aimed at improving training and education in the public service. The purpose of the WPSTE is to enable departments to design and implement training programs according to their strategic goals and needs. However, the problem in South Africa is that the institution responsible for training and education in the public service, the South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) is not without its problems. SAMDI's low capacity to deliver quality human resource training is a legacy of apartheid. SAMDI's predecessor, the Public Service Training Institute (PSTI) had a monopoly over training in the public service and conducted training in a prescriptive, supply-driven manner and according to apartheid ideology (Presidential Review Commission Report, 1998:149). National and provincial administrations have little input as to their training needs. This manner of conducting training is still evident in the present public service. There is either no training taking place, duplication of training in some departments, poor quality training that does not address the needs of the departments, and/or ad hoc or crisis training instead of intervention based on strategic goals and needs (Presidential Review Commission Report, 1998:150). The Presidential Review Commission recommended that SAMDI's monopoly over human resource development in the public service needs to be challenged by encouraging competition in the provision of education and training as envisaged by the WPSTE (ibid). The Commission further recommended that SAMDI be restructured. It did not believe that SAMDI, as presently constituted, has the capacity to effectively undertake continuous public service training and education, which is the key

to the transformation of the public service (ibid). The Presidential Review Commission therefore suggested that SAMDI's future role be that of co-ordinator of human resource development in the public service (ibid). The recent appointment of Mr. Job Mokgoro as Director General for SAMDI has produced some developments such as the Presidential Strategic Leadership Development Programme which was launched in 2000. This is essentially a training programme for Directors General, but an evaluation of the effectiveness of the programme and SAMDI's role in improving management capacity is premature.

Employment Conditions

The WTPS proposed a number of measures to ensure more equitable employment conditions in the public service. The first of which was the introduction of an adequate minimum wage (WTPS, 1995:68). The second initiative was the introduction of equal pay and benefits for equal work value, especially with regard to gender discrimination (ibid). It was also recommended that there be a reduction of differentials in pay and benefits by linking the pay increases to productivity (ibid). Human resource development such as training and education, career-pathing, promotion, grading and selection was seen as not only essential to the transformation process, but an improvement in employment conditions and employee morale. The WTPS (1995:69) also proposed a reduction in the number of grades in the public service based on performance appraisals and competency based evaluation. The last step in improving employment conditions was to improve the

conditions under which women and people with disabilities worked by reducing discriminatory practices (ibid).

The government recognised that in order to improve the employment conditions of the public service it had to take into account the diverse interests of public servants and bargain with the trade unions that represents those interests. The Labour Relations Act (1995) established a Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC), Sectoral Bargaining Councils for education and police services as well as Workplace Forums. Trade unions have been generally supportive and co-operative in the government's efforts to transform the public service. However, there have been a few points of disagreement between trade unions and government as an employer. For example, redundant posts and the respective public servants who have been affected have been placed on a supernumerary list. Should a post within the public service become vacant, the government is obliged to select qualified persons from this list. This limits government in terms of selecting persons with more appropriate skills and experience, diverse backgrounds and incorporating new blood and ideas into the public service. The government is also limited in terms of wage increases due to fiscal constraints.

Professionalism and Accountability

The government hoped that institution building would enhance internal democracy within the public service, and external accountability and responsiveness to the public. However, the government recognised that there was a need for statutory bodies to ensure external

accountability. Thus, the Constitution of South Africa makes provision for a Public Protector, Human Rights Commission, Gender Commission, Auditor-General and Public Service Commission. Other statutory bodies that are designated to ensure professionalism and accountability are the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees, national and provincial politicians, the Ministry for Public Service and Administration and Cabinet. In order to ensure that national and provincial administrations establish effective internal and external mechanisms to promote accountability, transparency, professionalism and democratic participation, appropriate performance measures and targets were developed for Director-Generals for which they would be held accountable (WTPS, 1995:62). Furthermore, a code of conduct was developed to further promote and entrench professionalism in the public service. However, despite some of the measures that have been introduced, the government has become increasingly concerned about the level of corruption and maladministration in the public service. A number of conferences on corruption have been held and although the issue has sparked debate and initiatives have been suggested, it is the absence of professionalism and a sense of civic duty within the organisational culture of the public service that deserves the most attention.

Transformation of Service Delivery

The delivery of services is the primary function of the public service. All of the preceding transformation strategies have the goal of improving the delivery of services to all South Africans. The government recognises that the focus should be on meeting the needs of the poor and those that have been previously disadvantaged (WTPS, 1995:57). The

government also recognises that in order to achieve efficient and effective service delivery there needs to be community partnerships with participation and consultation, intergovernmental collaboration and co-ordination within budgetary constraints (WTPS, 1995:58). In order to improve service delivery, it was envisaged that national and provincial departments would undertake the following:

1. Develop a mission statement with service guarantees,
2. Identify target groups
3. Determine the type, standard and level of services needed with the appropriate performance indicators and benchmarks,
4. Establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and structures in order to measure progress and take corrective action,
5. Develop plans for staffing, human resource development and organisational capacity to match service delivery needs,
6. Redirect human, financial and other resources to enhance service provision,
7. Build partnerships with the private sector, non-governmental organisations and the community,
8. Develop a culture of customer satisfaction as well as a sensitivity to issues of race, gender and disability, and
9. Introduce total quality management (ibid).

To give further impetus to transforming service delivery the government drafted a White Paper known as the *Batho Pele* White Paper. The word *Batho Pele* means people first, which entrenches the notion that the public are “customers”. The first principle of the

White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (WTPSD) focuses on consultation with communities as to the level and quality of services they are entitled to (WTPSD, 1997:15). The second principle related to informing communities as to the level and quality of services they could expect (ibid). The third *Batho Pele* principle is equality where all citizens are entitled to equitable access to the services (ibid). In the delivery of services, public servants are expected to be courteous and provide accurate information about services (ibid). Another principle is access to information. This requires departments to be open and transparent (ibid). Should a promised standard of service not be delivered, communities are also entitled to an apology, explanation and an efficient and effective remedy. The last principle is related to the notion of customer satisfaction where citizens are entitled to value for money (ibid).

The *Batho Pele* White Paper also outlined steps for improving service delivery and implementing the principles. The first step is to identify customers, establish their needs and priorities and then determine the current level and quality of service provision in order to make improvements (WTPSD, 1997:26 –27). Once the current level and standards of service are determined, departments should strive to improve upon service delivery as identified by the customers' needs and priorities (ibid). Departments' organisational capacity, human, financial and other resources should then be aligned to meet these needs (ibid). Once these preceding steps have been accomplished, departments should announce the service standards as benchmarks, making customers aware of the services they can then expect (WTPSD, 1997:28). The last step is

monitoring the delivery of services against the standards and should these standards not be met, customers are entitled to redress and accountability (ibid).

The reality is that the public service has fallen short of the principles entrenched in the Constitution, White Papers and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Efficient and effective service delivery has been hampered by a number of problems. Firstly, departments have human resource, financial, technical and process constraints. Many departments are still undergoing a transformation process complicated by other initiatives. Some departments are uncoordinated and/or neglectful of the transformation process. The South African public service's organisational culture is resistant to change and many public servants do not understand the new vision as well as how to operationalise the mission and implement the strategies for transformation. This lack of understanding is firstly due to a lack of skills and knowledge on how to improve service delivery. The second reason is that the exact White Papers and other documents that mandate the transformation of public service are complicated in nature and lack clear and unambiguous implementation plans and procedures.

The first point of confusion is who or which role-player drives the transformation process. There appears to be a notion that executing authorities and/or senior management should drive the transformation process while other White Papers call for the community or customers in conjunction with the lower echelons of the public service to determine transformation priorities. In South Africa, communities have unlimited needs and have difficulty in articulating these needs to a public service which is sometimes alien and

hostile to them. The lower echelons of the public service themselves have problems articulating their concerns or creative ideas to more senior management due to the hierarchical and authoritarian organisational culture. Senior management invariably does not have an adequate understanding of problems at grassroots level in communities. Executing authorities through a democratic political process may have some understanding of the needs of the community, but how to address these needs with the co-operation of the public service becomes a problem in itself. Another problem is the inconsistency between communities' needs and the policy mandate that public servants receive from executing authorities. In addition to this problem, is the issue of special interest groups that may influence public servants as well as executing authorities and politicians. The reality is that there is a gap between the community and the lower echelons of the public service, and senior management and executing authorities. A system that reduces this gap needs to be established so that elected officials have a clear understanding of the needs of the community and the capacity of the public service. In the United States and Britain both countries had strong and committed elected political figures that advocated the transformation of the public service in order to meet the needs of the community. Vice-President Gore (United States) and Margaret Thatcher (Britain) developed clear strategic goals and guidelines, and ensured that these reform initiatives were implemented. However, in South Africa this role has not been filled from the political scene and even within the public service a person managing the transformation process in each department is lacking.

A major problem with the South African transformation process is that the exact departments responsible for developing transformation guidelines and initiatives are

undergoing change and transformation themselves, such as the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) and the Public Service Commission. There appears to be a lack of coherence and co-ordination between these organisations, and national and provincial departments. Within these departments there are some public servants who view transformation as a reality and a necessity, and are committed to the process. However, there are those that are resistant and view transformation as a rhetorical exercise being implemented by over-zealous politicians who do not understand the organisational reality of the public service.

The transformation documents also appear to have a number of internal contradictions. Firstly, and related to the previous discussion, it is unclear who is to be empowered. In other words there is a discussion of empowering communities and public servants while there is also an effort to limit the power of public servants while empowering elected officials through the use of performance contracts (see Chapter Five). The second contradiction is that there are a set of principles that is to be applied to all levels of government and all departments, and then there is an emphasis that transformation is contingent on each department's context to which they should develop their own procedures for change. In fact, the Presidential Review Commission's Report, Annexure 3 (1998:3) states that the lack of clear and unambiguous guidelines for transformation is a necessity and cites the chaos in public service caused by the ad hoc nature of offering voluntary severance packages as attributable to the lack of coherent guidelines. Another contradiction with regards to these documents is that there appears to be a lack of clarity

as to whether the transformation process should or should not be driven by financial considerations. For public servants budgetary constraints are a reality. When public servants believe that the delivery of a service can be improved by the introduction of a new system or process such as information technology, their efforts are curtailed due to a lack of financial resources. The issue of transformation being a continuous process of improvement, and the requirement of clear programs, business plans and targets also appear to be confusing for public servants. Another frustration for public servants and a cause of low morale is the reduction in personnel. The contradiction is that the transformation documents state that employment conditions will be improved, but there is no clear understanding of the retrenchment procedures. In addition to this many white public servants feel threatened that affirmative action will require their retrenchment in order to maintain an optimal public service wage bill. Related to the contradiction of reduction in personnel is that government will strive to empower public servants so that they can deliver quality services, and should poor performance be an issue the public servant will receive training rather than be retrenched. A fundamental contradiction is the use of private sector management techniques in the public sector transformation process with no clear understanding or evaluation of how this will impact the South African public service and the public. Another concern is that South Africa has borrowed transformation strategies from Britain and other Commonwealth countries without assessing its applicability to the South African context.

This chapter has provided an analysis and comprehensive discussion of transformation within the South African context. South Africa's transformation process is complicated,

incoherent, needs refinement and a concerted effort to educate public servants about the process. A commissioner on the Presidential Review Commission described South Africa's transformation of the public service in T.S. Elliot's words; "Between the idea and the reality...falls the shadow" (Presidential Review Commission Report, Annexure 4, 1998:29). The transformation process has had an enormous impact on the role of the Director General in implementing transformation initiatives as well as being a recipient of those initiatives. The Director General's role as administrative head of a department is now over extended in meeting transformation objectives which are often incoherent and lacking in resources. The Director General's role in the political-administrative interface has also been affected by transformation in that they are subject to initiatives such as performance agreements. The impact of transformation on the role of the Director General will be discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICE:

Changing Role of the Director General

"I have gained this by philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law." - Aristotle⁷

The previous chapter provided a discussion of public service transformation in South Africa. This chapter focuses on senior management in the South African public service, specifically the changes that have taken place at Director General level. The role of the Director General is of fundamental importance to public administration and public policy because it is at this level that politics, public policy and administration interact. The separation of politics and administration has been discussed from a theoretical and comparative perspective in Chapter One. The transformation initiatives at Director General level, the political and administrative interface, and the changing role of the most senior position in the South African public service will be discussed in this chapter.

⁷ Aristotle as cited in Diogene Laertius (1895) Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers London: George Bell & Sons (translated by D.C. Yonge)

The 1980's: Inheriting the Past

Since the commencement of the executive presidency in South Africa the senior management echelon in the South African public service has faced numerous changes. Senior managers in the public service were constructs of their time, believed in the political ideology of that period and served the purpose of formulating and implementing the policies of the government of the day. As mentioned in Chapter Three the South African public service, and specifically the senior echelons, shared the same political and socio-cultural value characteristics as the political executive.

The ascendance of P.W. Botha to power had enormous implications for the public service. The consolidation of power in the form of an executive President, the adoption of the Constitution in 1983 as an attempt to reform the political arena, and the growing security concerns resulted in Botha arranging the state apparatus to suit security policy objectives. Botha was the first Prime Minister to attempt to reform the public service, *albeit* for draconian purposes. Immediately upon his ascendance to power in 1979 he began to rationalise and restructure the public service. In a parliamentary address Botha outlined his intention to eliminate duplication, increase efficiency, improve co-ordination, and employ skilled personnel and high calibre senior management (Hansard, 19 April 1979). Botha stated that, "...South Africa has a very good public service. I think that it has been the pride of the country for years. However, we should examine the machinery from time to time to ascertain whether it cannot be streamlined and better equipped to meet the demands of the time" (Hansard, 19 April 1979). Botha's motivation for

reforming the public service can best be described in his own words; "...behind our attempt to build up a well organised and well staffed public service, a public service that will be able to help the government in its struggle. In fact, the public service plays a crucial role in every total national strategy" (Hansard, 6 February 1979). The first attempt at public service reform in South Africa was somewhat paradoxical in nature for a number of reasons as mentioned in the previous chapter.

However, the first initiative at reforming senior management in the public service created a new senior post, that is Director General and the re-designation of other senior public servant posts. The position of Secretary was re-designated as Deputy Director General, and Chief Director and Director positions remained the same designation (Hansard, 1980:730). The new post of Director General was a re-definition of the responsibilities and change in senior management. The new post effectively gave Directors General more responsibilities in terms of managing a larger organisation and budget, although their basic responsibilities still included managing a public organisation efficiently and effectively.

Eighteen Secretaries became Directors General, twenty-four remained in their grade, that is Secretary, which became designated as Deputy Director General, and no public official retired, resigned or was dismissed (Hansard, 1980:730). The new designation of Director General was a direct result of the rationalisation process as described in the preceding chapter. The rationalisation process amalgamated various departments, for example the Department of Finance, Inland Revenue and Treasury which became the Department of

Finance. The problem was that large bureaucracies and organisational resources, with the accompanying large budget, required a very senior position, with complementary title and salary. In other words if the amalgamation of three departments resulted in three Secretaries at a senior position then a senior to Secretaries required a different designation. According to a Director General (interview, Cape Town: 30 October 2000) the selection of a Director General from a Secretarial position was based on seniority and merit with most Secretaries accepting the rationalisation and prospect of a promotion to Director General. However, there were a few disgruntled Secretaries as they in effect had to accept a demotion to Deputy Director General, but were compensated with a salary increase (ibid). It was also felt that aside from the seniority issue, the title itself was an inheritance from the colonial era and was more of a description of personnel assistants within the office of the Secretary (ibid). The title of "Director General" was decided upon and was borrowed from other public services such as France, and in fact the title had begun to gain popularity in other sectors of the South African public service such as the South African Bureau of Standards (ibid). Due to an increase in responsibility over a larger bureaucracy and resources, Directors General were given a compensatory salary. In 1981 the incumbent of the new designation of Director General earned R39000 while Deputy Directors General (previously the position of Secretary) earned R33120 per annum (Hansard, 1981:534). Prior to 1981 Secretaries earned R30472 per annum (ibid). Thus Directors General and Deputy Directors General all received salary increases. The rationalisation process in fact did not result in savings for the state. The total state expenditure for senior management in 1981 was as follows:

Table 7: Senior Management Salary

Grade	Number of Personnel	Expenditure
Secretary	34	R1036080
Chief Director	7	R204330
Director	16	R420000
Total	57	R1660410
New Grade	Number of Personnel	Expenditure
Director General	18	R702000
Deputy Director General	39	R1291680
Chief Director	19	R554610
Director	18	R191150
Total	94	R2739440

(Source: Hansard, 1981:534)

Table 7 illustrates that what had occurred was the promotion of Secretaries based on meritorious seniority to the new position of Director General. The Secretaries that were not selected to the new position became Deputy Director Generals. Moreover, the void created by the new position was filled by promoting personnel from lower ranks. The new designation therefore created a domino effect of promotions with subsequent salary increases. The new designation therefore did not create savings for the state, but in fact increased the personnel budget. It also did not create a transformed public service as the same personnel within the public service were appointed from within the ranks rather than outside of the public service. Thus, the public service did not change in appearance or procedures, but just structure.

The selection of Directors General was always made from within the ranks and always based on seniority and merit. Seldom were appointments made from outside the public service, and was only contemplated if no suitable candidate from within the public service could be identified. The Commission of Administration was involved in the daily administration of personnel matters of the public service and was the institution which

made the recommendations as to the filling of senior posts. The vacant post was seldom advertised. The Commission of Administration would identify suitable candidates for a Director General position, discuss the shortlist of candidates with the relevant Minister and reach a consensus after an initial selection interview. According to a Director General (interview, Cape Town: 30 October 2000) on occasion there would be a difference of opinion on the suitable candidate, but an agreement would always be reached. The successful candidate would have expertise and experience in a functional area, for example health, as well as the necessary managerial skills. The appointment of the Director General would then be ratified by Cabinet.

The rationalisation process culminated in the Public Service Act of 1984, No. 111. The responsibility of a Director General as prescribed by the Public Service Act of 1984 section 6, was the efficient management and administration of a department, including the effective utilisation of staff, the maintenance of discipline and the proper use and care of state property, and the performance of functions as prescribed. The Act also introduced and placed Directors General on five year contracts (Public Service Act, 1984: section 11) The renewal of a contract was subject to ministerial review and it was the Minister who could decide whether a Director General would be redeployed (ibid). A Director General would only be released from his or her contract once he or she had completed five years of service, or if suspected of inefficiency or misconduct (Public Service Act, 1984: sections 11, 18 and 41). The suspicion of misconduct or inefficiency was subject to a Presidential inquiry (ibid). The introduction of five-year contracts in effect did not only limit Director General's tenure but also held them accountable for performance.

The Director General was also regulated by the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1975, No. 66. The Director General was the accounting officer and was responsible for the accounting of the state's financial resources and property (Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975: section 15). The Director General as accounting officer was responsible for preparing and submitting to the Auditor-General and Treasury an account for each budget vote in terms of receipts, expenditure, surpluses, and an explanation of variances between receipts and expenditure (Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975: section 14). The Treasury had considerable powers resulting in the control over financial administration in the public service, expenditure, the determination of fees and charges, writing off a loss, the cancellation of contracts, holding the accounting officer accountable for state monies, authorising or condoning non-compliance of an accounting officer, determining which budget vote had to be charged, approving remissions, refunds, payments, gifts and the disposal of state assets (Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975: section 31). According to section 32 of the Exchequer and Audit Act (1975) the Treasury could delegate, as it determined, any power as mentioned above to the accounting officer. This in theory could give the Director General a certain amount of power in the management of financial resources. The Director General however, was limited in certain aspects and had to account for his management of financial resources to the Treasury, Auditor-General and Parliament. For example, the Director General as accounting officer was responsible for unauthorised expenditure and had to submit a report to the Auditor-General explaining the nature of expenditure (Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975: section 33). According to section 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Act (1975) the accounting officer must recover the unauthorised expenditure from the beneficiary of the expenditure or the

person responsible for the unauthorised expenditure and it could be recovered from the accounting officer. The accounting officer was also responsible for the recovery of losses and damages to the state (Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975: section 34).

The legislation regulating Directors General was consistent with most international practices. The South African senior public service during the 1980's can be described as professional and careerist based on seniority and merit. Legally and theoretically Directors General were regulated by the above-mentioned statutes, and personnel matters were controlled by the Commission of Administration. These legal prescripts defined the Director General's role as responsible for the management of financial and human resources within a department. This regulatory framework also defined the Director General as administrative head of government. Thus the Director General was responsible for administration, and policy advice and implementation while the Minister's role was political. However, this dichotomy did not really exist. Director Generals' political neutrality has to be questioned in the light of the political influence the Minister had in the selection process. The selection process created an elitist political-administrative relationship with Directors General sharing the same socio-cultural and political values as the political elite. This was evident in the formulation of policy during apartheid where Directors General and Ministers had the same ideological values.

During the transition period to South Africa's democratic dispensation, the role of the Director General in the political-administrative interface became less distinct. Many Directors General were actively involved in the negotiation process by providing

Ministers with policy advice based on a certain political agenda and ideology. Other Directors General who were not actively involved in the negotiations stated that they did not receive any direction from Ministers who were preoccupied with the negotiations, and Directors General had to make policy decisions on their own. However, this was a temporary measure and more a function of the turbulent transition period than the usual role of Directors General.

The 1990's: Something Borrowed and Something New

During the period post-1994, the democratic dispensation was faced with a number of challenges. As mentioned in the preceding chapters the democratic dispensation was faced with the challenge of transforming the public service in terms of diversity, rationalisation, institutional culture, human resource development and capacity to deliver services. The ANC's political leadership was mistrusting of public servants who served during apartheid. The political leadership therefore began to systematically appoint qualified persons with shared ideological values to senior positions within the public service and to advisory positions. In the case where a Director General from the previous dispensation was still completing his five-year contract the appointment of what was perceived to be "ANC loyalists" caused resentment. Many Directors General viewed these persons as usurping their role. These persons were in fact Directors General in the waiting and once a Director General resigned or retired, many of them became Directors General. The Directors General from the apartheid era were perceived as "National Party loyalists" and the concern that they would not serve the government of the day prompted

the ANC to appoint persons to Director General positions who they believed would implement their policies.

During this period there were a number of policy and legislative interventions beginning with the Public Service Act (1994) and subsequent amendments (1997, 1998 and 1999), the Public Finance Management Act (1999), the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995), as well as the Public Service Regulations (1999). Although in the previous chapter an analysis of the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) was provided, issues specifically related to Directors General will be discussed. Moreover, a critical analysis of the Public Service Act (1994) and amendments (1997, 1998 and 1999), Public Finance Management Act (1999) and Public Service Regulations (1999) will also be provided as it describes the contemporary role of Directors General.

The Public Service Act of 1994, No. 103 gave effect to one national public service and nine provincial administrations. This Act provided for the amalgamation of a national public service, the Public Service Commission, the composition and organisation of the public service and career incidents of public servants in the new South Africa. The Public Service Amendment Act of 1997, No. 47 introduced a number of sweeping changes. Firstly, it adjusted the powers and functions of the Public Service Commission as consistent with the Constitution (1996), but shifted policy matters relating to the public service to the Minister for Public Service and Administration thereby increasing his or her power over the public service. Secondly, it decentralised the organisation,

administration and staff matters to departments rather than a central institution. Thirdly, it introduced performance management into the public service with section 12 specifically focusing on senior management and Directors General. Fourthly, it changed the role of the provincial Director General and heads of departments. The Act also introduced affirmative action and a code of conduct for the public service.

According to section 4 of the Public Service Amendment Act of 1998, No. 86, a Director General is responsible for the efficient management and administration of his or her department, including the effective utilisation and training of staff, the maintenance of discipline, the promotion of sound labour relations and the proper use and care of state property, and the performance of functions as prescribed. This responsibility is not vastly different from the responsibilities of a Director General as prescribed by the Public Service Act of 1984. There is however, an addition to the Director General's responsibility in promoting fair labour practices as consistent with the Basic Condition of Employment Act (1997) and Labour Relations Act (1995), and the values of the ANC's labour alliance. The Public Service Act 1994, No. 103 and the Public Service Amendment Act 1998, No. 86 maintained the five year contractual obligation of Directors General. The contract, depending on performance, could be renewed by the Minister or executing authority (Public Service Amendment Act, 1998: section 5). In consultation with the Director General, the Minister could also redeploy the Director General to another department (ibid). Directors General may only be released from service after they have completed their five-year contract or may be released from their contract prior to five years due to charges of inefficiency, misconduct, a violation of

legislation and regulations, ill-health, resignation or early retirement (*see Appendix V for employment contract and conditions of service*). The contract may include any agreement that the Minister and Director General enters into, but should include the following:

1. The particular duties of the Director General,
2. The specific performance criteria for evaluating the performance of the Director General,
3. The grounds and procedures upon which the services of the Director General may be terminated before the completion of his or her contract, and
4. Any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister (Public Service Amendment Act, 1997, section 9).

The five-year contracts are given further impetus with performance contracts that are intended to hold Directors General accountable for performance.

The selection process for a Director General involves the advertisement of the vacant post as decided by the Minister and an interview by a selection committee consisting of at least three Ministers (Public Service Regulations, 1999:23). The selection of the suitable candidate is based on the following considerations:

1. Information based on valid methods, criteria and instruments that are free from bias,
2. The training, skills, competence and knowledge necessary to meet the requirements of the post,
3. The needs of the department, and
4. A preference for affirmative action appointees (Public Service Regulations, 1999:24).

An important development in South African public administration is that the appointment of a Director General is the authority of the President (Public Service Amendment Act, 1999: section 1). This shifts the most senior public service echelon from a career to a presidential appointment system. The rationale for the introduction of presidential appointments of Directors General was to achieve two objectives, that is administrative expediency and political clout (Hansard, 1999:2495-2498). The objective of administrative expediency was to:

1. Expedite the transformation of the senior public service in terms of representivity and leadership of the public service transformation process in general,
2. Increase the recruitment of diverse skills by appointing persons from outside the public service,
3. Redeploy Directors General so that their valuable skills would not be lost to the public service once they served five years or if there was a problem between the Director General and Minister,
4. Depersonalise the relationship between the Minister and Director General, and
5. Save the state costs in terms of paying out a Director General who did not complete his or her contract should the Minister not wish to retain the services of a Director General prior to the completion of his or her contract, and thus the Director General could be deployed to another department (ibid).

The Act and specifically the section relating to presidential appointments was introduced to deal with the problems that had emerged in the political administrative interface during the first few years of the democratic dispensation (interview with a Director General,

Johannesburg: 9 June 2000). After 1994 no fewer than twenty-eight national Directors General left the public service with the old guard giving way to the new (Taylor, 1999:59). Of the twenty-eight Directors General that left the public service, fifteen retired when their five-year contract was completed. However, other Directors General resigned or opted for early retirement. Of particular note is Dr. N. Barnard who during the 1980's was the head of National Intelligence Service, became Director General for the Department of Constitutional Development in 1992, and subsequently left the department in 1995 after conflicting interests with the ANC Minister for Constitutional Development, Mr. Mohammed Valli Moosa (ibid). However, not all the Directors General to leave office after 1994 were from the old guard. Six Directors General who were appointed during the new dispensation had also left public service (ibid). According to Taylor (1999:59) it has not only been a departure of Directors General but an acrimonious parting between the political and the administrative leadership. The much-publicised *Sarafina II* debacle caused bitterness between the Minister for Health, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma and the Director General for Health, Dr. Olive Shisana (now Executive Director for the World Health Organisation) with each blaming the other for the debacle. Another case of premature departure was the Director for Housing, Mr. Cobbett who also had a less than harmonious relationship with Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele. The Public Service Amendment Act of 1999, No. 5 was an attempt to have an authoritative person intervene when there is potential conflict between the administrative and political leadership. Thus, the President, being the appointing authority, could mediate if a conflict arose. The conflict could be resolved by deploying the Director General to another department and hence another Minister, thereby ensuring that the Director General's

skills were not lost to the public service. However, the Act does give the President the power to be involved in the appointment of Directors General. Given that the majority of Cabinet consists of Ministers from the same political party and persuasion as the President, Directors General inevitably share the same socio-cultural and political values as the political elite.

The adoption of the Public Service Regulations of 1 July 1999 sought to provide a coherent and comprehensive framework of rules and procedures for the public service in general, and in light of the changes to the legislation that have taken place. The Public Service Regulations (1999) introduces a new performance management system, as well as covers the roles, delegations, authorisations and responsibilities of public servants. It regulates organisation and conditions of work from planning, to reporting, to job evaluation, compensation, procedures for appointment, promotions and termination, to training and education, labour relations, code of conduct, and performance management.

There appears to be more of a decentralisation of powers to departments as opposed to a central authority. The regulations allow for the executing authority to delegate authority and responsibility to Directors General or provincial heads of departments as necessary to manage the department effectively and efficiently (Public Service Regulations, 1999:7).

The Director General or provincial head of department is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the strategic plan of the department by promoting efficient, economic and effective use of resources to improve the functioning of the department, and apply methods such as re-allocation, simplification and co-ordination of work (Public Service

Regulations, 1999:9). A Director General or provincial head of department for the most part will be responsible for the work environment such as working hours, emergency or overtime work, and health and safety (Public Service Regulations, 1999:20). A Director General is also responsible for the development of human resources within the department by ensuring sufficient funds are available for training and education and by granting financial assistance to employees to further their training and education.

The Public Service Regulations (1999, Annexure 2 and Appendix A) and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Resolution 13 of 1998 introduced a new performance management system for Directors General (*see Appendix VI*). The performance management system as described by the Public Service Regulations (1999:31) is a process that is "...linked to broad and consistent plans for staff development and align with the department's strategic goals." The process is to develop departmental strategic goals, both at national and provincial levels, and following from the strategic plan the development of business plans for each departmental component (*ibid*). The attainment of service standards according to the business plans and the *Batho Pele* principles will form part of the annual performance review for each department (*ibid*). The strategic goals and objectives of each department are then articulated into a performance agreement (*ibid*).

On 15 December 1998, Resolution 13 was entered into by public sector trade unions and the government in the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). The purpose of the agreement was to set a framework for senior managers in the public service to agree to performance agreements that would determine their annual salary increments (PSCBC, 1998:59). The aim of the performance agreements is to assist senior

managers (pay class 13 and higher) to define their key responsibilities and priorities in order to measure their performance as well as enable executing authorities and the immediate supervisor to assess the senior manager's performance (ibid). The senior manager, who is not a head of a department, would therefore enter into a performance contract with his or her immediate supervisor, and a head of department would enter into a contract with the relevant executing authority. The performance agreement includes a definition of a senior manager's work according to his or her key duties and responsibilities, methods for assessing the senior manager's performance in fulfilling those responsibilities, dates for quarterly assessment, mechanisms for resolving disputes about assessment, and the increment date (ibid). The quarterly assessment would be a review of the senior manager's key responsibilities which may lead to modification in either responsibilities, method of assessment and the progress towards objectives by removing obstacles to the manager's performance of duties. The performance agreement cycle would generally be from 1 July to 30 June (PSCBC, 1998:60). Should a manager enter into an agreement after 30 June, he or she would receive an increment on the basis of two quarterly reports and as of the 1 July nearest to the date of the second assessment (ibid). The Director General of the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) or his or her delegate will mediate over disputes that arise from an agreement and should this mediation fail, the dispute resolution procedures of the relevant collective agreements will be used (ibid). In order to ensure that all senior managers entered into performance agreements DPSA agreed to a 5,5% increase backdated to 1 July 1998 if the senior manager signed a performance agreement before 28 February 1999, and an increase from the date of signature after 28 February 1999. As of 1 July 1999 the annual

increments would be linked to the senior manager's performance as per the agreement.

These agreements are open to public scrutiny and filed with the DPSA.

The Director General signs the agreement emphasising his or her commitment to achieving goals of the department within a specified time, taking cognisance of available resources (Public Service Regulations, 1999:31). The Director General's performance will then be measured according to the achievement of the agreed goals. The focus of performance management is good governance and development in terms of the ability of departments to improve service delivery. The service delivery focus is expressed in the principle of the performance management system, that is "...departments shall manage performance in a consultative, supportive and non-discriminatory manner in order to enhance organisational efficiency and effectiveness, accountability for the use of resources and the achievement of results" (ibid)


The senior management in the public service from heads of national to provincial departments and administrations are now accountable to their relevant executing authority to ensure that their performance complies with the policy objectives of the government of the day and to ensure that services are being delivered. The performance agreement between executing authorities and senior management may include the following:

1. The purpose of the managerial position,
2. The functions of the manager,
3. The strategic context of the department,

4. The duties, responsibilities and accountability of the manager,
5. Reporting requirements, and
6. The performance framework which includes the internal and external core responsibilities measured against key outputs within given timeframes (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2000).

The relationship between Director General, Minister and President according to the Public Service Act and amendments can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 1: Relationship between the Political and Administrative Leadership



The aim of the performance management system is to provide an objective measure with which managers' performance can be assessed. The assessment could be used for career

development such as further training and promotion. However, should managers perform poorly, development initiatives such as training can take place or should a manager consistently perform poorly, the agreement can be utilised as an objective measure for dismissal. The performance management agreement can therefore be viewed as a tool to rationalise the public service according to objective measures and criteria. The second aim is to increase accountability and transparency of senior management roles and responsibilities, and to determine whether they are performing their function effectively and efficiently since performance contracts will be open to governmental evaluation and public scrutiny. The third aim is to improve the political and administrative interface between executing authorities and senior management in the public service so that each is aware of his or her responsibilities. This also achieves the aim of improving communication between executing authorities and management. The aim of the performance management system is to initiate a paradigm shift in the public service from a rule-bound authoritarian bureaucracy to one that focuses on performance outputs and outcomes rather than complying with regulations. Thus, the most significant aim of the new performance system is an attempt to improve performance in terms of service delivery. However, an evaluation of performance management within the public service is still premature as the system is currently being implemented. An assessment of performance contracts at Director General level, as of 1998, has yet to be tested as no Director General has been held accountable or received punitive measures for non-compliance according to a performance contract. The effectiveness of the performance management system at Director General level will be discussed in the following chapter.

Another important statute that regulates Directors General is the Public Finance Management Act of 1999, No. 1 which ensures the Director General is responsible for the financial resources of his or her department as the accounting officer. According to the Public Finance Management Act (1999, section 36) a head of a department must be the accounting officer and the employment contract of the head of department must include performance standards. The responsibilities of the accounting officer, i.e. head of department, include:

1. Maintaining an effective, efficient, fair and transparent financial, internal auditing system, procurement and provisioning and capital evaluation project systems and procedures,
2. Effective, efficient, economical and transparent utilisation of resources of the department,
3. Effective systems for collecting all financial resources due to the department, prevention of the unauthorised and irregular use of department resources, prevention of wasteful expenditure and losses resulting from criminal conduct, and management of capital efficiently and effectively,
4. The management of liabilities and the safeguarding and maintenance of assets,
5. Compliance with tax, levy, duty, pension and audit responsibilities,
6. The settlement of contractual obligations,
7. Reporting to the treasury unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure, and also to the tender board for irregular procurement goods and services,

8. The undertaking of effective and appropriate disciplinary action against public servants who contravene the Public Finance Management Act, or undermine the financial management of the department and/or permit unauthorised expenditure,
9. Ensuring the compliance with legislation when transferring financial resources,
10. Taking into account all relevant financial considerations such as value for money and bringing these considerations to the attention of the executing authority,
11. Consulting with and seeking consent from the national treasury on the establishment of a new entity, and
12. Complying and ensuring compliance with the Public Finance Management Act (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: section 38).

In addition to these general responsibilities the accounting officer has responsibilities in terms of budgetary control, which include:

1. Ensuring that expenditure is in accordance with the vote the department received,
2. Effective and appropriate steps are taken to prevent unauthorised expenditure,
3. Preventing overspending, and
4. Reporting to the executing authority and treasury the under-collection of revenue, shortfalls in budgeted revenue and overspending of the department's vote (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: section 39).

The accounting officer also has reporting responsibilities, which includes:

1. Keeping a full and accurate record of the department's financial affairs,
2. Preparing financial statements for each financial year,

3. Submitting financial statements within two months of the end of the financial year to the Auditor General and treasury,
4. Submitting within five months of the end of a financial year to the executing authority the annual report, Auditor General's report and financial statement, and
5. Submitting the annual report, financial statement and Auditor General's report within one month of receiving the Auditor General's report to Parliament (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: section 40). The annual report and financial statements must reflect the state of affairs of the department and its performance against predetermined objectives, losses, unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure, and any criminal and disciplinary action (ibid). The accounting officer must, before the beginning of a financial year, provide the treasury with the prescribed format per month of anticipated revenue and expenditure (ibid). The accounting officer must also provide the treasury with:
 - (a) a monthly report of actual revenue and expenditure for the preceding month, and
 - (b) a report with information of financial transactions of that month, projections of expected expenditure and variances and steps to be taken to ensure that revenue and expenditure remain within the budget within 15 days of each month (ibid).

The accounting officer also has a responsibility in terms of managing assets and liabilities. Should the accounting officer, that is head of department, be unable to fulfil these responsibilities, he or she must report to the executing authority and treasury his or her inability to fulfil these responsibilities with the reasons (ibid). The Public Financial Management Act (1999) places a burden of responsibility on Directors General to

maintain efficient and effective financial control of public resources. According to section 64 of the Public Finance Management Act (1999), for example, the accounting officer is held responsible for unauthorised expenditure. Although it has not been tested as to what the penalty for violating the Act would entail, it can be assumed that a Director General could be charged with misconduct, dismissed or forced to resign.

There appears to be more legislation regulating the public service than before with the legislation often being cumbersome and frequently amended. The legislation is in fact difficult to interpret and somewhat confusing and contradictory. The responsibilities of heads of departments from Secretaries before 1980 to Directors General after 1980 to the 1990's have not fundamentally changed. The basic role of a Director General has remained the same in terms of the management of a department's human resources and the control of a department's financial resources. In fact the job description of a Director General according to the Public Service Act, 1984 is identical to that of the Public Service Amendment Act of 1998. What has changed is the increase in power of the political executive with Directors General becoming subservient. The Director General rather than being the Minister's administrative counterpart is made subservient and accountable to the Minister in terms of performance agreements and the Public Finance Management Act (1999). The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 however, has made the Director General more accountable in terms of financial management of a department, but has limited the role of the Minister to ensure the department complies with the Act, which is to report on the financial transactions of the department to Parliament and to hold the Director General accountable for financial management of the

department (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: sections 63 to 65). The Minister's power has also increased in terms of removing the powers from the Public Service Commission. According to the Constitution (1996: section 196) the Public Service Commission investigates, monitors and evaluates the organisation and administration, and personnel practices of the public service. The role of the Public Service Commission, previously the Commission for Administration, has changed. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) has taken on much of the Commission's policy role.

There is also a contradiction in legislation which allows for the Minister's administrative power to increase as responsibility for certain inputs, both political and administrative has increased. However, it is the Director General who is held accountable for administrative outputs and outcomes. There is also an overlap in functions between the Minister and Director General. For example, as prescribed by the Public Service Amendment Act (1998) the Director General is responsible for amongst other things sound labour practices, but it is the Minister who acts on behalf of the state to manage labour negotiations, conclude collective agreements and resolve labour disputes (Public Service Regulations, 1999:32). Once again, it is the Minister who is involved in administrative matters, and should the labour dispute involve wage negotiations it is legally the Minister's mandate to resolve the dispute which has implications for the financial management of the department, a Director General function. Directors General also appear to be over-regulated which is contradictory to the vision of a transformed public service that is moving away from a rule-bound public service. As already mentioned an important change has been the appointment of Directors General by the President which

will be discussed in the following chapter. Much more power has been given to the political leadership which is not surprising given South Africa's past. The new political dispensation, being suspicious of the public service, sought to control the public service in order to ensure that its policies were implemented. According to Page et al (1999:269) the political leadership of countries that experience a political transition, tends to shape the relationship between the politicians and the public servant in favour of the politicians.

The 1980's did see reforms in the structure and role of the Director General in South Africa. However, the Director General's basic role has remained much the same for the last fifteen years. A change in the appointment process of Directors General and the consequent increase in diversity of the senior management echelon, the increase in demands placed upon the Director General, and the increasing role of the political executive, have impacted upon the Director General. However, one has to question whether there has been a change in the core relationship between the political and administrative leadership of government. The impact of the appointment process and regulatory framework has not changed the relationship between political and administrative leadership as there still exist an elite sharing the same ideological values *albeit* a different ideology to the 1980's. The impact of the regulatory and policy framework has not fundamentally changed the role of the Director General, although there are more demands placed upon current Directors General. Directors General are still the administrative heads of departments responsible for the management of financial and human resources, and policy advice, although in an increasingly complex social, economic and political environment. Thus, whether the role of the Director General has

been transformed is questionable, but it would be more accurate to state that their role is evolving as each political dispensation introduces measures that impact upon the position of the Director General. Thus, in the following chapter the researcher will attempt to provide answers to the research questions:

1. What role did the Director General play in the pre-and post-1994 South African public service?
2. What is the administrative and political interface in South Africa?
3. What ought to be the administrative and political interface in South Africa?

CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

"Great minds think alike, fools seldom differ"- Proverb

The analysis of the data collected from the interviews with Directors General indicate that their role as administrative head responsible for the management of human and financial resources has not changed fundamentally over that last fifteen years. However, current Directors General do appear to have more demands placed upon their role in terms of transforming departments, co-ordinating policy implementation and providing policy advice in an increasingly complex world. This finding is consistent with Larson and Coe's (1999) research on the changing role of Permanent Secretaries in Commonwealth countries. The data also indicates that policy is formulated by elite's with the political and administrative leadership sharing the same ideological values. Thus, the nature of the political-administrative interface in South Africa has not changed either. However, there does appear to be a trend by the political leadership to shape the political-administrative interface in their favour.

Social, Educational and Career Backgrounds of Directors General

The political and administrative leaders of South Africa are in powerful positions to make decisions that affect peoples' lives. Directors General form part of the administrative leadership, an elite group which has similar ideologies and values to the political elite of South Africa. Elitism is evident in South Africa's political-administrative interface and in the formulation of policy both in the pre-and post-1994 eras. Evidence of an ideological collusion will be presented in the section on Politics, Policy and Directors General. The political and administrative leadership of South Africa is not typical of the people of South Africa. They are disproportionately drawn from the upper socio-economic strata of South Africa. They are highly educated with similar socio-economic backgrounds. What distinguishes them from the rest of South Africa is that they have had more opportunities than others. This is even true for current or post-1994 Directors General who form part of a political network of persons who were either in exile or involved in the anti-apartheid struggle.


An analysis of Director General's education shows that English and Afrikaans feature dominantly in their secondary education. However, these languages were requirements of the state education system. Mathematics and Science subjects also dominate Directors General's secondary education. As many post-1994 Directors General were educated in Mathematics and the Sciences as pre-1994 Directors General. Given that the apartheid education system discouraged Mathematics and Sciences in the black education system

one can conclude that many of the black Directors General received a better education than most black South Africans with a few Directors General having attended missionary and boarding schools.


The Directors General who were sampled, are highly educated. Fifty-seven percent have Doctorates, twenty percent have Masters, four percent Honours degrees, and another twenty percent have Bachelor degrees (*see graph 1*). A pre- and post-1994 comparison shows that sixty percent of pre-1994 and fifty-four percent of post-1994 Directors General obtained Doctorates. Directors General's tertiary education is dominated by fields of study in Humanities. Forty-three percent of Directors General sampled have degrees in Humanities, thirty percent in Sciences, twenty percent in Law and four percent in Commerce (*see graph 2*). Most Directors General have a generalist education in Psychology, Languages, Economics, History, Political Science, and Sociology. However, it should be noted that the Sciences also feature quite prominently in both pre- and post-1994 Directors General education with thirty-four percent of pre-1994 and twenty-seven percent of post-1994 Directors General receiving degrees in the Sciences. Most Directors General, pre-1994, obtained their first degrees from the University of Pretoria (28%), while most post-1994 Directors General obtained their first degrees from universities in the homelands (14%) such as the University of Fort Hare, Transkei, Venda and Zululand (*see graph 3*). It is also interesting to note that only one pre-1994 Director General completed his higher degree at a foreign university, while seven of the post-1994 Directors General sampled, received higher degrees from foreign universities. This is quite understandable since opportunities for further education for black South Africans were limited.

Both pre-and post-1994 Directors General can be regarded as elite. They, in their respective periods, share similar socio-economic backgrounds with all receiving a better education than most South Africans. As the data will prove, Directors General were recruited from academia with many of the appointments having some degree of political influence. Pre-1994 Directors General, although originating from academia, were first employed in middle and senior management positions and then promoted to Director General positions. There were only two exceptions from the pre-1994 Directors General sampled who were immediately recruited from academia to Director General positions. Most of the appointments to Director General positions during the pre-1994 era were based on promotion, but with the President or Ministers stating their preference. However, many post-1994 Directors General were recruited from academia and either immediately became a Director General or were placed in senior managerial or policy advisory positions for a relatively short period of time before becoming Director General. Thus, many Directors General, both pre-and post-1994, were selected not only for their qualifications and academic acumen, but also for their shared values and ideology with the political elite.


Graph 1:




Graph 2:



Graph 3:



Graph 4:



Graph 4 shows that in the pre-1994 era almost fifty percent of Directors General were career public servants while only seven percent of post-1994 Directors General sampled were career public servants. Only a few pre- and post-1994 Directors General began their careers in the private sector. Interestingly many post-1994 Directors General worked in the non-governmental sector before entering public service, and a few openly stated that they were involved in political activity on behalf of the ANC while in exile. Most Directors General began their careers as academics (53%) with many spending a number of years in academia, then as senior managers and later selected for Director General positions. However, in the case of post-1994 Directors General they were first academics, then shortly after the 1994 democratic elections were headhunted by the ANC political leadership for senior management or advisory positions in the public service. This

strategy by the Ministers is understandable given that they were suspicious of the senior public service managers who served during apartheid, and wanted a senior management that was not only qualified, but also more sympathetic to their ideology. These appointees were first placed in positions where they would acquaint themselves with the organisational culture of the public service and the requirements of the position as Director General. They were in effect shadow Director Generals learning from senior managers who served during the apartheid years. This caused considerable resentment on the part of pre-1994 Directors General, an issue that will be discussed later. A pre- and post-1994 comparison shows that of the pre-1994 Directors General sampled, two out of fifteen Directors General were headhunted from academia and selected for Director General positions, while of the fifteen post-1994 Directors General sampled all were headhunted and first placed in senior managerial and advisory positions for a relatively short period of time before becoming Directors General.

Contrary to popular belief there has always been a degree of political influence in the selection of Directors General. Political influence took various forms from the Minister or President directly recruiting the person in question, or the Minister or President stating his preference to the Commission of Administration (pre-1994), or to other Ministers in Cabinet (post-1994). Of the pre-1994 Directors General sampled, forty-seven percent were selected for Director General positions based on seniority of service, while forty percent were selected with a degree of political influence and a further thirteen percent were selected based on the criteria of seniority and political influence. Although the selection process of pre-1994 Directors General suggested a process based on objectivity

and a scientific or standardised selection criteria, there is a lack of consistency in the application of selection criteria and procedures by the Commission of Administration, which was responsible for the selection process of Directors General. During the pre-1994 era it was a *fait accompli* who would be the next Director General if the selection was based on seniority. However, if it was a department where the President or Minister wanted to have a direct influence, his preference was made known to the Commission of Administration and the Minister or President would get the Director General he or she wanted. In the post-1994 era this is no different. The selection process of Directors General is supposed to involve a panel of at least three Ministers who would interview a short list of candidates, the preferred candidate's suitability would be discussed in Cabinet and the President would appoint the candidate in question. However, the researcher was informed that this process is merely a legal formality. It is usually a *fait accompli* who the Director General would be as the Minister and President would have already decided on who they wanted as Director General.

All Director Generals claim that they were qualified and prepared for the demands of the position. All base this claim on their training and/or their experience in the public service. It should be noted that pre-1994 Directors General were in senior management positions longer than their post-1994 counterparts who generally served on average about a year as a senior manager before becoming a Director General. Seniority and experience is also reflected in the age when Directors General were appointed. The average age of pre-1994 Directors General is fifty-one and post-1994 forty-two. Post-1994 Directors General are relatively young, ranging from thirty years for the youngest appointee to fifty-five for the

oldest. Comparatively, pre-1994 Directors General ages range from forty-two to sixty-one. There is a justifiable argument that post-1994 Directors General are far too young for such a senior position and lack the necessary experience in managerial and leadership decision making.

Office of the Director General

The Director General role involves many responsibilities, demands and expectations. It is a burdensome role that involves long hours, stress, personal sacrifices, frustration and dedication which often goes unappreciated. Many Directors General, both pre and post 1994, stated that the demands placed upon them makes it difficult to cope given limited resources and the lack of capacity.

Most Directors General, both pre and post 1994, described their day as atypical as it involves anything from meetings that last hours, to travel, to meeting stakeholders. However, there are common trends in all Director Generals' working day. Most Directors General start between six and eight in the morning, with the average day beginning at seven and the earliest at five-thirty. Directors General usually start with correspondence and administrative matters that require their signature. When their personal assistants arrive they are briefed on the day's matters and meetings. Most of the day appears to be occupied with meetings which usually start with a management meeting. Some Directors General have senior management meetings on a daily or weekly basis. These meetings involve senior management informing the Director General of each line function or

matters relating to projects and the implementation of policy. The Director General may also meet with certain individual departmental staff to discuss administrative issues or problems. The rest of the day involves meetings with stakeholders or interest groups which may last an hour or the whole day depending on the issues. Directors General, particularly post-1994, stated that increasingly they have to meet with other Directors General in official forums to co-ordinate policies and programmes. Also impacting upon the Director General's day is meetings with politicians, whether it is in a parliamentary committee or individual meetings. However, a meeting that takes precedence over all other meetings is that of the ministerial meeting. The Director General must avail him or herself to the Minister and other engagements may be suspended for a ministerial meeting. These meetings may be structured or informal from a telephone call any time of the day, to daily or weekly meetings. To illustrate the importance of such a meeting a few Directors General stated that they have a standing order with their personal assistant to interrupt any meeting when the Minister calls, and another Director General (interview, Cape Town: 27 September 2000) stated that he starts the day by having breakfast with the Minister. The meetings with Ministers usually involve a discussion regarding a particular issue, the request for advice or a submission with regards to a policy issue or a problem.

Towards the end of the day, which is usually around six in the evening, the Director General may deal with other administrative matters. Administrative matters involve human resource and financial issues that require the Director General's authorisation. Most Directors General stated that this was the most burdensome and time-consuming aspect of their job, which involved applying their mind to files of human resource and

financial matters. Some Directors General prefer dealing with these files early in the morning when there are fewer distractions, others attempt to deal with administrative matters throughout the day, while others deal with these matters at the end of the day. Directors General also have to make submissions to the Minister and many undertake these submissions at the end of the day while a few stated that they either do the submissions late at night or over the weekend.

Most Directors General only completed their working day late at night. A few Directors General stated that depending on events of the day they may only complete their work in the early hours of morning while most complete their day at about 10pm. On average, most Directors General have more than a twelve hour working day. However, if their day involves travel their working day is usually extended. Another aspect of their job that Directors General find burdensome is the travel between the legislative capital, Cape Town, and Pretoria, the administrative capital. The notion of Directors General enjoying a jet-set life is far from true as many complain that travel distracts them from the office and occupies most of their day which could be used more productively. Directors General are therefore facing many demands which supports Larson and Coe's (1999) finding that Directors General are being "stretched" to meet the demands of their position.

Directors General, post-1994, travel more frequently abroad than pre-1994 Directors General. Fifty-three percent of post-1994 Directors General compared to twenty-seven percent of pre-1994 Directors General stated that they travelled frequently. Sixty percent and twenty-seven percent of pre-1994 and post -1994 Directors General stated that they


travelled once in a while. The most frequently visited countries by all Directors General were the United States of America and countries in the European Union. This finding is consistent with Larson and Coe's (1999) argument that Permanent Secretaries are travelling more frequently as global dynamics impact upon their job.

When Directors General were asked about the negative aspects of the job most of the pre-1994 Directors General complained about the bureaucratic culture of red tape which inhibited innovative ideas and performance. Most of the post-1994 Directors General complained about the lack of personal time and sacrifices they have to make in terms of spending time with their families. Other complaints ranged from the lack of appreciation, to too many responsibilities and high expectations, to the interference of politicians. Five of the pre-1994 and three of the post-1994 Directors General sampled, stated that political interference was a negative aspect of the job. The post-1994 Director Generals' complaint of political interference centred more on the involvement of the Minister in departmental matters. Many pre-1994 Directors General, specifically those that served during the political transition, stated that the political interference in departments and the undermining of the Director General was particularly problematic. For example one Director General (interview, Johannesburg: 5 June 2000) stated that ANC Ministers employed advisors without consulting the Directors General, who were in fact the accounting officers for the department in terms of financial matters. Although the advisors were paid from the departmental budget they had no sense of accountability and lacked fiscal discipline (ibid). When the Director General complained about advisors' excesses he was viewed as obstructionist and reinforced the belief that public servants

who served during the apartheid era were a hindrance to the implementation of developmental policies (ibid). Many Directors General who served during the transition felt that they would have liked to make more of a contribution, but were viewed with suspicion.

Another form of political interference that a few pre-1994 Directors General resented was that policies that they believed were morally correct and administratively possible were often ignored because they were not regarded as politically correct for that period. Many pre-1994 Directors General also resented the political interference via the National Security Management System. To a lesser extent pre-1994 Directors General complained about the loss of personal time, the lack of appreciation and too many responsibilities and expectations. Post-1994 Directors General stated that there are too many responsibilities and expectations, the bureaucratic culture of non-performance and the lack of staff capacity are also negative aspects of the job (*see graph 5*).

Graph 5:



All Directors General stated unanimously that a positive aspect of the job is the contribution one can make in improving the quality of life of South Africans. Many stated that the Director General position offers the opportunity to serve while being involved in important and often historic decisions. As one Director General (interview, Johannesburg: 22 May 2000) stated "a thought could make a difference" which indicates the powerful position that Directors General hold as the decisions they make affect many lives. Directors General, both pre- and post-1994, appear to have an idealistic notion of their position where they have an opportunity to serve others, while some appear to enjoy the power that comes with the position. All things considered, most Directors General stated that they have job satisfaction as they have a sense of achievement and contribution.

Eighty percent of pre-1994 Directors General and all post-1994 Directors General stated that they co-operated with other Directors General frequently. Directors General appear to co-operate for two reasons, namely for administrative and functional support. Most Directors General stated they frequently co-operated for administrative support with the Department of Finance when it involved budgetary matters, and with the Commission of Administration (pre-1994) and Department for Public Service and Administration (post-1994). Functional support took place for various reasons, but usually involved the collective completion of a necessary function or programme such as the Department of Health and Education developing a public awareness campaign on infectious disease, the Department of Agriculture and Water Affairs undertaking a water project for farmers, the

Office of the Presidency requiring the assistance from the Department of Foreign Affairs for Presidential foreign tours, or the Department of Correctional Services and Public Works co-operating in the construction of a prison. However, most of the co-operation that does take place is along administrative and functional lines with little time left for Directors General to develop real innovative service delivery initiatives.

Post-1994 Directors General are having more opportunities to co-operate in official forums such as the Forum for South African Directors General (FOSAD) and Clusters. FOSAD was initially established for the co-ordination of policy implementation and is a forum to ensure the co-ordination of the transformation of the public service. In other words if a Department had a particular implementation programme then other Departments which would benefit from the programme would pool resources towards the implementation of the goal. For example the programme of computer generated identification cards was a co-ordinated effort between the Departments of Finance, Home Affairs and Justice. FOSAD is suppose to meet on a quarterly basis, but during the Mandela presidency FOSAD was just being established and meetings under the auspices of FOSAD were ad hoc. However, since President Mbeki has taken office Directors General stated that they more frequently and regularly participate in Clusters and it appears that the role of FOSAD as a co-ordination forum for the implementation of policy is being usurped. Many Directors General stated that although they are not forced to co-operate, they are in fact obliged to participate in Clusters, which two Directors General stated were just more meetings that they had to attend. The issue of Clusters will be discussed in the section on Politics, Policy and Directors General. Beyond these

formal lines of communication and the occasional telephone conversation, Directors General stated that they do not really have time to co-operate and develop co-ordinated service delivery initiatives.

In the pre-1994 era there were two forums in which Directors General co-operated and communicated. The first was called the *Top Amptenare van die Staatsadministrasie* (TASO) which in English translated to the Senior Officials of the State Administration. TASO convened once a month under the auspices of the Commission of Administration which provided an opportunity for all Directors General to discuss personnel or human resource management issues and administrative matters of common interest with the Commission of Administration. The second forum was an annual retreat which was a strategic planning and co-ordination session in light of the government's policy intentions. At these retreats Directors General were given the government's policy direction. These forums eventually dissipated by 1992, as the government became more preoccupied with the negotiations and transition to a democratic South Africa. When Directors General were asked about the National Security Management System (NSMS) many Directors General would not comment on the functioning of the system, but those who did answer the questions relating to the NSMS stated that it was an efficient system for co-operation and co-ordination in the public service, but they did not like the undue influence of senior security personnel on the civilian public service. Responses relating to questions about the National Security Management System ranged from "...hated it...", to "no comment," to "...it was an efficient administrative system for co-ordination but there

was too much security and secrecy....," to "...it was a good system of dealing with problems at the time."

With the exception of two Directors General, most pre-1994 Directors General stated that they were never forced or told to co-operate with other Directors General. The two exceptions related more to Directors General making too hasty a decision and excluding other Directors General who were affected by the decision. The Directors General were therefore requested to co-operate in that functional area.

Most pre-1994 Directors General stated that they socialised with each other, but this was usually at official functions or when they were in Cape Town for parliamentary sessions. A few stated that they did not socialise because of the nature of their work and the lack of time. The Directors General who were not from the public service ranks, that is those who were not recruited directly from academia, felt as if they were outsiders and therefore did not form any real friendships. Most Directors General based their friendships on functional interaction rather than personal friendships which were more collegial than real friendships.

Most post-1994 Directors General stated that they do socialise with other Directors General, while others stated that due to time constraints and the pressures of work, they do not have time to socialise at all. Most friendships also appear to be along functional lines while a few Directors General openly admitted that they socialise with many other Directors General and politicians because of friendships and the networks forged during

the anti-apartheid struggle and in exile. One Director General (interview, Johannesburg: 8 June 2000) stated that post-1994 Directors General "... are people that came out of the struggle, so its people that I've known, including Ministers, its people that I grew up with them out of the country. So they're not only friends, but they're part of my family. After all, you know, the black elite is very small in South Africa. I know every black person...who has gone beyond a certain education level." The current Directors General appear to have more of a camaraderie than collegial relationship which may be due to their involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle and politics, socio-political backgrounds, the policy and service delivery challenges that they face, and/or their relative youth. However, it does appear that, like in the pre-1994 era, current Directors General are part of an elite who share similar ideological values as the political elite.

In addition to ministerial and parliamentary demands, Directors General face a number of external demands. Sixty percent of pre-1994 Directors General stated that they frequently co-operated with community based organisations (CBO's) and interest groups. Twenty percent stated that they co-operated with CBO's and interest groups once in a while and another twenty percent stated that they hardly ever co-operated. Fifty-four percent of Directors General state that the nature of the interaction with CBO's and interest groups were co-operative, twenty percent accommodative, thirteen percent consultative, and another thirteen percent stated that their relationship with CBO's and interest groups ranged from co-operative to confrontational.

Directors General who served during the transition period and immediately after the 1994 elections stated that they were frequently interacting with CBO's and interests groups. This is understandable given that many South Africans, particularly black South Africans, were alienated from government policy formulation and the democratisation of government provided opportunities for those previously marginalised to articulate their interests in the formulation of policy. In comparison, post-1994 Directors General are interacting with CBO's and interest groups to a lesser extent (47%) and for the most part the interaction with CBO's and interest groups is co-operative and consultative. The possible reasons for the current decline in interaction with CBO's and interests groups is that many of the leadership of these organisations have been employed by government because of their expertise, the democratic process is being consolidated where CBO's and interest groups can lobby politicians, there may be community apathy, or a belief that needs are being addressed. Although the data is inconclusive, Directors General are nonetheless interacting with CBO's and interest groups on a frequent basis. Another external demand, the media, receives a favourable response from Directors General. Most stated that their interaction with the media was co-operative while ten percent stated it was confrontational, and thirteen percent accommodative.

Director General as Manager

Most Directors General, both pre- and post-1994, describe their managerial style as participative and orientated towards people. This is not surprising given that the bureaucracy is essentially an organisation of people. However, the problem is that

Directors General are preoccupied with the management of people and attempt to be inclusive in their decision making. They neglect the real aim or mission of the department and displace the objectives of delivering services. Only twenty-seven and thirty-three percent of pre- and post-1994 Directors General, respectively, stated that their management style was task orientated. There are merits in both styles, that is the people and task orientation.


The people orientated style of management, that is incorporating employees in a participative decision making process, allows employees to feel empowered and part of a process where they have a sense of ownership and commitment to the objectives decided upon. However, given that bureaucracies are usually large, the participative style is time-consuming and inevitably it is the senior management that is involved in the decision making process with the implementation of decisions flowing down the hierarchy. The task orientation style involves senior management deciding upon objectives and ensuring that these objectives are met. The task-orientated style of management has been described as autocratic where employees have to comply with established objectives that have been decided upon by senior management. Although an analysis of management theories and definitions is beyond the scope of this paper, the concept of the Managerial Grid developed by Blake and Mouton (1964) deserves mention as it has relevance to the researcher's argument of participative and task orientation styles of management. Blake and Mouton (1961:8-9) identified two basic managerial dimensions, that is concern for production and concern for people. Blake and Mouton (1964:10-11) through their research discovered that the most effective manager is one who has a balanced

perspective, that is concern for production and people. Less effective managers are those who have a high concern for people and a low concern for production, or those that have a high concern for production and low concern for people (ibid). The management style needed during this period of transformation in the South African public service is a combination of people and task orientation, that is a balance between a concern for people and production. This recommendation will be explored in the following chapter.

Directors General also face the challenge of management capacity in the public service. Most pre- and post-1994 Directors General stated that human resource issues, such as the lack of staff capacity, skills and experience, and personnel conflicts were and continue to present a problem (*see graph 6*). Three Directors General stated that the problem is to attract and retain the best calibre employees, and many of the best performing employees are lost to the private sector which can offer better salaries. A pre-1994 Director General (interview, Pretoria: 6 July 2000) complained that the management capacity in the public service is a problem with many managers lacking the ability to make effective decisions, delegate and innovatively solve problems. Related to the problem of human resources is the lack of performance. Non-performance by public servants either took the form of not delivering services at all, or the lack of quality service delivery, or goal displacement by complying with rules and regulations rather than achieving departmental goals. Other problems that Directors General had to deal with included the lack of financial resources in order to achieve objectives, and the management of the transformation process. Problems related to the transformation of the public service included the constant reorganisation and restructuring that took place during the transition period, the

amalgamation process, and political sensitivity required during this process. One Director General (interview, Pretoria: 6 June 2000) stated that public servants experienced transformation fatigue with many initiatives being implemented without public servants understanding the process before more changes were introduced which created confusion and uncertainty for public servants. Other problems that Directors General mentioned were labour relations and negotiations with trade unions during the transformation process, corruption, and the political interference of politicians in the management of departments.

Graph 6:



Directors General described negative management incidents, and although the researcher cannot provide the specifics of each case as it would compromise the anonymity of the Directors Generals, most of the negative incidents centred around human resource issues.

especially for post-1994 Directors General. The following are examples of incidents, explained in general terms, which post-1994 Directors General described as negative management incidents⁸:

- A Director General believed he should have provided a clearer vision and more leadership during the transformation process in his department.
- A Director General stated that there were many personnel conflicts and mistrust during the transformation process that she had to constantly manage.
- Another Director General stated that the lack of co-ordination and a holistic perspective in planning caused many management problems.
- A few Directors General also stated that constant crisis management is also a problem.
- One Director General described a case where an over-reliance on rules and regulations hampered the resolution of a personnel conflict.
- Another Director General provided a case where he was reluctant to dismiss a non-performing public servant because the Director General had to be politically sensitive.
- Another Director General believed that the dismissal of a public servant could have been handled in a more constructive manner.

Some of the negative incidents described by pre-1994 Directors General include⁹:

- Communication problems with employees.
- The integration of diverse personnel during the transformation period.
- The inadequate planning in co-ordinating financial resources and staff development.

⁸ The examples are drawn from various interviews conducted with Directors General.

⁹ The examples are drawn from various interviews conducted with Directors General.


- The financial monitoring of contractors to deliver services on behalf of the department.
- The lack of organisational skills in the management of the transformation.

Directors General did describe positive management incidents. Interestingly both pre- and post-1994 Directors General described the management of the transformation process as illustrations of positive management incidents. For many pre-1994 Directors General, especially those that served during the transition, the resolution of conflict, the management of the amalgamation process, retaining the commitment of personnel, and being involved in the negotiation process were not only positive incidents, but highlights of their careers. Five of the pre-1994 Directors General described innovative service delivery initiatives which they described as positive management incidents (description of the service initiative will compromise the Director Generals' anonymity), but interestingly none of the post-1994 Directors General described innovations in service delivery as examples of positive management incidents. Other positive management incidents which Directors General described included financial management, leadership, and organisational skills.

Directors General were asked about improvements they wish or wished they could have made to departments. Six pre-1994 Directors General and thirteen post-1994 Directors General stated that they wanted to improve the diversity, staff and management capacity of the department (*see graph 7*). Three of the pre-1994 Directors General stated that they wanted to improve the financial resources of the department, one wanted to improve the

image of the department, two the performance, and another two the planning and co-ordination of objectives. A further two stated that they wanted to improve the role of policy advisors, and four stated that they would have liked to improve upon the management of the transformation process. Three of the post-1994 Directors General would also like to ensure more financial resources for the department so that they can improve staff capacity and service delivery, two would like to improve the image of the department, seven would like to improve the performance of the department in terms of quality service delivery and responsiveness, and three would like to improve the implementation of policy which is related to performance.


Graph 7:



Directors General were asked about the issues that occupy most of their time which appeared to be once again the management of human resources (*see graph 8*). Human resource issues ranged from personnel conflicts, labour relations, staff complaints, resignations and communication. Another issue that occupied Director Generals' time,

which is related to human resource issues, is the problem of non-performance. The management of the transformation also appears to occupy many Director Generals' time as does financial management, policy formulation and planning. Only one Director General, pre-1994, stated that interest groups or stakeholders occupied most of his time.

Graph 8:



Almost all Directors General stated that their responsibilities included the management of financial and human resources, as specified by legislation. Almost all Directors General understood their role. Other responsibilities which Directors General included were leadership, policy advice and implementation, service delivery, co-ordination, and two pre-1994 Directors General stated that ethical conduct was part of a Director General's


responsibility. Only one Director General, post-1994, included information technology as his responsibility.

The following table and graph illustrates the qualities which Directors General believed were necessary for the position as Director General:

Table 8: **Director General Qualities**

Qualities	Pre-1994	Post-1994
Ethical Conduct	1	0
Financial Management	6	5
Human Resource Management	6	5
Information Technology Skills	0	1
Interpersonal Skills (e.g. communications)	6	5
Leadership (e.g. ability to make decisions, give direction, vision)	8	11
Organisational Skills	1	2
Political Sensitivity	1	8
Service Delivery	1	2
Specialist Knowledge	8	1
Understand the culture of the bureaucracy	2	0

Graph 9:



A comparison between pre- and post-1994 Directors General shows that there is relative agreement on the qualities a Director General ought to have such as leadership, interpersonal, financial and human resource management skills. However, an analysis of qualities shows that there is a difference of opinion with regards to political sensitivity and specialist knowledge of a departmental function. It appears post-1994 Directors General view understanding and being sensitive to the political environment and political leadership as being an important quality. This indicates that the role of Directors General is becoming more politicised with Directors General becoming more cognisant of the political dynamics and environment that they have to operate in. Pre-1994 Directors General placed more of an emphasis on specialised knowledge (for example you need to be a doctor in order to be the Director General for Health or an engineer in order to be the Director General for Public Works) as a necessary qualification for the position of Director General. Therefore, the question to ask is; are Directors General becoming more generalist public administrators than specialist policy advisors? The answer to this question is somewhat complex and will be addressed in the following paragraphs, that is the Politics, Policy and Directors General, and Commentary on Transformation.

Politics, Policy and Directors General

In order to answer this question one needs to examine the nature of policy making between Directors General and Ministers, and Presidential styles, i.e. the political-administrative interface. All Directors General understand their administrative roles of human resource and financial management. They have all articulated these areas of

responsibility as their domain. However, policy formulation appears to be the area where there is not only confusion about the respective roles of Directors General and Ministers, but also where the boundaries between the political and administrative interface become blurred.

Pre-1994 Directors General appear to have been more specialist in their functional fields in terms of policy formulation. Although a dichotomy between the political and administrative leadership did not exist during apartheid, there was more of a dichotomy than the current political-administrative interface. When pre-1994 Directors General, especially during the Botha presidency were involved in policy it was more at a specialist and technical advisory level. They were cognisant of the political dynamics, but seldom involved themselves in the political domain. The administrative-political interface during this period was more a function of P.W. Botha's presidential style, and the dominant role that President Botha and his Ministers played in the formulation of policy. P.W. Botha's presidential style is described by many Directors General as efficient and "hands on." Some referred to President Botha's style as autocratic, authoritarian, and militaristic, but well organised. A few Directors General described President Botha as difficult, lacking in interpersonal skills and often not encouraging honest and open communication from advisors, Ministers and Directors General. However, most Directors General agreed that President Botha was meticulous, could analyse voluminous reports and could submerge himself in the details of policy issues. A Director General who served during the Botha presidency stated that for the first time, proper minutes of Cabinet meetings were taken by a proper Secretariat, government was organised and activities co-ordinated (interview,

George: 1 June 2000). President Botha was described as more of a manager than a leader by being involved in the daily operations of the public service ensuring that decisions were being implemented through various committees such as that of the NSMS.

Although President Botha surrounded himself with decisive Ministers in their own right, they were agreeable to his views, and Directors General were relegated to more of an administrative role than a proactive policy formulation role. Ministers mandated by Cabinet decisions would request Directors General to make policy submissions in this regard. Most Directors General during this period stated that the policy formulation process would typically involve the Minister providing policy direction, a discussion would follow with the Minister, and the Director General would be requested to develop the policy further. The Director General, after consultation with the senior management of the department would develop the policy, which would then be submitted to the Minister. The Minister had the final decision and it was considered unprofessional to disagree with the Minister. Once the Minister approved the policy the Director General would be responsible for its implementation.

It was seldom that Directors General became involved in political decision making even in the NSMS. It appears that they implemented requests made by the political leadership and committee chairs. Another factor that impacted upon the interface between the political and administrative leadership during the Botha presidency, is that the training that public servants received was in the Westminster tradition and those who were academics provided specialised advice rather than engaged in politics. However, it should

be borne in mind that Directors General did share similar ideological values to the political leadership and therefore did not have to challenge political decisions or contradict the Minister in their advisory capacity. Thus, Directors General during the Botha presidency were complacent in the administrative and policy implementation role. In fact, when Directors General were asked about their responsibilities more Directors General during that period answered that they were responsible for policy implementation than formulation.

The transition period, that is early 1990's, proved to be an administrative dissonance for many Directors General. During this period they became more involved in the formulation of policy and the political domain. This was not only due to the negotiation process which required more input, but also President De Klerk's presidential style. President De Klerk was described more as a "hands off" manager and more of a leader. Most Directors General stated that President De Klerk had a more open and personable approach than his predecessor. He welcomed different perspectives and ideas, and was described as a good listener. However, a few Directors General criticised his neglect of providing policy direction to Directors General by focusing more on the CODESA negotiations. A Director General who served during the De Klerk presidency stated that; "...he (De Klerk) didn't check up whether Cabinet decisions were implemented and was a very nice person to work with and you could disagree with him and all that...(but) the most difficult period for anything to happen was the last year before the '94 elections because the total Cabinet just focused on various negotiations, summit negotiations, and we (Directors General) couldn't get any decision out of Cabinet. It was a disaster, so it

put us (Directors General) back a long way because the focus was totally political" (interview, Pretoria: 14 April 2000). Some Directors General had more scope than others and became involved in political negotiations while others had to develop more co-operative relations with the leadership of the ANC alliance. Some Directors General appeared to have a positive view of this period by becoming more actively involved in the formulation of new policies and most stated that they felt they were making a contribution to a democratic South Africa. Many were involved in advising Ministers during the negotiation period, others were involved in new developmental policies through a more inclusive consultative processes, and others contributed to the development of new national symbols and ideas. Most Directors General described the period as exciting and stimulating.

However, during this period and particularly after the 1994 democratic elections some Directors General also had a difficult time in coming to terms with the increasing politicisation of senior managerial positions in the public service and the marginalisation of their role. During the period 1994 to 1995 the political leadership of the democratic dispensation began to appoint advisors and other senior managers who shared similar ideological values. This is not at all surprising given that many Ministers were somewhat suspicious of Directors General who served before 1994. These advisors and senior managers were Directors General in the making, accountable to the Minister and not to the Director General. Many of these advisors and senior managers eventually became Directors General. Directors General who served before 1994 viewed this as political interference and resented the role of advisors. Some also stated that they had difficulties

in working with some Ministers who did not understand their respective roles. A few Directors General stated that Ministers sometimes became directly involved in the administration of the department.

Thus, during the 1980's the policy role of Directors General followed more of a political-administrative "dichotomy" with Directors General providing specialist input during the formulation of policy and leaving politics to the Minister. This was more of a function of President Botha's style of management and governance system. However, in the period during the transition and following the 1994 elections the role of the Director General became more politicised with Directors General providing specialised and political advice during the negotiations and consolidation of democracy. The period after 1994 saw an increasing politicisation of the Director General's role, and the increasing role of Ministers and their advisors.

Since 1996 the nature of the political and administrative interface becomes somewhat complicated. Most Directors General when asked how they would typically formulate policy stated that the Minister provides the policy direction and a discussion follows with the Director General making advisory inputs. The Director General after a participative and consultative process with the relevant departmental senior management and stakeholders formulates the policy. The policy is submitted to the Minister who may approve the policy or may request adjustments. The policy may be redrafted until the Minister approves of the policy. The difference between the policy formulation process in the 1980's and the late 1990's is that there appears to be more of an exchange of views

between the Minister and Director General with joint decision making, although the Minister has the final decision. The policy formulation process also appears to be more co-operative with Directors General not only providing specialist advice, but being cognisant of political dynamics and the needs of the political leadership. This is due less to their intellectual astuteness than the political network that operates among the political and administrative elite.

The policy formulation process cannot be generalised for all Ministers and Directors General. There are different scenarios in which policy is formulated between the Minister and Director General. The following typology describes Ministers and Directors General as either "weak" or "strong." This does not imply that Ministers and Directors General are personally, politically or administratively "weak" or "strong." The reference to the terms "weak" and "strong" relates to the relative relationship between the Director General and Minister. For example, a Director General may be more decisive and have more specialised knowledge than the Minister who trusts the Director General in the formulation of policy. This also implies that the Director General is aware of the policy and political direction, and ideology of the political leadership. Another scenario may be where a Minister and Director General may have strong views on a policy and neither of whom wishes to compromise their viewpoints in policy formulation. Another scenario is where a Director General may not be competent for a particular portfolio and the Minister may be more preoccupied with the political consolidation of power than his or her responsible portfolio. A scenario may also exist where a Minister is quite dominant and decisive in his or her decision making and is actively involved in the formulation and

sometimes implementation of policy making, taking on some of the responsibilities of the Director General. In this scenario the Director General is relatively “weak” and the Minister “strong.” The policy formulation process and the extent to which the Director General is involved in the formulation of policy is therefore dependent on the nature of the relationship between the Director General and Minister, in other words the political-administrative interface. An illustration of the different scenarios or typology in which policy is formulated is as follows:

Figure 2: **Political-Administrative Interface in South Africa**

Strong Director General/ Strong Minister	Weak Director General/ Weak Minister
Strong Director General/ Weak Minister	Weak Director General/ Strong Minister

The policy formulation process between a strong Director General and weak Minister can be explained as follows. The Director General initiates the policy and discusses it with the Minister who provides the Director General with the scope to develop the policy further. The Minister and Director General would discuss the policy and the Minister would approve the policy on the advice of the Director General. In other words the Director General is given the scope to play a dominant role in the formulation of policy either due to the fact that the Minister is preoccupied with politics, is relatively apathetic, or relies upon the Director General's specialised knowledge and accepts the advice. The Director General also has an intimate knowledge of political dynamics and shares the same ideological values as the political leadership. The other scenario of a strong Minister and weak Director General is when the Minister not only provides policy direction and leadership but is actively involved in the formulation of the policy and takes

upon some of the Director General's policy formulation and sometimes implementation responsibilities. The Director General is usually weak and generally provides advice that supports the Minister's views and does not seriously challenge the Minister in an advisory capacity. There is also the scenario where a Minister is relatively strong and Director General also has strong views. This often leads to a situation of conflict. An example of this scenario is the former Director General for Health, Dr. Olive Shisana and Minister Zuma. The scenario of a weak Minister and weak Director General also exists. The result of this political-administrative interface is that the formulation of policy is of a poor quality and the administrative capacity is lacking. An example of this scenario is the former Director General of Home Affairs, Mr. Albert Mokoena and Minister Buthelezi. The above scenarios are not a desirable state of affairs nor should policy be formulated in this manner. The manner in which policy ought to be formulated will be suggested in the following chapter.

However, government in late 1999 developed an integrated approach to the formulation and implementation of policy. This has impacted upon the way policy is formulated but does not fundamentally change the dynamic which exists between Minister and Director General. The integrated approach to policy deserves attention as it involves Directors General in Clusters. There are five Clusters relating to the social, economic, governance and administration, justice and crime prevention, investment and employment, and international relations sectors. The Social Clusters comprise Arts and Culture, Education, Health, Housing, Sport and Recreation, Water Affairs and Forestry, and Welfare Departments. The Economic Cluster consists of the Departments of Agriculture, Land

Affairs, Communication, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Finance, Minerals and Energy Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Transport. The Departments of Provincial Affairs, Public Service and Administration, and Public Works form the Governance and Administration Cluster. The Investment and Employment Cluster consists of the Departments of Labour, Public Enterprises, and Trade and Industry. The Departments of Justice, Correctional Services, Home Affairs, Intelligence, Defence and Safety and Security form the Justice and Crime Prevention Cluster. The Cluster on International Relations comprises of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Intelligence. There are a number of Directors General who may be part of one or more Clusters. The notion of Clusters is derived from a desire to co-ordinate the implementation and monitoring of policy. The aim of Clusters appears to be threefold. Firstly, that the President and Cabinet are adequately informed of issues related to the achievement of policy objectives. Secondly, that there is a level of co-ordination between and among the Office of the Presidency, Cabinet Committees, and Clusters. Thirdly, to ensure that the implementation of policy does in fact take place.

The integrated policy decision process involves five phases, namely planning, policy initiation, analysis, decision and adoption, and implementation and monitoring (Cabinet Memorandum, 1999: 1). The planning phase involves the development of an integrated annual policy plan which is based on policy programmes of all Ministries and submitted to the Cabinet Office in the Office of the Presidency (*ibid*). The plan is determined by national priorities set by the Cabinet and President (Cabinet Memorandum, 1999: 2). It is therefore the President and Cabinet that determines priorities, the Ministry in conjunction

with the Department that establishes policy programmes in *lieu* of these priorities which is submitted to the Cabinet Office for assimilation into a national annual policy plan. The plan is submitted to Cabinet which ensures that individual Ministerial policies are consistent with national priorities (ibid). The initiating policy process flows from the needs identified within the national framework of priorities and is communicated to the Cabinet Office, and Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services by the initiating Ministry or Department (ibid). A draft Cabinet memorandum is developed by the initiating Ministry or Department and once approved by the relevant Minister is then analysed by the relevant Director General Cluster, Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, and technical teams from the public service (Cabinet Memorandum, 1999: 3). The responsible public officials such as the Director General develops a memorandum based upon these stakeholders' inputs for consideration by the initiating Minister (ibid). Once the Minister has approved the memorandum it is then submitted to the relevant Cabinet Committee which mirrors Director General Clusters, but consists of Ministers and Deputy Ministers (ibid). The Cabinet discusses the recommendations made by the relevant Cabinet Committee and makes a decision (ibid). Once the policy is adopted, the initiating Minister communicates the decision to the Ministry and Department (ibid). Cabinet communicates the decision to the relevant Director General Cluster with a view to integrating implementation of the policy (ibid). Thus the relevant Director General Cluster co-ordinates the implementation and monitoring of the policy as adopted by Cabinet.

The integrated policy process in theory shows that there is more co-ordination among Directors General. This is consistent with Larson and Coe's (1999) finding that policy is becoming more co-ordinated requiring Directors General to develop linkages across departments. The Minister or Director General, in light of national priorities set by Cabinet, may initiate policy. The researcher could not accurately determine the extent to which Ministers or Directors General are initiators of policy. As mentioned earlier this depends on the "weak/strong" interface between Minister and Director General. The development of national priorities and the formulation of policy within this framework also confirms that the formulation of policy in South Africa tends to be elitist.

The role of advisors and interest groups in the formulation of policy also deserves discussion. The majority of pre-1994 Directors General used the senior management within the department as advisors and seldom employed external advisors or consultants. In the period prior to and after 1994, Directors General were obliged to be more inclusive in the formulation of policy by becoming more participative and consultative with interest groups, stakeholders and Ministerial advisors. Current Directors General do not only consult with senior management from the department, but external advisors as well. Although this inclusiveness should be welcomed as an increase in diverse policy perspectives and an increase in democratic participation, there should be a balance. Interest groups may limit the expediency of the formulation process, or for other intentions may also inhibit the process all together. The result could be a paralysis in policy formulation. A Director General (interview, Cape Town: 19 June 2000) explained his frustration with interest groups in the following manner; "We cannot have an election

every five years and now for me to implement government policy I must have mini-elections with all NGO's (non-governmental organisations) ... stakeholders cannot overrule the elected Parliament ... the people whom we have elected by way of democracy should give final instructions." Although interest groups or stakeholders have the right to democratically participate in the formulation of policy, it should not result in a paralysis of governance and the policy process. The participation of interest groups in the formulation of policy should be a balanced process. Their participation in the policy formulation process should be limited to consultation as they are advisors representing a particular constituency.

The following table is a comparison between pre-and post-1994 Directors General when asked questions that related to the degree to which they provide specialised and technical advice, whether they represented a particular cause or group, whether they had to mediate between various interests, and whether Director General were or are involved in partisan politics.

Table 9: Policy Formulation Variables

Variable	Pre-1994		Post-1994	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Technical advice	87%	13%	100%	0%
Cause	67%	33%	67%	33%
Mediate	100%	0%	87%	13%
Group	47%	53%	73%	27%
Partisan politics	0%	100%	0%	100%

Most Directors General provide specialised knowledge or technical input in the policy formulation process. The two exceptions during the pre-1994 period related to the

Directors General having limited input because they had "strong" Ministers who had specialist expertise in the area as well. The researcher found that most Directors General were qualified in the specialist area of their respective departments and are qualified to provide specialised knowledge in the formulation of policy. Those Directors General, during the pre-1994 period, who stated that they represented a particular cause during the formulation of policy, either represented the cause of service delivery, the people of South Africa, the disadvantaged, or the objectives of government. Similarly, post-1994 Directors General stated that they represented the cause of the department, the people of South Africa, and a majority of Directors General stated that they represented the disadvantaged and the poor. This was a similar response to the question relating to representing a group. Most Directors General, pre-and post-1994, who responded positively to this question stated that they often represented the interests of the poor and disadvantaged during policy formulation. Although all Directors General stated that they never became involved in partisan politics, three pre-1994 Directors General stated that they were frequently asked, and four of the post-1994 Directors General stated that they were asked, and one post-1994 Director General admitted that because of his ideological background he is sympathetic to a particular political party.

There appears to be an ideological collusion of minds between Directors General and Ministers in the formulation of policies and as in the past, most Directors General do not seriously oppose the nature of the policy although they enter into a discussion with the Minister as to the content and form of the policy. However, there is another factor that impacts upon the formulation of policy in the late 1990's, that is the presidential style of

President Mbeki. Directors General describe President Mbeki as more of a manager than his predecessor. President Mandela is described as a good leader, personable and is respected by every Director General. However, President Mandela is described as more of a "hands off" manager and more of a leader than a manager. In fact, during the Mandela presidency Thabo Mbeki was managing government and conducting Cabinet meetings. President Mbeki is described as very much a "hands on" president who is efficient, intelligent, well read, knowledgeable about many issues, and has the ability to analyse detail. President Mbeki is apparently very much involved in the formulation of policy through a staff of advisors in the Office of the Presidency (an Office that continues to increase in staff component) and through feedback received from Cabinet and its committees. This is the same description and in fact the same terms used by pre-1994 Directors General to describe President Botha's presidential style. It is certainly not the intention of the researcher to equate President Botha and President Mbeki as they have different ideologies and their policy goals are different. However, it is significant that they do share similar presidential styles of management. There are of course problems with this presidential style. President Mbeki may be inclined to become involved in too many issues for which he does not have the specialised knowledge and expertise. This may lead to making unqualified statements such as his recent comments about the causes of HIV/AIDS, or he may become a "jack of all trades and a master of none." A president should be a leader providing the country with a vision and his Cabinet with political and policy direction. This is why President Mandela was an effective leader as he not only had the interpersonal skills to be leader, but he also provided South Africa with the vision of reconciliation and development. President Mbeki has yet to find his leadership niche

and will only do so once he relinquishes his presidential style of "hands on" management and leaves the technical advice during policy formulation, and the administration and implementation of policy to the specialists, Directors General. A recommended political-administrative interface and the role of the Director General as policy advisor will be discussed in the following chapter.

Transformation Commentary

Directors General were asked questions relating to the transformation initiatives. The majority of Directors General viewed the transformation of the public service in a positive light with some Directors General, who served during the transition period, stating that they wished they could have done more to diversify the staff component of their departments. Directors General were asked about transformation initiatives such as fixed term and performance contracts, and presidential appointments. Although pre-1994 Directors General had no experience with performance agreements as these agreements were only introduced in 1998, many were nonetheless willing to provide an opinion.

Ninety-three percent of Directors General, both pre- and post-1994, are supportive of fixed term contracts. Ninety-three percent of pre-1994 and one hundred percent of post-1994 Directors General are supportive of performance contracts. However, there are a few reservations from both pre-and post-1994 Directors General about these initiatives. Most Directors General are supportive of fixed term contracts of five years as it enhances performance. It enables the political leadership after five years to remove a Director

General who is not performing. However, there is the danger that with every five years there is an election which could result in a turnover of Directors General who may not share the same ideological views as the political leadership. This turnover can be counter productive as recent changes in administrative leadership proved that uncertainty and instability in departments resulted in poor performance and low morale. The fixed term contracts is also a useful tool to increase diversity, creativity and innovative ideas as it avoids stagnation and ensures "new blood" at the most senior level of the public service. However, the problem is that Directors General who are aware that they may only be in the position for five years may not have a long-term vision. Their planning and policy focus is therefore short term, neglecting initiatives that may be more effective but are beyond their tenure. The fixed term contracts may also result in a loss of competent Directors General. Some Directors General may have their contracts renewed for another five years, but given the pace of work and extent of their responsibilities most retire after five years and are duly employed in the private sector with better remuneration. Also, given the relative youth of the current Directors General there is a possibility that they will find more lucrative careers in other sectors. However, most Directors General support the idea of fixed term contracts that are no less than five years. Most state that it takes a year to acquaint oneself with a particular department, another year to finalise policies and another three years to implement. Also, the administration of transformation initiatives takes considerable time and frequent changes in administrative leadership often results in new transformation initiatives, which in part contributes to a lack of commitment by public servants to these initiatives and transformation fatigue.

It has been suggested that Directors General enter into three-year contracts. The reasoning is that Directors General should form part of a management team at the disposal of the State which can redeploy any Director General to another portfolio. It is argued that Directors General should formulate policies during their first three years of office and should then be rotated so that there are new initiatives in the implementation of the policy and complacency is therefore avoided. Three-year contracts are problematic. Firstly, the constant turnover will be counter-productive. Secondly, Directors General may receive better employment offers from other sectors, both locally and internationally, and their skills will be lost to the public service. South Africa is in competition in a global market for scarce skills, particularly at this senior managerial level. Thirdly, it is a dubious assumption that after three years of policy formulation Directors General may become complacent. In fact it may be the case that a Director General will become less concerned about the feasibility of implementing a policy if he or she will not be responsible for the implementation nor will the Director General consider the outcomes of the policy. If the Director General is involved in the formulation of a policy and implements it as well, then it follows that he or she will ensure that the policy is implemented as it was intended and evaluate it making adjustments as necessary. Three-year contracts also assumes that there is a vast pool of persons qualified to assume the position of Director General, but the reality is that there is a lack of skills in South Africa and it takes considerable time and effort to fill the position of Director General. The redeployment of Directors General also assumes that Directors General have generalist skills and can manage any department despite lacking the specialist expertise. It should be borne in mind that Directors General are the

administrative leaders of a department employed specifically for their expertise in a particular area and thereby able to provide specialist advice to a Minister, who in turn provides a department with political leadership and support, and it is the Minister who can be deployed to any portfolio.

There has also been a suggestion that the role of the Director General as administrator and policy advisor should be separated. A Director General (interview, Johannesburg: 9 June 2000) explained the future role of Directors General as follows; "The Minister calls the DG of the Department and sits down with the DG and says, 'This is my policy. I want you to implement this. Is it possible? How much do we need for it?' And so on. Then goes to Parliament, asks for the money, and contracts you as a Department to deliver on that policy. And then when you deliver, that policy unit of the Minister in his or her office monitors your delivery. That's why it becomes easier when you criticise the Department for failing to do certain things. It's not like you are attacking the Minister for failing, it's the Department. And the Minister can stand out from that Department he or she is responsible for, and criticise it where it fails to implement his or her policies, and hold the DG accountable. But our system is not like that. The role of the DG and policy advisor is linked into one, and therefore Ministers tend to defend nonsense because an attack on their Department's performance is an attack on them as well, because the decision around policy and a decision around implementation originates from the same people, the Minister and the DG. That's probably one thing that has to be changed as time goes on, in our public service...That's your core problem, because for as long as the DG is

both the policy advisor and manager of his Department you are bound to find these conflicts...there's a whole document which was given to Thabo Mbeki..."

The above quote firstly illustrates that there is a proposal that Ministers should divorce themselves from the political responsibility of a portfolio and that the accountability of policy should be the sole responsibility of a department, vis-à-vis the Director General. This in effect allows a Minister to absolve him or herself from policy accountability and to "pass the buck." Secondly, the quote illustrates that Directors General are becoming subservient to the political executive with Directors General playing less of a role in policy formulation. Thirdly, the quote shows that there is a growing trend of employing generalist managers for government departments and divorcing Directors General from their specialist advisory role. Should this idea come to fruition the role of the Director General will change to generalist public managers/administrators, while policy and specialist advice will be concentrated in the Office of the Presidency. The researcher has identified these trends already taking place as some Directors General, without specialist expertise are being deployed to various departments. There is also the increasing use of advisors in the Office of the Presidency, and the concentration of policy formulation in Cabinet, Committees and Clusters. Thus, to answer the posed question, are Directors General becoming more generalist public administrators than specialist policy advisors? The analysis of current trends indicates that Directors General are becoming more generalist managers with some specialist expertise, and the formulation of policy is being co-ordinated through the Office of the Presidency. Although co-ordination of policy is welcomed, the role of the Director General in providing specialist advice and input on the

administrative feasibility of policy should not be marginalised. This argument will be explored in the following chapter.

Most Directors General support the idea of performance agreements as it not only enhances performance, but structures the relationship between Minister and Director General where the Director General knows his or her respective responsibility and roles, and cannot be dismissed for arbitrary reasons. Directors General therefore not only view performance agreements as a tool for ensuring performance, but as an insurance against political whims and therefore adds an objectivity to the political-administrative interface. However, some Directors General although in agreement with performance agreements have certain reservations. The performance of a Director General is firstly intangible and difficult to measure. According to one Director General there are too many variables, for example the performance of other public servants and contractors, is not controllable. Furthermore, the nature of the public service is such that the measure of service delivery is difficult given that there is no bottom line or benchmark as in the private sector where profit is measurable. In fact, many Directors General recognised performance contracts as a private sector initiative which is not really feasible for the changing public sector environment (see Chapter 2). According to another Director General (interview, Cape Town: 14 September 2000) the difficulty lies in measuring performance according to standardised measures and criteria. The public sector environment is such that there are many variables, which constantly change and outcomes differ across sectors (ibid). One Director General (interview, Pretoria: 6 July 2000) stated that although it is a useful tool to ensure performance, in the public sector there are always limited financial and human

resources which often inhibits performance. Many Directors General stated that the performance agreements are inadequate and are not really taken seriously. Their skills are in demand and there is an intrinsic awareness of the lack of staff capacity and financial resources which inhibits performance. Another Director General (interview, Cape Town: 14 September 2000) stated that the performance agreements contain too much detail and not enough substance with performance criteria being too generalised. Also, the nature of the political environment is such that there is more of an importance placed on political horse-trading than policy outcomes (ibid). A Director General also stated that one cannot be held accountable for non-performance when the outcome of a policy and its implementation lies in the domain of provinces and other role-players, and is dependent on human capacity which may be beyond the control of the Director General (interview, Cape Town: 14 September 2000). The Director General argued that if a Minister decided that the performance measure was the development of policies, the Director General stated that he could develop as many policies as the Minister would like and then according to the performance agreement the Director General would meet the performance measures (ibid). However if these policies had negative outcomes or were not achievable, he believed he would fail in his capacity of serving the people (ibid). Performance contracts have strengths and weaknesses, but linked to the fixed term contracts it could be a useful instrument to enhance performance. However, the instrument should not be punitive, but provide Directors General with incentives to perform. In other words, dismissal should be a last resort and a more constructive strategy would be to appoint qualified and competent persons to Director General positions in the

first place. This would require a review of the selection process which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Another transformation initiative is the change to presidential appointments of Directors General which was introduced in 1999. This has been widely misunderstood as it is not the President alone who appoints Directors General. As mentioned earlier, the short list of candidates for the Director General position are interviewed by a panel of three Ministers and after the selection interview the candidate is discussed at Cabinet level with the President being the appointing authority after Cabinet approves the candidacy.

However, as also already mentioned, it is generally a *fait accompli* who is appointed to the Director General position since it is usually decided at a higher level who the Director General would be. The extent to which the President decides who should be appointed is unknown. Political influence has always been a reality. The present role of the President in the appointment of Directors General has strengths and weaknesses. The first and obvious danger is that the President will appoint loyalists who support his or her ideology and would thus inhibit the articulation of alternative ideas in decision making. Thus, the Director General would be agreeable to any decision made by the political leadership. Secondly, a more extreme danger could be the appointment of Directors General who are not only loyal in terms of ideology but also rewarded for their patronage. Another danger is also nepotism and cronyism which could become a reality if there are no checks and balances that ensure Directors General are appointed based on competence.

However, as more and more countries around the world have discovered, there are merits to the President being the appointing authority of senior management in the public service. Firstly, it provides the President with the opportunity to increase diversity at senior management level in the public service in terms of race, gender and ideas. The increase in diversity of Directors General is particularly relevant given the racial and gender distortions in South Africa. It also offers the President the opportunity to appoint persons not only from the public service, but from other sectors as well. This is also relevant in South Africa where there is a shortage of skilled black persons who are suitably qualified for the position of Director General and it therefore offers the President the opportunity to appoint persons from a larger skills pool.

Secondly, the appointment of Directors General by the President allows for an intermediary when it comes to a conflict between the Director General and the Minister. Should a conflict develop between the Director General and Minister, the President as the appointing authority can intervene to resolve the conflict or could redeploy the Director General to another department without the public service losing a skilled person. This reasoning was the motivation for introducing of the Public Service Act 5 of 1999. There had been conflict situations between Ministers and Directors General such as the much publicised conflict between Minister Zuma and Dr. Shisana. Many of these Directors General resigned and their skills were lost to the public service. Legislation was therefore introduced so that the President could appoint the Director General and could therefore mediate between the Director General and Minister should a conflict develop. Although the reasoning is valid for the introduction of such legislation, it is problematic in the first

place to have a conflict situation between Minister and Director General. The redeployment of Directors General should be a last resort as the turnover of administrative leadership does have a negative effect on performance of departments. This turnover would not only affect one department but at least two as there are spillover effects to the redeployment of Directors General. This strategy also assumes that Directors General are more generalists than specialists and can be redeployed to any portfolio. This also supports the belief that there is an increasing generalisation of the Director General's role.

In conclusion some of the findings can be summarised as follows. The Director General in South Africa has an administrative and a policy advisory role. Since the 1980's the Director General's administrative role has not fundamentally changed. They continue to be administratively responsible for the financial and human resource management of a department. However the present incumbents do appear to face more demands and pressure than their predecessors. They are responsible for the transformation of departments with the inevitable problems which result from rapid change. Directors General are required to co-ordinate activities across departments and co-operate with other Directors General in various forums. They have to ensure the delivery of services in a complex socio-economic environment with various constraints and are now held accountable for performance. In the following chapter some of these implications will be explored.

The Director General's policy advisory role within the political-administrative interface appears to be changing. Although there has never been a genuine political-administrative "dichotomy" between Directors General and Ministers over the past fifteen years, the policy role of the Director General is becoming more politicised. The political-administrative interface in South African tends towards what Aberbach et al (1981) termed the "pure hybrid image." Policy roles have converged between the Directors General and Ministers. The bureaucratisation of politics was especially evident during the Botha presidency with policy being formulated in committees. President Mbeki's style of policy formulation in committees, which co-ordinate the decisions and activities of politicians and senior bureaucrats, once again converges the roles of politicians and bureaucrats.

There appears to be an ebb and flow between the political or administrative leadership's involvement in the polity. During the De Klerk and Mandela presidencies, the administrative leadership played a more dominant role in the formulation of policy. This was a function of the political leadership's pre-occupation with negotiations, transition and consolidation of democracy. This period required technical input from the administrative leadership with an understanding of the political dynamics of that period. However, during the Botha and Mbeki presidencies the political leadership has played a more dominant role in the polity. The relative dominance of the political leadership in the formulation of policy during the Mbeki presidency will continue even to the extent that the administrative leadership may be relegated to the task of managing departments rather than actively participating in the formulation of policy.

The politicisation of the bureaucracy has also been evident to various degrees over the past fifteen years. However, it is more explicit with the presidential appointments of Directors General. The research also indicates that the policy role of Directors General is declining, favouring a more dominate role by Ministers in the political-administrative interface. This finding is consistent with arguments made by Page and Wright (1999), and Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000), that policy is becoming more politicised than bureaucratised as there is a gradual shift of policy from the administrative to political arena. The Director General and Minister ought to have an equal partnership in the formulation of policy rather than either dominating the process. The Minister should provide policy direction while the Director General should advise the Minister on policy in terms of specialist knowledge, and the administrative and financial feasibility of the policy. The following chapter provides a normative model of what the role of the Director General ought to be.

CHAPTER SEVEN

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The research has explored many issues such as the imperatives to change in the modern state and the trends in international public sector reform, the change from the apartheid state to a democratic dispensation, and the consequent transformation of the public sector in South Africa. These changes have impacted upon the Director General to some degree. Directors General face more demands in terms of their administrative role and an increasing politicisation of their policy role. There is an implicit paradox that current and future Directors General will face. Directors General are required to be managers in their administrative capacity, but at the same time are required to be leaders in their capacity as policy advisors. They are becoming over-extended to meet administrative and policy demands. Directors General are required to manage human and financial resources, and at the same time required to keep abreast of policy issues that affect their department and South Africa.

Management and Leadership

"Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other" - John F. Kennedy¹⁰

According to Korac-Kakabadse et al (2000:1) leadership is a much abused management concept which is often uncontextualised and emphasises individualist traits deemed transferable between the private and public sectors. There are as many definitions and theories of management as there are of leadership. Management and leadership are not the same either in concept or in practice. Management involves functions and activities related to planning, organising and controlling (Gibson, Ivancevich and Donnelly, 1991: 363). Leadership involves the interaction between people where one person modifies the behaviour of others through motivation and influence (Gibson et al, 1991:364). A manager may direct, instruct or command, but unless others follow voluntarily, there is no leadership (Gibson et al, 1991:365). Leadership therefore is the function of a person influencing another to accept his or her request without the exertion of force (ibid). Stephan Covey (1989:101) explains the difference between leadership and management in the following manner; management is a lower order focus with most managers concerned with the question of "how best can I accomplish things," while leadership is a higher focus concerned with the question of "what are the things I want to accomplish?"

Ingstrup and Crookall (1998) conducted research with public service organisations that were reputed to be the best performing organisations for at least five years. The research involved senior management responding to open-ended questionnaires with a final

¹⁰ Kennedy, J.F.K., A speech to have been delivered in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963

sample consisting of forty organisations in fourteen developing and developed countries. Ingstrup and Crookall (1998) discovered a number of variables that influenced the effectiveness of a public service organisation, and although it is beyond the scope of this paper to adequately discuss each variable, Ingstrup and Crookall (1998) identified leadership and mission statements as two of the key variables.

Ingstrup and Crookall (1998:53) believe that leadership involves a leader assisting an organisation in the development of a shared mission, that is a unity of purpose. They (ibid) discovered that effective leadership requires listening, involving and delegating, dispersion, commitment, consistency and leadership beyond borders. Listening involves not just hearing what public servants or employees have to say, but actively listening to understand what they are saying which requires listening with empathy (Whetton and Cameron, 1995:267). Most Directors General when responding to the questions relating to communication stated that they do listen to employees concerns and problems, but there are often time constraints.

Involving, delegating and dispersion refer to leaders involving employees in decision making and activities, and empowering and enabling employees to undertake certain responsibilities and activities (Ingstrup and Crookall, 1998:55). Most Directors General do involve senior management in decision-making, but do not appear to have faith in delegating responsibilities to managers in departments. This is expressed in their lack of faith in the capacity of management in their departments. Commitment by employees is also essential to effective leadership (Ingstrup and Crookall, 1998:57). According to

Ingstrup and Crookall (1998:57-58) public servants are increasingly clear about what they want from leaders and if they are encouraged public servants can respond with performance beyond expectations. Exemplary leadership requires more than cajoling employees into activities, but involves creating a rewarding environment for employees (ibid). Directors General do not appear to have achieved this attribute of leadership. Most appear to be crisis managing, setting activities and cajoling public servants rather than developing an environment where public servants feel rewarded, and will be committed to the leadership and mission of the department. It is therefore not surprising that many public servants are not motivated and suffer from transformation fatigue.

Consistency is another aspect of effective leadership and requires a leader to undertake three basic actions. Firstly, the leader must be consistent with and focused on achieving the organisational mission (ibid). Secondly, a leader's individual style must be consistent with the organisation's preferred leadership style, and thirdly a leader must be consistent in word and deed (ibid). Directors General do not display consistency in terms of achieving the organisational mission. In addition, because most Directors General have been appointed, they are not familiar with the style of leadership needed in the department. Directors General should undertake a concerted effort to understand the organisation and its culture. Some Directors General do lead by example, but others are not visible and consistent in their communication. The last important attribute of leadership is leadership beyond borders, that is external leaders whose responsibilities extend beyond their own organisation, and lead in the community and networks of related organisations as well (Ingstrup and Crookall, 1998:62). Most Directors General appear to

be external leaders as they have the opportunity to provide leadership in co-ordinated forums such as Clusters. However, Directors General external leadership is limited by time constraints. As mentioned earlier, Directors General do not have time to explore emerging paradigms and develop new service delivery initiatives.

It is seldom that one finds a person with management and leadership abilities. However, given the complex environment in which Directors General function, it is important for them to be leaders rather than managers to meet the increasing demands of their position. They should provide direction towards the achievement of the departmental mission, and motivate employees to achieve departmental objectives. They should avoid becoming too engrossed in personnel problems and mundane management matters. Human resource issues that do not have a financial implication, bearing in mind the Director General is the Accounting Officer, should be delegated to senior management.

Most Directors General regard themselves as leaders. They have always been in leadership positions and have been respected for their leadership abilities in these positions. Directors General who were interviewed said they have the potential to be leaders, but regress into management roles because of the demands of their position and the lack of management capacity in their departments. As discussed earlier, most Directors General stated that they have a participative style of management as they want to involve other levels of management in decision making. However, it is suggested that Directors General should be leaders of a transformation process in departments that incorporate all levels of management in a concern both for people and for accomplishing

organisational objectives. Thus, a process that incorporates both a participative and task orientated approach in the transformation of departments and ultimately the delivery of quality services is recommended.

The participative process should include as many public servants as possible to develop a common value system such as the mission statement for the department. This process of developing a mission statement should as far as possible be a participative one where all employees understand the mission of the department. Moreover, employees will develop a sense of ownership and commitment to the mission of the department. It should not be a strategic planning exercise for the sake of a planning exercise, but a concerted effort to incorporate every public servant of a department in the decision making process of developing a common set of values for delivering quality services to all South Africans.

Directors General were asked about strategic planning processes in departments and sixty percent stated that the process usually involved senior management going on a retreat facilitated by a consultant. Only twenty percent of Directors General stated that the strategic planning process for their department was internal by allowing all public servants to participate in the planning process. The twenty percent of Directors General who incorporated a more internal process of strategic planning stated that this was possible because they either had small departments and thus fewer staff, or they incorporated a bottom up process of each division in a department developing a mission statement which was finally assimilated into one departmental mission statement. The twenty percent of Directors General proved that it is possible to have more of a

participative strategic planning process, although it may be more cumbersome and time-consuming.

However, there are long term benefits to planning and establishing organisational objectives. Three alternative strategies can be suggested, depending on the nature and size of the department, for a more participative strategic planning process. This would hopefully result in more commitment and belief in mission statements and organisational objectives. The first option is that if the department is small in size and number of employees, then it is possible for all employees to participate in a strategic planning process, employing the services of a consultant, or using the senior manager of corporate services or planning to facilitate the process. The second option is to use line managers of each division to facilitate a strategic planning process for each division and then using the services of a consultant or collectively all senior managers to assimilate each division's mission statement into a departmental mission. The third alternative is to use information technology such as e-mail for relatively large and dispersed departments to incorporate the ideas of employees into a departmental mission statement by once again using the services of a consultant or senior managers. Once a department has developed a mission statement it is important that the exercise be not just an academic one, but one that is implemented and adhered to as far as possible. In other words, the mission statement should be accepted and visible, and should provide guidance and a mandate for the Director General to develop strategies and objectives to achieve that mission statement.

The Director General should then adopt a more task-orientated style of management for the achievement of the decided mission statement. It is the Director General, guided by the decided upon mission statement that makes the mission of the department possible by establishing objectives and ensuring that objectives are being met through senior management. The Director General therefore provides leadership and manages the objectives of the department through senior management and other line managers. This strategy requires Directors General to do the following:

1. Understand the mission of the department,
2. Develop objectives and strategies to achieve the mission statement of the department by consulting senior managers and the Minister,
3. Provide leadership to managers in the department by providing direction and guidance in the achievement of objectives,
4. Communicate this guidance and direction in a clear, consistent and unambiguous manner,
5. Delegate the implementation and monitoring of objectives to managers in the department, and
6. Evaluate the achievement of objectives in terms of performance agreements.

This strategy for the achievement of objectives in the light of the departmental mission statement will release Directors General from the demands and pressure they complained about, and they would essentially be leaders rather than managers, especially crisis managers. Thus, delegation will reduce the long working hours, and release the Director General to focus on more strategic policy objectives. The Director General should

therefore be a leader and his or her managerial role should be reduced by delegating certain responsibilities, such as the implementation of policy and the transformation process with its consequent personnel problems, to other levels of management. The delegation of responsibilities may require a review of existing legislation.

Thus, the Director General should provide administrative leadership by facilitating the development of organisational objectives in the context of the departmental mission statement, strategic plan and the policy framework. The implementation of strategic objectives should be delegated to senior management and the Director General should monitor the achievement of objectives, and control the financial resources in the achievement of these objectives. Thus, the evaluation of the transformation process as well as information systems and research capacity needs to be improved.

The lack of management capacity within the public service needs to be addressed as well. Training and educating public servants to meet the challenges of an ever-changing environment and to improve management capacity is essential. Training and education is needed to develop excellence in the public service, and although it is a long-term process, it is an investment in human capital, and hopefully the quality of service delivery will improve and public sector inefficiencies will be reduced.

According to the White Paper on Public Service Training and Education (1997: section 5.5) the formulation, implementation and evaluation of training and education programmes will be conducted according to the following principles:

1. All public servants will be have access to ongoing and meaningful opportunities for education, training and personal development,
2. Public service training and education will focus on outcomes and competencies rather than inputs, and
3. Public service training and education will be promoted in a manner which will enable public service institutions to become learning institutions capable of continuous development.

However, as mentioned in Chapter Four, there are problems in the training and education of public servants. Moreover, a low priority is accorded to the education and training of public servants (Westhuizen, 1999:37). Many national and provincial departments have failed to utilise their training budgets and in the majority of cases expenditure on training and education represented less than one percent of the annual salary expenditure (Westhuizen, 1999:38). Many departments have failed to provide adequate financial and human resources available for education and training of public servants (ibid). Another problem is the lack of co-ordination as training needs are addressed by a variety of providers from local and international public and private sectors (ibid). Westhuizen (ibid) suggests that a transformed approach to the training and education of public servants is needed, which should be aimed at providing public servants with a needs-based, outcomes-based and competency-based approach.

In 1995 the South African Qualifications Authority Act was passed which provides for a National Qualifications Framework. The South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA)

is attempting to change the old institution-led, time-based models of training and education to a standardised system which recognises skill outcomes and competence (Westhuizen, 1999:39). It is not the intention of this paper to debate the merits of outcomes-based and competency-based education (an often contentious issue in South Africa), but it is important to note the training and education outcomes as envisaged for public servants and others. The outcomes can be summarised as follows:

1. Identify and solve problems in which responses demonstrate critical and creative thinking,
2. Work effectively in a team, group, organisation and community,
3. Organise and manage one's activities responsibly and effectively,
4. Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information,
5. Communicate effectively using visual, mathematical and/or written presentations,
6. Use science and technology effectively and critically, showing responsibility towards the environment and health of others,
7. Demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems (macrovision)
8. Reflect and explore a variety of strategies to learn more effectively,
9. Participate as a responsible citizen in local, national and global communities,
10. Be culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts,
11. Explore education and career opportunities, and
12. Develop entrepreneurial opportunities (South African Qualifications Authority, 1996:20-21, and Wessels, 2000:318).

Hilliard and Wissink (1999:11-19) suggest that an alternative approach or model to the training and education of public servants needs to be developed. They (1999:10) argue that there is a need to develop "all-rounders" for the public service, which consists of people who are capable of handling change efficiently, and flexible enough to adjust to dynamic environments. Plato in 386BC suggested that an institute be established to develop public officials and leaders who would be able to meet the challenges and pressures of office. There is still merit in this suggestion as public officials face a world that is increasingly complex and changing with increasing challenges to deliver services. It is therefore suggested that regional schools of governance be established in each province to train and educate current and future public managers.

Students who have excelled in an undergraduate degree in various fields should be recruited for regional schools of governance where they are educated in the field of public administration, public management and public policy. After completing the necessary courses graduates receive a postgraduate degree in Public Administration. The schools should be based on the French system (*Ecole Nationale d' Administration*), but taking cognisance of the South African context. For example, to avoid the potential of elitism, nine provincial schools of governance should be established. The regional representation of public managers in national departments will add to the diversity of different sectors of South African society in government. Students who graduate from the schools with above average grades should be recruited by national government, but also have the option of being employed at provincial and local government.

The curriculum for the schools of governance should be developed in conjunction with South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) and according to SAQA requirements. The curriculum should consist of theoretical and practical components over at least a two-year period. The first year should equip students with the theoretical foundations and critical skills needed to function within the public service, specifically at a management level. The core theoretical courses should include the study of public policy, public sector management (public financial and human resource management), project implementation and service delivery, applied research, ethical and regulatory systems, leadership and decision making, and communication. Students should also be required during the first year to choose an elective course in their area of interest. The suggested elective courses could include community, local and provincial government studies, international and diplomatic studies, public economic and fiscal studies, and public policy and social studies. The core and elective courses should equip students for their second year and second component of the degree, that is an internship. Students should be placed, depending on their interest, in local, provincial and national government, non-governmental and civic organisations, state enterprises and statutory bodies. During the internship, students should be mentored by a designated manager within the appropriate organisation. The internship should be a meaningful and constructive experience so that students can acquire practical skills and critically apply knowledge. It is also suggested that during the second year of the programme students should complete a research project based on the internship. The successful completion of the theoretical and internship components of the programme would provide the public

service with graduates who have both the knowledge of public administration, management and policy as well as practical skills.

Graduates of these schools of governance should be placed at the lower levels of management and those who excel at the lower levels of management should be fast-tracked into middle management positions. Eventually through experience and further training these managers may be promoted to senior management and Director General positions. The British system of fast-tracking and grooming public servants for senior managerial positions has met with some success (see page 53-55). Although, fast-tracking will attract graduates into public service and improve the diversity at senior managerial level, it is suggested that this system should first be conducted on a pilot basis, and continually monitored and evaluated by the South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI).

The training and education needs of current public managers should be identified through the use of performance contracts. The training of current public managers could also be undertaken by these regional schools of governance. Current public managers could opt for the degree programme of two years or enrol for specific courses which would be a diploma component of the programme. Public managers at local and provincial levels of government would be trained at the respective regional schools of governance, and public managers at the national level of government could opt for a school of governance in Gauteng.

The suggested training, education and fast-tracking model will hopefully improve the calibre of public managers at all levels and future Directors General as well. The training and education of public managers for Director General positions thereby incorporates a more career system to the appointment of Directors General. It will provide senior management within the public service with an incentive to perform given the possibility of promotion. However, a preferred system of meritorious promotion does not preclude the President from appointing suitably qualified persons from outside the public service to Director General positions. The training and education of public managers will provide a larger skills pool from which Directors General can be selected and provides the President with more of a choice. Training and education will also improve the management capacity of the public service which is severely lacking and places innumerable demands on current Directors General. Thus, the training and education of public managers will also enable the Director General to become more of a leader than manager as the public managers would be more equipped to deal with delegated responsibilities.

The selection and appointment of public managers to Director General positions are equally important. The selection and appointment of Directors General is currently clouded with secrecy. The status quo is not desirable. The selection process by a ministerial interview panel, consisting of three Ministers, should be more open and transparent to the public. There should be more public scrutiny of the selection process, especially since the Director General is the Accounting Officer, responsible for the financial management of a department. A parliamentary committee should be involved in

this scrutiny process since the Director General is accountable to Parliament for the financial management of a department. This committee should consist of the chairs of the Standing Committee of Public Accounts (SCOPA), the Portfolio and National Council of Provinces Committees for Public Administration, and a member from each opposition party. The committee for the selection and appointment of Directors General should play an oversight role.

Once a vacancy for a Director General position is identified, it should be openly advertised. A shortlist of candidates should be generated by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in conjunction with the Minister and management of the department where there is a Director General vacancy. The shortlist of candidates should be evaluated according to criteria such as suitable qualifications, experience in the management of human and financial resources, the development of policy, and leadership qualities. The criteria should be developed in conjunction with the South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI), Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), the Public Service Commission (PSC) and Cabinet. The candidate should be interviewed and requested to make presentations to Cabinet as well as the oversight committee. The proceedings of the committee should be open to the public and media. It is important that the public, through the media, be adequately informed about the Director General of a government department. The media could therefore play a scrutiny and informational role.

Cabinet should decide upon the most suitable candidate for the position of Director General. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Public Service Commission (PSC) should attend as observers during the Cabinet session for the appointment of the Director General. Once Cabinet has agreed upon the most suitable candidate, the Director General is appointed by the President. The oversight committee should be informed on the President's reasoning in the appointment of a Director General. This would hold the executive arm of government accountable to the legislature, and provide a system of checks and balances in the appointment of Directors General.

The training, education and selection process of future Directors General have been recommended in order to develop excellence and leadership in the public service. It is the Director General who is responsible for the human and financial resources of a government department, for transformation of government departments and society, and the delivery of services to South Africans. This is a position that deserves and necessitates leadership and excellence.

Political and Administrative Interface

"The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him" - Niccolo Machiavelli¹¹

As discussed in the previous chapter, presidential appointments of Directors General have increased the politicisation of the public service in South Africa. However, as noted, there are strengths and weaknesses in presidential appointments. It is however recommended that the presidential power to make appointments be retained with the addition of certain checks and balances. The training and education of public managers will ensure meritorious promotion as well as the appointment of qualified Directors General. The selection and appointment process as described earlier will ensure objectivity, impartiality and transparency in the appointment of qualified Directors General.

The political-administrative interface in South Africa should ideally be a partnership between equals and there should be synergy in the formulation of policy. The Minister should articulate the political vision of government with specific policy priorities to the Director General. The Minister should provide political leadership for the department under his or her portfolio, and should buffer and assist the Director General in the political environment. The Director General on the other hand should provide the department with the administrative leadership by facilitating the development of strategic

¹¹ Machiavelli, N. (1935) *The Prince*, London: Oxford University Press (translation by Luigi Ricci)

objectives. These strategic objectives should be consistent with policy envisaged by the Minister as well as the departmental mission statement.

As explained in the previous chapter, the political-administrative interface in South Africa is dependent on the personal relationship between Directors General and Ministers. This relationship was explained in terms of a “strong” or “weak” dynamic between Director General and Minister. Thus, using Aberbach et al’s (1981) typology of the relationships that exist between politicians and bureaucrats the following political-administrative interface is suggested for the South African context.

Figure 3: **Normative Model of Political-Administrative Interface in South Africa**

Strong Director General/Strong Minister Then Political-Administrative Dichotomy	Weak Director General/Weak Minister Then Pure Hybrid Relationship
Strong Director General/Weak Minister Then Energy-Equilibrium Relationship	Weak Director General/Strong Minister Then Fact-Interests Relationship

The political-administrative dichotomy as explained by Aberbach et al (1981:5) describes the relationship between politician and bureaucrat in dichotomous terms where the politician formulates policy and the bureaucrat implements the policy. A qualified version of the political-administrative “dichotomy” would complement the Strong Director-General/Strong Minister relationship. The Minister and Director General would have to understand and respect each other’s roles. The Minister would develop specific policy objectives. The Director General would only provide limited advice in terms of the financial feasibility of the policy, but would to a large extent be concerned with the

implementation of the policy. This would to a large extent avoid conflict situations as neither would be encroaching on the other's roles since the roles would be distinct. Thus, each would have their separate domain of influence. The image of "fact-interests" is more appropriate in addressing the problems associated with the Weak Director General/Strong Minister interface. According to Aberbach et al (1981:6-9) the "fact-interests" image is where both politician and bureaucrat participate in the formulation of policy, the bureaucrats bring facts, knowledge and technical expertise while politicians bring values, interests and constituency concerns to the formulation of policy. The presentation and articulation of facts based on specialist knowledge and technical expertise by the Director General would offset the dominance of the Minister in the formulation of policy. The Director General would be empowered by the use of knowledge and facts when making submissions to the Ministers. Thus, alternative policy options would be initiated by the Director General based on valid and factual arguments.

The image of "energy-equilibrium" described by Aberbach et al (1981) is more appropriate for the Strong Director General/Weak Minister interface. The "energy-equilibrium" is described as a policy formulation process involving the bureaucrat and politician as both are concerned with politics (Aberbach et al, 1981:9). This is the case in the Strong Director General/Weak Minister relationship where both are involved and cognisant of dynamics of the political environment. However, according to Aberbach et al (ibid) the distinction is that the politician articulates broad, diffuse interests while the bureaucrat mediates narrow, focused interests. This image would address the dominance of the Director General in the political-administrative interface as the Director General

can be more practical, pragmatic, and provide a policy equilibrium by understanding the political dynamics and diverse interests. The Minister on the other hand could satisfy diverse constituency interests and be idealistic in policy, but has to articulate these diffuse interests to the Director General and the policy objective that the Minister envisaged. Thus, the Minister also has to provide a policy equilibrium by articulating political interests to the Director General who provides more practical input in the formulation of policy.

As noted in the previous chapter the “pure hybrid image” represents the convergence of roles between politicians and bureaucrats (Aberbach et al 1981:16-19). The result is a bureaucratisation of politics and the politicisation of the bureaucracy, and an overlap of roles between politicians and bureaucrats (ibid). This image is only relevant when the political-administrative interface is one where there is a Weak Director General/Weak Minister. In other words, the Minister and Director General complement each other’s roles. The Minister assists the Director General where he or she may be weak in policy advice and the Director General assists the Minister in his or her policy direction. It is often the case that the Director General is weak in policy advice because the Director General and senior management of the department do not understand the policy direction of the Minister or the political dynamics. The Minister should therefore articulate policy objectives and sensitise the Director General and senior management to the political environment. This could be achieved in a committee style of policy formulation where politics, policy and options are discussed between the Minister, Deputy Ministers, Director General and senior management. The formulation of policy in committees would

also involve the Minister in the bureaucracy so that he or she obtains a better understanding of the dynamics and constraints within the bureaucracy.

The normative model of the political-administrative interface, incorporating Aberbach et al's (1981) typology, is to address the imbalance that results from weak and strong relationships between Directors General and Ministers. However, a more ideal political-administrative interface is one where there is an equal partnership. The Minister who is mandated by Cabinet and cognisant of political dynamics, provides the Director General with policy direction and leadership. It is the responsibility of the Director General to provide the Minister with practical and specialist advice on the administrative, technical and financial feasibility of the policy. The Director General in conjunction with the department and in consultation with senior management and other role-players develops the policy until it is approved by the Minister. The Minister makes the final decision to adopt the policy and should be held accountable for the adoption of the policy, but not the implementation thereof. The Director General should be held accountable for the financial feasibility, negative outcomes (if any) and output of a policy. Thus, the Director General should have the right to disagree with the Minister in a constructive and professional discussion. The Director General should be able to challenge the Minister should the implications of the policy lead to an unfunded mandate, unauthorised expenditure or an illegal activity as prescribed by legislation. Thus, there are checks and balances in the political-administrative interface. This would enhance the quality of public policy as alternative perspectives would be incorporated into the formulation of policy and the implementation would also be improved given the pragmatic input.

Another check and balance that can mediate the relationship between Directors General and Ministers is the system of five-year contracts and performance agreements. All Director General appointments should be based on five-year contract with an annual performance review. Should a Director General's performance prove to be unsatisfactory to both the Minister and President for three consecutive years, or if a Director General has engaged in an illegal activity, the President should have the power to dismiss the Director General or request his or her resignation depending on the circumstances. This notion of performance review is different from the three-year contract where Directors General are redeployed for policy implementation purposes discussed earlier. Should a Director General be an asset to the public service in terms of performance and service delivery then the Director General's contract should be extended in agreement with the Director General. However, a Director General should serve no longer than eight years. The eight years is sufficient time for a Director General to develop long term strategies and policies, and to ensure their implementation. A Director General who serves longer than eight to ten years (two five year contracts) will be inclined to create a fiefdom or in Knott and Miller's (1987) terminology an "imperial bureaucracy."

The fixed term contracts should be linked to the performance agreements entered into between the Director General and his or her respective Minister. As mentioned earlier the non-performance of a Director General should warrant a dismissal or request for resignation. The annual review of a Director General's performance should be a constructive feedback session between Minister and Director General where specific

objectives are set with time frames for achievement, but the establishment of objectives should be a joint decision making process which is mutually agreeable. The objectives must be realistic and achievable, which forms part of a long-term strategy and complements the departmental mission statement. If the Minister and Director General decides that the set objective is the development of a policy, it should follow that positive intended outcomes should also form part of the objectives. The Minister and Director General should develop an equal partnership in formulating policy with the Director General providing advice, and the Minister securing the political support for the policy. The performance agreement should not result in a subservient relationship between the Minister and Director General, but should rather be an instrument that enhances performance through a partnership between the Minister and Director General each knowing their respective roles in ensuring the achievement of agreed policy objectives and the departmental mission.

The achievement of objectives should be rewarded either with monetary bonuses or through some other form of recognition. It is also recommended that the remuneration of Directors General should be improved given the demands placed upon them. However, consistent failure over three years to meet objectives should be brought to the attention of the President and discussed in Cabinet where a decision should be made on the future of the Director General. This discussion at Presidential and Cabinet level prohibits arbitrary decision making by one Minister or the President and provides a check and balance for the Director General. Furthermore, performance agreements should be applied to all senior managers and not only to Directors General. It is somewhat unfair to expect a

Director General to implement a policy if all management, which is also responsible for the implementation of policy, is not held accountable for their performance. Performance agreements should therefore be entered into between a Director General and other managers, and their performance should be reviewed annually by the Director General.

This chapter sought to provide some recommendations for the future role of Directors General in South Africa. Directors General face a complex and changing world with ever-increasing demands placed upon them. They need to be equipped with the skills, knowledge and competencies to meet these demands. An essential element of their role is leadership in terms of the capacity to meet the demands of the changing environment by providing vision and direction. They should not be relegated to the role of manager, but be leaders in both their administrative and policy roles.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Alice: "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

Cat: "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." - Lewis Carroll¹²

Governments are facing increasing pressures to deliver quality public services with limited resources in an increasingly complex and changing environment. Governments face the increasing pressure of integrating and competing in the global market. This has required governments to change economic and social policies in order to manage industrialisation, unemployment and poverty while investing in education and other services to compete in the global market. Governments are also facing an increasing population and urbanisation. This necessitates an increase in the delivery of public services. There are challenges such as technological developments and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, and old problems of war and social instability, all of which impact upon the global market and require government to find solutions. The changing role of the state and the pressure on the modern state prompted many governments to reassess the role of the public service. The traditional manner in which the public service functioned was becoming increasingly anachronistic.

¹² Carroll, L. (1907) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. London: Heinemann

Internationally, many countries have met these challenges by reforming their public services. Most notable in the public sector reform effort are the United States and Britain which have exported these reforms to many countries. Although public sector reforms have been criticised for incorporating private sector principles and the success of these reforms is difficult to quantify, most would agree that the delivery of services in these countries have improved.

However, in South Africa the post-apartheid government not only faces the challenges of globalisation, technological developments, AIDS, population growth, poverty, etc. as do most countries, but the government is also faced with addressing the legacy of apartheid. South Africa has to transform the exact institutions responsible for transforming South Africa from an apartheid to a democratic state. South Africa had to transform its public service so that it could address the inequalities of apartheid, provide services efficiently and effectively to all South Africans, and enable South Africa to compete in the global market. However, this was a public service that had entrenched the apartheid ideology in its organisational culture, staff component, procedures and systems of services delivery. South Africa's public sector transformation process was therefore compounded by the apartheid legacy.

The change in South Africa from apartheid to democracy has had an enormous impact on the public service. South Africa embarked upon a transformation process, which had a

major impact on the state, the delivery of services and the public service itself. The transformation process involved *inter alia*:

1. The rationalisation and restructuring of the homeland, self-governing territories' and apartheid administrations into one national public service,
2. The adoption of affirmative action programmes to increase representivity of the public service,
3. An attempt to improve institutions and management,
4. The development of human resources through training and education,
5. An attempt to improve service delivery,
6. The introduction of a code of ethics to instil professionalism in the public service, and
7. An improvement in labour relations and working conditions.

South African public sector transformation is to a large extent based upon the reforms in Britain and other Commonwealth countries. The South African transformation process is problematic, complicated, incoherent and lacks strategic implementation. The impact of the South African public sector transformation process has been difficult to assess and it is suggested that further research needs to be conducted in this area. Transformation has also impacted upon the most senior of public servants, the Director General.

This paper has attempted to assess the impact of transformation on the role of the Director General by exploring several research issues:

1. What role did the Director General play in the pre-and post-1994 South African public service?
2. What is the administrative and political interface in South Africa?
3. What ought to be the administrative and political interface in South Africa?

The Director General in South Africa has two basic roles; one being administrative head of a government department and the other being policy advisor to the Minister. In South Africa, the policy and administrative roles of the Director General are interrelated. The findings of this paper indicate that the basic role of the Director General as administrative head of department has not changed over the past fifteen years. The Director General is still responsible for the financial and human resources in his or her administrative capacity. Legislation, prescribing these roles, has not changed fundamentally. Directors General both from the pre-and post-1994 eras face the same problems and issues, the management of financial and human resources. This will persist into the future and needs to be addressed by improving management capacity.

However, what has changed are the demands placed upon Directors General. There is more pressure on Directors General to perform through the use of performance and five-year contracts, and the Public Financial Management Act (1999). However, current Directors General do not take these contractual agreements seriously as they are part of a political support network and are aware that they enjoy a relative monopoly of skills in a country where many have been educationally disadvantaged. The pressure to perform is more political than contractual, that is current Directors General appear to be responsive

to their Ministers and the President rather than fulfilling contractual agreements. Thus, one could argue that the relationship between Directors General and Ministers are more personal than legal. These personal relationships are evident as Directors General accompany Ministers to new portfolio's. For example, the Environmental Affairs & Tourism Minister, Mr. Mohammed Valli Moosa, who was previously the Minister for Constitutional Development, brought Dr. Chrispian Olver to the Department of Environmental Affairs to head the department. Welfare Minister Dr. Zola Skweyiya appointed Ms. Angela Bester (previously Director General for the Public Service Commission) as his Director General after working together at the Department of Public Service & Administration and the Public Service Commission. Moreover, the President also plays a role in determining which Director General is appointed to key positions such as the appointment of Commissioner Jacki Selebi to the South African Police Services, and Mr. Sipho Pityana to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Directors General also face pressure from Ministers and the public to transform departments while concurrently delivering services in a complex environment. This requires Directors General to solve human resource problems, to transform departments and deliver services with limited financial resources in a demanding political and social context. There is also more pressure to consult with stakeholders. Directors General since 1994 are interacting and co-operating with each other to a greater extent. There are forums and Clusters in which Directors General have to meet on a regular basis in order to devise strategies for policy implementation. This finding is consistent with Larson and

Coe's (1999) findings where Permanent Secretaries are co-operating as a senior management team breaking down the traditional barriers between departments.

Thus, the changes in the last part of the twenty-first century have resulted in a change in the role of the state and thereby necessitated a change in the role of the most senior public servant. Directors General are therefore facing more demands although their fundamental administrative role (management of financial and human resources) has not changed.

However, there is the trend to restrict Directors General to their management role. The Minister for Public Service and Administration, Ms. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi has stated that the changes in the Director General role are necessary because government needs managers more than policy-makers (Financial Mail, 29/10/1999). This would in effect result in a role dichotomy where the administrative and policy roles of the Director General are separated. The Director General would be responsible for the management of a department rather than providing policy advice to a Minister. The Minister would then dominate policy which would lead to an undesirable and unequal relationship between Minister and Director General. The Director General would therefore not be able to provide a check and balance in the formulation and implementation of policy. Thus, the Director General, as a manager, would be subservient to a Minister, and would merely implement policy as prescribed. A Director General, as a manager, enables the Minister to play the leadership role resulting in an unequal political-administrative interface.

The Director General should be the administrative leader and the Minister the political leader. The Director General should provide the Minister with direction and pragmatic advice on the administrative feasibility of a policy while the Minister provides the Director General with policy direction and the political support for the policy. This relationship should encourage open and honest discussion, and the opportunity for professional disagreement. However, the relationship between the administrative and political leadership is not always equal and Aberbach et al's (1981) typology has been suggested as a means to address the inequalities that may exist between Director General and Minister. However, the ideal political-administrative interface should be one of an equal partnership where both Minister and Director General understand and respect each other's roles. The relationship between Minister and Director General should be professional rather than personal, and should be based on the achievement of policy outcomes that are politically prudent, administratively feasible and in the public interest.

A Director General should be a leader in his or her administrative and policy roles. The management and implementation of policy should be delegated to other levels of management. The administrative role of the Director General is to provide vision, direction, and leadership to achieve policy and departmental objectives. In order for the Director General to delegate some managerial responsibilities to other levels of management an investment in education and training is needed to improve management capacity at all levels.

However, the trend towards Directors General becoming managers and rather than policy advisors may be a reality as Director General's policy advice is becoming more diffuse in Clusters and within the national policy framework. The formulation of policy also appears to be more centralised, consolidated and top-down with the Office of the Presidency playing a dominant role in the formulation of policy. The policy role of Directors General is therefore changing and becoming more politicised. However, in South Africa the policy role of the Director General has always been politicised. Politicisation is due to the selection process of Directors General which provides an opportunity for the appointment of Directors General who share the socio-cultural values of the political elite. According to Page et al (1999:7-8) the recruitment and selection patterns of senior public servants shape the culture of the public service. Presidential appointments have therefore increased the politicisation of the Director General position, which has strengths and weaknesses. However, the appointment of qualified persons to Director General positions should not be based on personal or political connections, or shared ideology. This is unsustainable and does not allow for an equal political-administrative interface. Moreover, the appointment of Directors General based on personal connections and loyalty does not allow for dissenting or trouble-shooting policy advice. The selection and appointment of Directors General should therefore be a more transparent process.

The selection and appointment of future Directors General should be based on excellence in the ability to deliver services in an increasing complex environment rather than political connections. Moreover, if South Africa wants excellence in its public service, it

has to train, educate, develop, recruit and appoint excellence. The role of the Director General is certainly not an easy one especially with the increasing demands by the public and political leadership, the difficulties in the political-administrative interface, the transformation South Africa is experiencing, and the changing global environment. However, future Directors General ought to approach their two basic roles, administrative and policy roles, as follows.

The Directors General in their administrative capacity should be leaders with the ability to deliver, provide vision, and meet the challenges within a changing global environment. They should focus departments and management on performance and the achievement of policy objectives. Directors General should adopt a participative approach, internally and externally, towards the achievement of objectives. Directors General should also be encouraged to develop co-operative systems for innovative service delivery whether it is within the department, with external stakeholders or other governmental institutions. In terms of the policy role, they should focus on the outcomes of policy, the administrative feasibility of a policy and attempt to understand the political direction of the Minister and the political environment.

South Africa is transforming its institutions and consolidating its democracy. It is still attempting to clarify its constitutional and institutional arrangements whether between the executive, legislature, judiciary and/or within the executive branch of government.

Within the executive branch of government there exists an uncertainty about the political-administrative interface. However, current trends indicate that the political leadership is

playing a dominant role in this relationship. This supports the argument that there is an increasing convergence between politics and administration with the role of senior public servants becoming more politicised and the political executive gaining more influence in the formulation of policy. This trend is consistent with the international trends identified by Page and Wright (1999). According to Page and Wright (1999:278) there is an increasing political influence over the senior public service which occurs more often during transitions in government. Politicians seek to shape to a greater extent the relationship between politicians and the public service in favour of the politicians, and changes in the public service are inevitably linked to much wider political changes (Page and Wright, 1999:269-270). However, South Africa needs a more sustainable solution to the political-administrative interface in order to develop effective policies and transform government institutions so that it can compete in an increasingly changing and complex world. The survival of the present government, and perhaps democracy itself, ultimately depends upon improved service delivery.

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Interviews

Mr. M. Bhabha Formally the Chair of the NCOP Committee on Public Administration and Local Government

Mr. P. Dexter Executive Director of NEDLAC

Mr. J. Erentzen Deputy Chair of the Public Service Commission

Mrs G. Fraser-Moleketi Minister of Public Service and Administration
Previously Minister of Welfare

- Mr. S. Manie Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio of Labour
Previously Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio on Public
Administration
- Mr. R. Meyer Formally Deputy President of the United Democratic
Movement and Minister of Constitutional Development
- Dr. I. Robson Public Service Consultant

University of Cape Town

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

Director General – Ministers Database

APPENDIX I

Director General and Minister Database

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Agriculture	1982	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1983		Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1984	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1985	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1986	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1987	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Dr. D.W. Immelman
	1988	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Mr. H.S. Hattingh
	1989	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Mr. H.S. Hattingh
	1990	Mr. J.J. Wentzel	Mr. H.S. Hattingh
	1991	Mr. J. de Villiers	Mr. H.S. Hattingh
	1992	Mr. A.I. Van Niekirk	Dr. F.J. van der Merwe
	1993	Mr. A.I. Van Niekirk	Dr. F.J. van der Merwe
Agriculture	1994	Mr. A.I. Van Niekirk	Dr. F.J. van der Merwe
	1995	Mr. A.I. Van Niekirk	Dr. F.J. van der Merwe
	1996	Mr. D.A. Hanekom	Dr. F.J. van der Merwe
	1997	Mr. D.A. Hanekom	Ms. B. Njobe-Mbuli
	1998	Mr. D.A. Hanekom	Ms. B. Njobe-Mbuli
	1999	Ms. Thuto Dilela	Ms. B. Njobe-Mbuli

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Education	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1987		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991		
	1992		
	1993		
Arts	1994	Mr. B. Ngubane	Mr. J.C. Pauw
	1995	Mr. B. Ngubane	Mr. W.R. Jardine
	1996	Mr. B. Ngubane	Mr. W.R. Jardine
	1997	Mr. B. Ngubane	Mr. W.R. Jardine
	1998	Mr. B. Ngubane	Mr. W.R. Jardine
	1999	Mr. B. Ngubane	Dr. R.M. Adam

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Development Planning	1982	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Dr. J.E. du Plessis
Development Planning	1983	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Dr. J.E. du Plessis
Development Planning	1984	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. A.H. van Wyk
Development Planning	1985	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. A.H. van Wyk
Development Planning	1986	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Development Planning	1987	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Development Planning	1988	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Development Planning	1989	Mr. H.J. Kriel	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1990	Dr. G. van N. Viljoen S.S. van der Merwe	
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1991	Dr. G. van N. Viljoen S.S. van der Merwe	
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1992	Dr. G. van N. Viljoen	Dr. L.D. Barnard
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1993	Mr. R.P. Meyer	Dr. L.D. Barnard
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1994	Mr. R.P. Meyer	Dr. L.D. Barnard
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1995	Mr. R.P. Meyer	Dr. L.D. Barnard
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1996	Mr. M.V. Moosa	Mr. Z. Titus
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1997	Mr. M.V. Moosa	Mr. Z. Titus
Const. Develop & Prov. Affairs	1998	Mr. M.V. Moosa	Mr. Z. Titus
Justice & Const. Develop	1999	Mr. P. Modure	Mr. Vusi Pikul

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	CHIEF
Defense	1982		
	1983		Gen. C.L. Vrijen
	1984		Gen. C.L. Vrijen
	1986	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1987	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1988	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1989	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1990	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1991	Gen. M.A. de M. Malan	Gen. J.J. Geldenhuys
	1992	Mr. R.P. Meyer	Gen. A.J. Liebenberg
	1993	Mr. E. Louw	Gen. A.J. Liebenberg
	1994	Mr. J. Modise	Gen. G.L. Meiring
	1995	Mr. J. Modise	Gen. G.L. Meiring
	1996	Mr. J. Modise	Gen. G.L. Meiring
	1997	Mr. J. Modise	Gen. G.L. Meiring
	1998	Mr. J. Modise	Gen. G.L. Meiring
	1999	Mr. P. Lekota	Gen. B. Nyobu

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Education (national)	1982	Dr. G. van N. Vrijen	Dr. P.S. Meyer
	1983	Dr. G. van N. Vrijen	Dr. P.S. Meyer
	1984	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	R.H. Venter
	1985	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	R.H. Venter
	1986	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	R.H. Venter
	1987	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	R.H. Venter
	1988	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	R.H. Venter
	1989	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	J.G. Garbers
	1990	Mr. E. Louw	J.G. Garbers
	1991	Adv. L.A. Pienaar	J.G. Garbers
	1992	Adv. L.A. Pienaar	J.G. Garbers
	1993	Mr. P.G. Marais	J.B.Z. Louw
	1994	Mr. S. Benge	Dr. N.C. Manganyi
	1995	Mr. S. Benge	Dr. N.C. Manganyi
	1996	Mr. S. Benge	Dr. N.C. Manganyi
	1997	Mr. S. Benge	Dr. N.C. Manganyi
	1998	Mr. S. Benge	Dr. N.C. Manganyi
	1999	Mr. K. Agyem	Thami Msekwa

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Environment	1982	Mr. S.A.A. Hayward	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1983	Mr. S.A.A. Hayward	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1984	Mr. S.A.A. Hayward	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1985	Mr. J.W.E. Wiley	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1986	Mr. J.W.E. Wiley	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1987	Mr. G.J. Kotze	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1988	Mr. G.J. Kotze	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1989	Mr. G.J. Kotze	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1990	Mr. G.J. Kotze	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1991	Mr. Pienaar	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1992	Mr. Pienaar	Mr. W.F. Visagie
	1993	Mr. Pienaar	Dr. C.M. Cameron
	1994	Dr. Z. P. Jordan	Dr. C.M. Cameron
	1995	Dr. Z. P. Jordan	Dr. C.M. Cameron
	1996	Dr. Z. P. Jordan	Dr. C.M. Cameron
	1997	Dr. Z. P. Jordan	Dr. C.M. Cameron
	1998	Dr. Z. P. Jordan	Mr. P. Fitzgerald
	1999	Mr. M.V. Moosa	Mr. P. Fitzgerald
		Mr. M.V. Moosa	Dr. C. Oliver

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Finance	1982	Mr. O.P.F. Horwood	Dr. J.H. de Loor
	1983		Dr. J.H. de Loor
	1984		Dr. J.H. de Loor
	1985	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Dr. J.H. de Loor
	1986	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Dr. C. L. Stals
	1987	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Dr. C. L. Stals
	1988	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Dr. C. L. Stals
	1989	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Dr. C. L. Stals
	1990	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Mr. G.P. Croeser
	1991	Mr. B.J. du Plessis	Mr. G.P. Croeser
	1992	Mr. D.I. Krys	Mr. E. Calliz
	1993	Mr. C. Liebenberg	Mr. E. Calliz
	1994	Mr. C. Liebenberg	Mr. E. Calliz
	1995	Mr. C. Liebenberg	Mr. E. Calliz
	1996	Mr. C. Liebenberg	Ms. M.C.N.C. Ramos
	1997	Mr. T. Manuel	Ms. M.C.N.C. Ramos
	1998	Mr. T. Manuel	Ms. M.C.N.C. Ramos
	1999	Mr. T. Manuel	Ms. M.C.N.C. Ramos

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Foreign Affairs	1982	Mr. R.F. Botha	Dr. B.G. Fourie
	1983	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. J. van Dalsen
	1984	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. J. van Dalsen
	1985	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. R. Kilen
	1986	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. R. Kilen
	1987	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. R. Kilen
	1988	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. N.P. van Heerde
	1989	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. N.P. van Heerde
	1990	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. N.P. van Heerde
	1991	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. N.P. van Heerde
	1992	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1993	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1994	Mr. A. Nzo	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1995	Mr. A. Nzo	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1996	Mr. A. Nzo	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1997	Mr. A. Nzo	Mr. L.H. Evans
	1998	Mr. A. Nzo	Mr. J. Bafani
	1999	Dr. N. Zuma	Mr. S. Pityana

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Health & Welfare	1982	Mr. C. van der Merwe	Dr. F.P. Retief
Health & Welfare	1983	Mr. C. van der Merwe	Dr. F.P. Retief
Health & Welfare	1984	Mr. C. van der Merwe	Dr. F.P. Retief
Health & Pop. Develop	1985	Dr. W.A. van Niekerk	Dr. F.P. Retief
Health & Pop. Develop	1986	Dr. W.A. van Niekerk	Dr. F.P. Retief
Health & Pop. Develop	1987	Dr. W.A. van Niekerk	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1988	Dr. W.A. van Niekerk	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1989	Dr. E.H. Verter	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1990	Dr. E.H. Verter	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1991	Dr. E.H. Verter	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1992	Dr. E.H. Verter	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health & Pop. Develop	1993	Dr. E.H. Verter	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health	1994	Dr. N.C. Zuma	Dr. C.F. Slabber
Health	1995	Dr. N.C. Zuma	Dr. O. Shisana
Health	1996	Dr. N.C. Zuma	Dr. O. Shisana
Health	1997	Dr. N.C. Zuma	Dr. O. Shisana
Health	1998	Dr. N.C. Zuma	Dr. A. Ntsaluba
Health	1999	Ms. M. Tshekalala-Morimang	Dr. A. Ntsaluba

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Internal Affairs	1982	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. S.S. van der Merwe
	1983	Mr. J.C. Heunis	Mr. S.S. van der Merwe
	1984	Mr. J.C.G. Botha	Mr. S.S. van der Merwe
Home Affairs	1985	Mr. J.C.G. Botha	Mr. G.B.S. van Zyl
	1986	Mr. J.C.G. Botha	Mr. G.B.S. van Zyl
	1987	Mr. J.C.G. Botha	Mr. G.B.S. van Zyl
	1988	Mr. J.C.G. Botha	Mr. G.B.S. van Zyl
	1989	Mr. E. Louw	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1990	Mr. E. Louw	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1991	Mr. E. Louw	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1992	Mr. L.A. Pienaar	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1993	Mr. D.P.A. Schutte	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1994	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1995	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1996	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Mr. P.J. Colyn
	1997	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Mr. A.S. Mokoena
	1998	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Mr. A.S. Mokoena
	1999	Dr. M.G. Buthlezi	Phulu Mbathe

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Planning & Const. Development	1982		
Planning & Const. Development	1983		
Planning & Const. Development	1984		
Planning & Const. Development	1985		
Planning & Const. Development	1986		
Planning & Const. Development	1987		
Planning & Const. Development	1988		
Planning & Const. Development	1989		
Prov. Affairs & National Housing	1990	Mr. H.J. Kriel	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Prov. Affairs & National Housing	1991	Mr. L. Wessels	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Local Govt & Housing	1992	Mr. S.J. de Beer	Mr. E.G. de Beer
Local Govt & Housing	1993	Mr. L. Shill	Mr. L.C. Koch
Housing	1994	Mr. J. Slovo	Mr. W.J. Cobbett
Housing	1995	Ms. S. Mhembu-Mahanyele	Mr. W.J. Cobbett
Housing	1996	Ms. S. Mhembu-Mahanyele	Mr. W.J. Cobbett
Housing	1997	Ms. S. Mhembu-Mahanyele	Mr. W.J. Cobbett
Housing	1998	Ms. S. Mhembu-Mahanyele	Ms. M. Ntshale-Ntshale
Housing	1999	Ms. S. Mhembu-Mahanyele	Ms. M. Ntshale-Ntshale

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Justice	1982	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Mr. J.P.J. Coetzer
	1983	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	S.S. van der Merwe
	1984	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	S.S. van der Merwe
	1985	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	S.S. van der Merwe
	1986	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	S.S. van der Merwe
	1987	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1988	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1989	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1990	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1991	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1992	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1993	Mr. H.J. Coetsee	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1994	Mr. A.M. Omar	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1995	Mr. A.M. Omar	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1996	Mr. A.M. Omar	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1997	Mr. A.M. Omar	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1998	Mr. A.M. Omar	Adv. J.J. Noeth
	1999	Mr. P. Maduna	Mr. V. Pikoll

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Regional & Land Affairs	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1987		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991	Mr. J. de Villiers	Mr. C.G. de Villiers
Land Affairs	1992	Mr. J. de Villiers	Mr. C.G. de Villiers
	1993		Mr. C.G. de Villiers
	1994	Mr. D. A. Hanekom	Mr. C.G. de Villiers
	1995	Mr. D. A. Hanekom	Mr. C.G. de Villiers
	1996	Mr. D. A. Hanekom	Mr. G.M. Budender
	1997	Mr. D. A. Hanekom	Mr. G.M. Budender
	1998	Mr. D. A. Hanekom	Mr. G.M. Budender
	1999	Ms. T. Odiza	Ms. B. Njoku-Mbuli

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Manpower	1982	Mr. S.P. Botha	Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1983		Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1984		Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1985	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1986	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1987	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Dr. P.J. van der Merwe
	1988	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. J.D. Fourie
	1989	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. J.D. Fourie
	1990	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. J.D. Fourie
	1991	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. J.D. Fourie
Labour	1992	Mr. P.G. Mera	Mr. J.D. Fourie
	1993	Mr. L. Wessels	Mr. J.D. Fourie
	1994	Mr. L. Wessels	Mr. S.M. Pityana
	1995	Mr. T.T. Mbweni	Mr. S.M. Pityana
	1996	Mr. T.T. Mbweni	Mr. S.M. Pityana
	1997	Mr. T.T. Mbweni	Mr. S.M. Pityana
	1998	Mr. T.T. Mbweni	Mr. S.M. Pityana
	1999	Mr. M.M.B. Mdledlana	Mr. S.M. Pityana

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Mineral & Energy	1982	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1983		Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1984		Mr. L. Alberts
	1985	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. L. Alberts
	1986	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. L. Alberts
	1987	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. L.N.J. Engelbrecht
	1988	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. L.N.J. Engelbrecht
	1989	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. L.N.J. Engelbrecht
	1990	Dr. J. de Villiers	Mr. P.J. Hugo
	1991	Dr. J. de Villiers	Mr. P.J. Hugo
	1992	Mr. G.S. Bartlett	Mr. P.J. Hugo
	1993	Mr. G.S. Bartlett	Mr. P.J. Hugo
	1994	Mr. R.F. Botha	Mr. P.J. Hugo
	1995	Mr. R.F. Botha	Dr. G.P.N. Venter
	1996	Mr. P. Maduna	Dr. G.P.N. Venter
	1997	Mr. P. Maduna	Adv. S. Ngqirha
	1998	Mr. P. Maduna	Adv. S. Ngqirha
	1999	Ms. P. Mlambo-Ngcuka	Adv. S. Ngqirha

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DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	COMMISSIONER
SAP	1982	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. M.C.W. Geldenhuys
	1983	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. M.C.W. Geldenhuys
	1984	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. P.J. Coetzee
	1985	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. P.J. Coetzee
	1986	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. P.J. Coetzee
	1987	Mr. L. Le Grange	Gen. P.J. Coetzee
	1988	Mr. A.J. Vlok	Gen. H.G. de Vill
	1989	Mr. A.J. Vlok	Gen. H.G. de Vill
	1990	Mr. A.J. Vlok	Gen. J. van der Merwe
	1991	Mr. A.J. Vlok	Gen. J. van der Merwe
	1992	Mr. H.J. Kriel	Gen. J. van der Merwe
	1993	Mr. H.J. Kriel	Gen. J. van der Merwe
	1994	Mr. F.S. Mufamadi	Gen. J. van der Merwe
	1995	Mr. F.S. Mufamadi	Maj.-Gen. G. Fivaz
	1996	Mr. F.S. Mufamadi	Maj.-Gen. G. Fivaz
	1997	Mr. F.S. Mufamadi	Maj.-Gen. G. Fivaz
	1998	Mr. F.S. Mufamadi	Maj.-Gen. G. Fivaz
	1999	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. J. Selebi

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	COMMISSIONER
Prisons (Justice)	1982	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G J.F. Otto
Prisons (Justice)	1983	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	
Prisons (Justice)	1984	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Prisons (Justice)	1985	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Prisons (Justice)	1986	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Prisons (Justice)	1987	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Prisons (Justice)	1988	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Prisons (Justice)	1989	Mr. H.J. Coetzee	L-G W. H. Willems
Correctional Services (Law & Order)	1990	Mr. A.J. Vlok	L-G W. H. Willems
Correctional Services (Law & Order)	1991	Mr. A.J. Vlok	L-G W. H. Willems
Correctional Services (Law & Order)	1992	Mr. A.J. Vlok	L-G W. H. Willems
Correctional Services (Law & Order)	1993	Mr. A.J. Vlok	Gen. H.J. Bruyn
Correctional Services	1994	Dr. S. Mzimela	Gen. H.J. Bruyn
Correctional Services	1995	Dr. S. Mzimela	Gen. H.J. Bruyn
Correctional Services	1996	Dr. S. Mzimela	Dr. K. Sitole
Correctional Services	1997	Dr. S. Mzimela	Dr. K. Sitole
Correctional Services	1998	Dr. S. Mzimela	Dr. K. Sitole
Correctional Services	1999	Mr. B.M. Skocana	Mr. T. Mseleku

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Public Enterprises	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1987		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991		
	1992		
	1993	Mr. D.J. de Villiers	Mr. J.J.D. Kiewraat
	1994	Ms. S. Sigcau	Dr. E.P. van Eden
	1995	Ms. S. Sigcau	Dr. E.P. van Eden
	1996	Mr. J. Radebe	Prof. S.R. Shabatale
	1997	Mr. J. Radebe	Prof. S.R. Shabatale
	1998	Mr. J. Radebe	Prof. S.R. Shabatale
	1999-1999	Mr. J. Radebe	Ms. N.T. Mopella
	1999	Mr. J. Radebe	Mr. G. Gouden

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Public Service	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991		
	1992		
	1993		
	1994	Dr. Z.S.T. Skweyiya	Dr. M.P. Nchola
	1995	Dr. Z.S.T. Skweyiya	Dr. M.P. Nchola
	1996	Dr. Z.S.T. Skweyiya	Dr. M.P. Nchola
	1997	Dr. Z.S.T. Skweyiya	Dr. M.P. Nchola
	1998	Dr. Z.S.T. Skweyiya	Dr. M.P. Nchola
	1999	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleke	Mr. R. Ramatlh

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Public Works	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985	Dr. L.A.P.A. Munkik	Mr. P.C. van Bloomsdaj
	1986	Dr. L.A.P.A. Munkik	Mr. P.C. van Bloomsdaj
	1987	Dr. L.A.P.A. Munkik	Mr. P.C. van Bloomsdaj
	1988	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Mr. P.C. van Bloomsdaj
	1989	Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis	Mr. P.C. van Bloomsdaj
	1990	Mr. G.S. Bartlett	Mr. C.W. van Niekirk
	1991	Mr. L. Wessels	Mr. C.W. van Niekirk
	1992	Mr. L. Wessels	Mr. T.P.C. van Robbroek
	1993	Mr. E. Louw	Mr. T.P.C. van Robbroek
	1994	Mr. J. Radebe	Mr. T.P.C. van Robbroek
	1995	Mr. J. Radebe	Mr. T.P.C. van Robbroek
	1996	Ms. Stefa Sigcau	Mr. S.K. Shazi
	1997	Ms. Stefa Sigcau	Mr. S.K. Shazi
	1998	Ms. Stefa Sigcau	Mr. S.K. Shazi
	1999	Ms. Stefa Sigcau	Mr. T. Solute

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Education	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1987		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991		
	1992		
Sport & Rec	1993		
	1994	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. M. Tyamzashe
	1995	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. M. Tyamzashe
	1996	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. M. Tyamzashe
	1997	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. M. Tyamzashe
	1998	Mr. S. Tshwete	Mr. M. Tyamzashe
	1999	Mr. N. Balfour	Mr. D. Hendricks

Appendix I

OFFICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	DG
Prime Minister	1993	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.E. du Plessis
State President	1994	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	1995	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	1996	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	1997	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	1998	Mr. P.W. Botha	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	1999	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	2000	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	2001	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	2002	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Dr. J.P. le Roux
	2003	Mr. F.W. de Klerk	Mr. D.W. Steward
	2004	Mr. R.N. Mandela	Prof. G.J. Gerwel
	2005	Mr. R.N. Mandela	Prof. G.J. Gerwel
	2006	Mr. R.N. Mandela	Prof. G.J. Gerwel
	2007	Mr. R.N. Mandela	Prof. G.J. Gerwel
	2008	Mr. R.N. Mandela	Prof. G.J. Gerwel
	2009	Mr. T. Mbeki	Rev. F. Chikane

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Trade & Indust	1992	Mr. D.J. De Villiers	Dr. T.A. du Plessis
	1993	Mr. D.J. De Villiers	Dr. T.A. du Plessis
	1994	Mr. D.J. De Villiers	Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1995	Mr. D.J. De Villiers	Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1996	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1997	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Mr. S.J.P. du Plessis
	1998	Mr. D.W. Steyn	Dr. S.J. Naude
	1999	Mr. K.D.S. Durr	Dr. S.J. Naude
	2000	Mr. K.D.S. Durr	Dr. S.J. Naude
	2001	Mr. K.D.S. Durr	Dr. S.J. Naude
	2002	Mr. D.L. Keys	Dr. S.J. Naude
	2003	Mr. D.L. Keys	Dr. S.J. Naude
	2004	Mr. T. Manuel	Dr. Z.Z.R. Rustonjee
	2005	Mr. T. Manuel	Dr. Z.Z.R. Rustonjee
	2006	Mr. A. Erwin	Dr. Z.Z.R. Rustonjee
	2007	Mr. A. Erwin	Dr. Z.Z.R. Rustonjee
	2008	Mr. A. Erwin	Dr. Z.Z.R. Rustonjee
	2009	Mr. A. Erwin	Dr. A. Rullers

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Transport	1992	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1993	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1994	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1995	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1996	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1997	Mr. H. Schoeman	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1998	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. A.B. Eksteen
	1999	Mr. E. van der M. Louw	Mr. R.G. Meyer
	2000	Mr. G.S. Bartlett	Mr. R.G. Meyer
	2001	Mr. G.S. Bartlett	Mr. R.G. Meyer
	2002	Dr. P.J. Welgemoed	Dr. C.R. Scheepers
	2003	Dr. P.J. Welgemoed	Dr. C.R. Scheepers
	2004	Mr. M. Maharaj	Dr. C.R. Scheepers
	2005	Mr. M. Maharaj	Mr. K.M. Gordhan
	2006	Mr. M. Maharaj	Mr. K.M. Gordhan
	2007	Mr. M. Maharaj	Mr. K.M. Gordhan
	2008	Mr. M. Maharaj	Mr. K.M. Gordhan
	2009	Mr. A.M. Omar	Mr. B. Mofinye

Appendix I

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
	1982	Dr. C.V. van der Merwe	Mr. J.F. Otto
	1983		Mr. J.F. Otto
	1984		Mr. J.F. Otto
	1985	Mr. J.J. G. Wentzel	Mr. J.G. du Plessis
	1986	Mr. J.J. G. Wentzel	Mr. J.G. du Plessis
	1987	Mr. J.J. G. Wentzel	Mr. J.G. du Plessis
	1988	Mr. G.J. Kolze	Mr. G.C.D. Classens
	1989	Mr. G.J. Kolze	Mr. G.C.D. Classens
	1990	Mr. G.J. Kolze	Mr. G.C.D. Classens
	1991	Mr. G.J. Kolze	Mr. G.C.D. Classens
	1992	Gen. M.A. de Melan	Mr. G.C.D. Classens
	1993	Gen. M.A. de Melan	Mr. M. Erasmus
Water Affairs	1994	Prof. A.K. Asmal	Mr. M. Erasmus
	1995	Prof. A.K. Asmal	Mr. M. Erasmus
	1996	Prof. A.K. Asmal	Mr. M. Erasmus
	1997	Prof. A.K. Asmal	Mr. A.M. Muller
	1998	Prof. A.K. Asmal	Mr. A.M. Muller
	1999	Mr. R. Kasils	Mr. A.M. Muller

DEPARTMENT	YEAR	MINISTER	DG
Health & Pop. Devel.	1982		
	1983		
	1984		
	1985		
	1986		
	1987		
	1988		
	1989		
	1990		
	1991		
	1992		
	1993		
Welfare	1994	Mr. A.B. Williams	
	1995	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	
	1996	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. L. Pabel
	1997	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. L. Pabel
	24/07/1998	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. A.M. Mokaba (acting)
	26/08/1998	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. N.E. Chinkanda
	06/09/1998	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. N.E. Chinkanda
	30/08/1998	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Dr. N.E. Chinkanda
	01/10/1998	Ms. G. Fraser-Moleketi	Ms. L.A. Abrahams
	1999	Dr. Z. Skweyiya	Ms. A.J. Ester

APPENDIX II

Letter to Directors General

(University of Cape Town,
Political Studies Department
Letter Head)
(date)

(Title) (Initial) (Surname)
(Designation)
(Organization)
(Address)

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: Doctoral Research

I am currently a lecturer in public management and a doctoral candidate at the University of Cape Town. My doctoral research focuses on senior management in the South African public service. The research will attempt to provide an insight into how senior management makes policy and managerial decisions as well as the nature of the relationship between senior management and Ministers.

The significance of this study is that it will provide an insight into the office of the Director General or equivalent designation. Furthermore, the research will attempt to develop guidance on the roles and responsibilities of senior public servants in order to enhance the delivery of public services. There has been no other study of this nature and it will also be of historical significance to record how policy and managerial decisions were made by senior public servants.

I kindly request your voluntary co-operation as you have been selected for this research study. Your participation will be gratefully appreciated as your valuable insight, experience and expertise will be an enormous contribution and enhance this significant research. Should you so desire your confidentiality and/or anonymity can be assured, and a complimentary copy of the research findings can also be made available to you. At your convenience it would be appreciated if a personal interview could be scheduled. Please contact me at the above telephone number or return address to schedule the interview.

Should you have any queries about the nature of the research or the process of the interview, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

Ms. Karen Johnston

APPENDIX III

QUESTIONNAIRE

Interview Date _____ Place/Venue _____
Time _____

A. Personal Details

1. Surname _____ Name _____
2. Department _____ Years as DG _____
3. Date of Birth _____ 4. Place of Birth _____
5. Religion _____ 6. Home Language _____

B. Education

1. Secondary School _____
2. Matriculation Subjects _____
3. Achievements at school _____
4. Tertiary Education:
4.1. Undergraduate Degree _____ 4.1.2. Years _____
4.1.3. Undergraduate Institution _____
4.1.4. Major courses _____
4.1.5. Achievements _____
4.2. Secondary undergraduate degree _____ 4.2.1. Institution _____
4.2.2. Years _____

4.3 Postgraduate degrees:

(1) _____
 Institution _____ Years _____

(2) _____
 Institution _____ Years _____

(3) _____
 Institution _____ Years _____

5. Military Service/ Exile

Yes	No
-----	----

 5.1. Years _____

5.2. Place _____ 5.3. Highest Rank _____

5.4. Service _____

C. Career as Director General

1. Describe your career path.
2. Describe your selection process as Director General.
3. Did you receive any orientation training?
4. Do you believe you were prepared for the demands of the position?
5. How would you describe your managerial style?
6. What were your strengths as a manager?
7. What were your weaknesses as a manager?
8. What training did you receive as Director General?
9. Describe an incident where you believed you could have been a better manager.
10. Describe an incident where your managerial expertise produced a favourable outcome.
11. In your opinion what are the important managerial qualities required for the position as Director General
12. What were the recurring problems in the Department that you had to deal with?
13. What were the positive aspects of the job?
14. What were the negative aspects of the job?
15. Describe a typical day of the Director General.
16. What do you believe were your main responsibilities as Director General were?
17. What do you think you could have improved about the Department?
18. What were the issues in the organization that occupied most of your time?
19. When employees approached you with problem how did you handle it?
20. What do you think is important when communicating with employees?
21. Would you regard yourself as a leader and why?
22. Did you subscribe to any journals? If yes, which journals and did you have time to read these journals?

Appendix III

23. Did your Department ever undertake a strategic management exercise? Describe the process?

24. How frequently did you travel abroad in your professional capacity?

Frequently	Every once in a while	Hardly ever	Never
------------	-----------------------	-------------	-------

25. Which countries did you most frequently travel to and what was the purpose of the trips?

26. How frequently did you voluntarily cooperate with other Director Generals?

Frequently	Every once in a while	Hardly Ever	Never
------------	-----------------------	-------------	-------

27. Describe an incident where you and one or more Directors General voluntarily cooperated and what was the outcome?

28. Were you ever told or forced to cooperate with one or more Director Generals?

29. Were there formal lines of communication between Directors General, for example a weekly scheduled meeting? If so, describe the aim and process of the interaction.

30. Did you ever socialize or interact beyond the office with one or more Directors General?

31. Which Director General did you regard as an ally or friend?

32. Did Directors General ever go on a retreat?

33. What is your opinion of performance contracts?

34. What did you think of Directors General being placed on fixed term contracts?

35. Describe an incident where you and the Minister strongly disagreed about an issue and what was the outcome?

36. Did you and the Minister disagree

Frequently	Every once in a while	Hardly ever	Never
------------	-----------------------	-------------	-------

37. Describe an incident that is prominent for you, where you and Minister cooperated and what was the outcome?

38. Did you and the Minister cooperate

Frequently	Every once in a while	Hardly ever	Never
------------	-----------------------	-------------	-------

39. How would you describe the Minister on a professional level?

40. What do you think the nature of the relationship should be between Director General and Minister?

41. Do you support or oppose the President appointing Directors General at national level? Why?

42. What did you think of President (name of President under who Director General served) management style?

1. Sex

M

F

2. Race

3. Office

4. Comments

If the questionnaire was posed to a current Director General the questionnaire would be changed to the present tense.

APPENDIX IV

RESEARCH GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Nature of the research

The research forms part of a doctoral study that focuses on:

- (a) the managerial and policy competencies required at senior management level in the South African public service, and
- (b) the nature of the relationship between Director Generals and Ministers.

The main aim of the research to gain an insight into the office of the Director General.

The significance of this research is that it will attempt to develop procedural guidance on the roles and responsibilities of senior public servants as well as managerial and policy competencies required by senior management. The methodology is therefore to interview a sample of Director Generals.

2. Questionnaire format

The first section of the questionnaire relates to personal information such as home language, the second section deals with educational background and the last section relates specifically to your role as Director General. The section on your role as Director General covers questions that deals with managerial and leadership style, policy making and the nature of your professional relationship with the Minister.

3. Rights

- (a) You may refrain from answering any question and please indicate so at the appropriate question.
- (b) You may request confidentiality for specific questions thereby insuring that the information provided will not be published. Please indicate at the appropriate time whether your response to a specific question is "off the record."
- (c) You may request anonymity, that is your name will not be published or made known to others. Please indicate now whether you wish to remain anonymous.

4. Research collection

- (a) Please answer the questions as honestly as possible.
- (b) The tape recorder will be used to ensure accuracy of responses.
- (c) The tapes are only for the researcher's purposes and will not be made available to others, unless you give permission to do so.

Do you understand and agree to participate in this research?

(Await response by subject and record response)

APPENDIX V

APPENDIX V

Director General Employment Contract

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROMULGATED UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, 1994 (PROCLAMATION NO 103 OF 1994) AS AMENDED FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENT

ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN

The Government of the Republic of South Africa herein represented by _____ (full name of political office-bearer) in the capacity of Executive Authority of _____ (political office) (hereinafter referred to as the Employer)

and

_____ (full name) as head of department (hereinafter called the Employee.)

WHEREBY IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1 Appointment

1.1 The Employer hereby appoints the Employee who agrees and accepts appointment as Head of Department _____ (name of Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) in terms of section 12 of the Public Service Act, 1994 for a period of _____ years (_____ calendar month) commencing on the _____ day of _____ and terminating on the _____ day of _____.

1.2 In terms of his Contract -

1.2.1 The Employee shall serve the Employer as Head of the _____ (name of Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) at such place as may from time to time be decided by the Employer.

1.2.2 The Employee will be responsible for the efficient management and administration of _____ (name of Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) as contemplated in section 7(2)(a) read with section 7(4) of the Act.

1.2.3 The Employee is also responsible for the exercise of the powers and the performance of the functions entrusted to a head of department in general or in the incumbent of Head of Department or _____ (name of Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) in particular, by or in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996), the Act or any other law.

Appendix V

2. Remuneration

- 2.1 The remuneration that the Employee shall receive as from the date of assuming duty as stated in clause 1 above, is that specified in Appendix A.
- 2.2 The salary and benefits will be payable in twelve (12) equal monthly instalments on the fifteenth day of each month and should the fifteenth fall on a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, on the preceding working day.
- 2.3 The general conditions of service and benefits specified in Appendix A, except for item 2.1 of Appendix A, will be as stipulated and provided for in terms of the Act, Regulations and applicable collective agreements issued in the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). The parties to this Contract accept that the general conditions of service and benefits in Appendix A (excluding item 2.1) may be changed from time to time by means of collective agreements in the PSCBC and/or in terms of determinations by the Minister for the Public Service and Administration in terms of section 33(1)(a) & (2)(a) of the Act.
- 2.4 Subject to section 34(4) of the Act, the Employee will also qualify for compensation in other benefits and special privileges normally bestowed on a Head of Department as far as this is arranged accordingly in the Contract or other applicable prescripts.
- 2.5 When required to perform critical duties away from his/her headquarters, the Employee shall travel at the Employer's expense and shall be paid a subsistence allowance in accordance with the provisions prescribed in the Act.

3. Deployment during the contract period and re-appointment on expiry of the Contract

The Employee acknowledges that s/he is familiar with the provisions of section 38 and 39 of the Act.

4. Termination of employment

- 4.1 The term of office of the Employee may be terminated in the following ways:
- 4.1.1 On reaching the prescribed (or earlier optional) retirement age (section 16(1), (2), 21(A) and (2) of the Act)
 - 4.1.2 On completing a term or extended term of office (section 10(3) of the Act)
 - 4.1.3 Premature retirement at own request of Employee (section 13(3) of the Act)
 - 4.1.4 Discharge in terms of any of the suggestions of section 17 of the Act
 - 4.1.5 Reappointment or original term or extended term of office by the Employer (section 12(1) or (2) of the Act)
 - 4.1.6 Voluntary resignation
 - 4.1.7 Death
- 4.2 Pension and other payable benefits are directly linked to the specific section of the Act which is utilised, as regulated by the Government Employees Pension Fund Law, 1995, the regulations promulgated thereunder as applicable in a Head of Department, the Public Service Regulations and the collective agreements as required.

Appendix V

- 4.3 Subject to the provisions of sections 16(5) and 12(1) or (2) of the Act, and the Labour Relations Act, 1995, either party may, after consultation and agreement, terminate the Contract before the expiry of an original term of office or an extended term of office, by giving to the other party three months' notice of termination, which notice shall -
- 4.3.1 be given in writing; and
 - 4.3.2 be given on or before the last day of a month and take effect on the first day of the succeeding month.
- 4.4 Should notice of termination be given as contemplated in clause 4.3, the Employer has the right to require the Employee to vacate the office occupied by her/him and to leave the premises of the Department before the expiry of the three months' notice period on a day specified by the Employer and not to present herself/himself for duty at any time thereafter.
- 4.5 Should the Employer invoke the provisions of clause 4.4, the Employee will still be entitled to all such benefits as contained in the relevant pension and collective agreement.
- 4.6 In the case of redundancy and misconduct, the Employer may deal with her/him, in accordance with the procedure contained in the applicable collective agreement reached in the PSCJC and the relevant labour legislation.
5. **Renewal and extension of term of office**
- 5.1 The Employer shall in writing confer with the Employee at least two calendar months prior to the expiry of the term contemplated in clause 1 (above) whether she/he proposes to retain the Employee in service for any extended period not exceeding five years (30 calendar months), or not; if the Employee is so informed of such intention to retain her/him in service for an extended term, she/he shall in writing inform the Employer, within one calendar month from the date of that communication, of her/his acceptance or not of such extended employment.
 - 5.2 In the event that agreement is reached that the Employee shall enter into a further Contract on termination or completion of this Contract, the continued service of the Employee will be recognised under the new Contract as if no break of service and any accrued or pro rata entitlements will be carried forward into the new Contract.
 - 5.3 Should the Employer not renew the Contract beyond the initial period as stated in Clause 1 above, the Employee shall be entitled to the pension and other benefits already linked to the specific section of the Act which is utilized.
6. **Conduct**
- 6.1 In the interest of the protection and maintenance of the trade secrets, technical business know-how, confidential information, business connections, customer connections and all other confidential information ("trade secrets") of the Department, the Employee undertakes to the Employer that -
 - 6.1.1 she/he will not during her/his employment or at any time thereafter, after herself/himself, utilize or cause to be utilized, either directly or indirectly, divulge and/or disclose to any third party (except as required by the terms and nature of the Employee's employment with the Employer) of any of the Employer's trade or other Government secrets;

Appendix V

- 6.2 she/he will treat as confidential all confidential information which a third party has in terms of any agreement made available to the Employer and which has become known to the Employee in the course of her/his duties and not divulge to any other third party any information regarding such confidential information contrary to the terms of such agreement;
- 6.1.3 any documents or records (including written instructions, notes or memoranda) relating to the trade secrets of the Employer which are made by the Employee or which come into the Employee's possession during the period of her/his employment with the Employer, are deemed to be the property of the Employer and will be surrendered to the Employer on demand, and in the event of the termination of the Employee's employment by the Employer, the Employee will not retain any copies thereof or extracts therefrom;
- 6.1.4 she/he shall comply with the prescribed Code of Conduct.
- 6.2 The restraints imposed upon the Employee in terms of this clause –
- 6.2.1 are deemed to be, in respect of each part thereof, separate, severable and separately enforceable in the widest sense from the other parts thereof and the invalidity or unenforceability of any clause or any part thereof will in no way affect the validity or enforceability of whether part of the clause or the Contract; and
- 6.2.2 are deemed to have been imposed separately in respect of each of the provinces of the Republic of South Africa and the fact that they may not be valid or enforceable in respect of any one of the provinces will not affect their validity or enforceability in so far as the other provinces are concerned.
- 6.3 The Employee –
- 6.3.1 acknowledges that she/he has carefully considered the provisions of the clause;
- 6.3.2 agrees that this clause is, after taking all relevant circumstances into account, reasonable and necessary for the proper protection of the interests of the Employer and the Government of the Republic of South Africa and that if she/he should at any time dispute the reasonableness of this clause, then the onus of proving such unreasonableness will be upon her/him; and
- 6.3.3 acknowledges that she/he entered into this Contract freely and voluntarily and that no circumstances exist or ever existed for her/him alleging either now or at any future time that she/he was at a disadvantage in agreeing to the restraints set out in this clause or was other than in an equal bargaining position with the Employer in agreeing to such restraints.
7. Additional terms and conditions
- The Employer and the Employee hereby agree to the following additional terms and conditions as contemplated in section 12(4) of the Act (which is not applicable):
- 7.1 The Employee shall enter into an Annual Performance Agreement with the Employer, in respect of a specific financial year, which shall include at a minimum the following:

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- 7.1.1 Salary increases will be based on the performance of the Employee. Performance will be assessed in accordance with her/his responsibilities and key performance areas contained in her/his performance agreement and the extent to which the Employee complied therewith. In terms of an agreement reached in the PSGB, salary increases for the Employee will be based on individual consultation. The Employee along with the Employer have the responsibility to consult annually regarding her/his salary increases and cash bonus within the restrictions of the budget based on the performance of the Employee. In consulting on the salary increase and cash bonus of the Employee, the guidelines forwarded by the Minister for the Public Service and Administration should always be borne in mind.
- 7.1.2 An annual performance agreement provided for in terms of paragraph 7.1 above linked to a specific financial year, stating clear performance areas/responsibilities of the Department and the Employee must be entered into for the duration of this Contract. As performance agreements are linked to financial years, it should be entered into and provided to the Employer at the latest on 30 June every year for the duration of this Contract. The Employee should enter into her/his first performance agreement not later than three months after assumption of duty. In terms of the Public Service Regulations VII 8.2, the Employer shall record delegations and/or authorisation in the performance agreement.
- 7.1.3 The performance agreement shall be revised if, at any time during its term, the work or environment of the Department is so altered (whether as a result of Government or management decision or otherwise) that the contents of it are no longer appropriate.
- 7.1.4 This Contract is directly linked to the performance agreement referred to in 7.1.1 supra. In the event that the Employee does not achieve the prescribed objectives/responsibilities of the Department, the Employee acknowledges that the Employer may deal with her/him, in accordance with the procedure contained in the applicable collective agreement reached in the PSGB and the relevant labour legislation.
- 7.1.5 _____

- 7.2 Any other particular duties of the head of department:

- 7.3 The grounds upon, and the procedures according to which, the services of the head of department may be terminated before the expiry of his or her term of office or extended term of office, as the case may be:

Appendix V

U. General

8.1 Good faith

In the implementation of this Contract, the parties undertake to observe the utmost good faith and they warrant in their dealing with each other that they will neither do anything nor refrain from doing anything which might prejudice or detract from the rights, assets or interests of each other.

8.2 Applicability of the Act

Any matters arising from this Contract, which are not specifically provided for herein shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Public Service Act, 1994 as amended, the aforesaid Public Service Regulations, applicable collective agreements and other relevant legislation.

8.3 Interpretation of Agreement

The interpretation of this Contract shall be governed by the laws and legal principles applicable in the Republic of South Africa.

8.4 Jurisdiction of courts

8.4.1 The Employee submits to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Republic of South Africa in the event of any legal proceedings arising from the provisions of this Contract.

8.4.2 It shall not be a breach of the Contract if a party to this Contract is prevented from or hindered in the performance or observance of its obligations hereunder by any Act of Parliament or other action of the State or by any cause or event outside the control of that party.

8.5 Variation

8.5.1 The Contract constitutes the whole of the agreement between the parties to this Contract relating to the subject matter of this Contract, and save as otherwise provided, no amendment, alteration, addition or variation of any kind, term or condition of this Contract will be of any force or effect unless reduced to writing and signed by the parties to this Contract.

8.5.2 The parties agree that there are no other conditions, warranties or representations, whether oral or written and whether expressed or implied or otherwise, save those contained in this Contract, the Public Service Act, 1994, the Public Service Regulations, collective agreements and other relevant legislation (e.g. Government Employees Pension Fund Law).

8.6 Waiver

No waiver of any of the terms and conditions of this Contract will be binding for any purpose unless expressed in writing and signed by the party giving the same, and any such waiver will be effective only in the second instance and for the purpose given. No failure or delay on the part of either party in exercising any right, power or privilege precludes any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege.

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9. Notice and Domestium

- 9.1 The parties choose as their respective domestic agent of execution for the purpose of legal proceedings and for the purpose of giving or sending any notice provided for or necessary in terms of this Contract, the following addresses:

	Employer	Employee
Physical address	_____	_____
Postal address	_____	_____
Telefax Number	_____	_____

provided that a party reports any change of her or his domestic agent of execution, physical address, postal address or telefax number by written notice to the other party. Such change of address will be effective seven days after receipt of notice of the change of domestic agent.

- 9.2 All notices to be given in terms of this Contract will:

- 9.2.1 be given in writing; and
- 9.2.2 be delivered or sent by prepaid registered post or by telefax; and
- 9.2.3 if delivered, be presumed to have been received on the date of delivery; or
- 9.2.4 if sent by prepaid registered post, be presumed to have been received within three business days of posting unless the contrary is proved; or
- 9.2.5 if sent by telefax, be presumed to have been received on the first business day following the date of sending of the telefax unless the contrary is proved.

SIGNED by the Employer at _____ on the ____ day of _____

AS WITNESSES:

1. _____

EMPLOYER EXECUTING
AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF
THE GOVERNMENT

2. _____

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SIGNED by the Employee at _____ on the _____ day of _____

AS WITNESSES

1. _____

EMPLOYEE (HEAD OF
DEPARTMENT)

2. _____

University of Cape Town

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX VI

Director General Performance Agreement


1999/ 2000 PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT

Between : Dr ZST Silewayiya
Minister for the Public Service and Administration

And : Dr MPE Mcholo
Director-General: Public Service and Administration

For the period: January 1999 – 31 March 2000

This agreement sets out the Government's objective in relation to the Department of Public Service and Administration and the Minister's expectations for the Director-General's performance. It further provides for a systematic evaluation of the performance of the Director-General in achieving key objectives as contained in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (November 1995).



Appendix IV

**MANDATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND
ADMINISTRATION**

1. PURPOSE

To advise the Minister on Government Policy regarding the public service and matters incidental thereto.

2. FUNCTIONS

- 2.1 Supporting the Minister in the determination of public service policy on:
 - 2.1.1 Remuneration Matters, General Conditions of Service and Labour Relations;
 - 2.1.2 Human Resource Development; and
 - 2.1.3 Organisational Matters and Information Technology and Management;
 - 2.2 Supporting the Minister in Labour Relations negotiations;
 - 2.3 Rendering of Corporate Services;
 - 2.4 Rendering services regarding the Public Service Reform Programme, Transverse Support and Information;
 - 2.5 Providing Communication and Ministerial Support Services; and
 - 2.6 Providing and facilitating Training around the core competencies to implement the New Management Framework of the Public Service
-

**3. STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND
ADMINISTRATION**

- 3.1 The Government has committed itself to "continually improving the lives of the people of South Africa by a transformed public service, which is representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all".



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- 3.2 In supporting the Government, the Department of Public Service and Administration has set out its Vision as: A responsive public service that delivers on the government's commitment to a better life for all the people of South Africa.
- 3.3 The Director-General commits himself to the Mission of rendering professional support to the Minister in:
- Leading the transformation process by developing appropriate policies and facilitating their implementation through strategic interventions and partnerships; and
 - Maintaining a functioning public service.

4. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

- 4.1 The Department of Public Service and Administration shall be subject to the overall direction and control of the Minister. The Minister determines the overall policy framework within which the Department operates and in broad terms its scope of activities. The Minister will further determine in broad terms, the resources available to the Department in line with the Budget Votes: Improvement of Conditions of Service, Public Service and Administration and SAMDL. The Minister is not involved in the day-to-day management and operation of the Department but shall be consulted from time to time on the handling of operational matters which could give rise to significant public or parliamentary concern.
- 4.2 The Director-General is directly responsible to the Minister for the Department's performance, operations, the realisation of the Performance Agreement and specifically for –
- 4.2.1 preparing a strategic plan for the Department;
 - 4.2.2 preparing draft business plans, including key performance targets and submitting them to the Minister for approval;
 - 4.2.3 achieving key performance targets;
 - 4.2.4 managing resources efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the principles of fairness and equity as outlined in Government Policy;



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- 4.2.5 providing the Minister with such information as is required to enable performance to be monitored;
 - 4.2.6 preparing an Annual Report and Accounts for submission to the Minister and Parliament;
 - 4.2.7 ensuring that all aspects of the management and organization are kept under review and ensuring that they best suit the Department's business needs;
 - 4.2.8 contributing to the Department's development and formulation of policy, including assessing the impact and practicability of proposed policy changes and ensuring that the Department is in a position to implement change expeditiously and efficiently;
 - 4.2.9 the efficient management and administration of the Department, including the effective utilization and training of staff, the maintenance of discipline, the promotion of sound labour relations and the proper use and care of the State property, and shall perform the functions that may be prescribed; and
 - 4.2.10 executing delegations from the Minister (see Annexure A).
- 4.3 To give effect to clause 4.2.6, the Director-General is responsible to ensure that proper accounts are kept and that financial procedures are being adhered to and for the proper, effective and efficient use of departmental resources within the law as well as to provide such information requested by the Auditor-General to enable him to audit the Department's books.
- 4.4 The Director-General could to be called upon to appear before the Joint Public Accounts Committee and other Committees of Parliament to give evidence on both the policy and management of the Department and shall do so in a transparent and accountable manner.
- 4.5 To enable the Director-General to perform his duties and exercise the power entrusted to him, the Minister undertakes to:
- 4.5.1 provide political support for policies and activities set out in this agreement;
 - 4.5.2 create an enabling environment for the Director-General to deliver against Core Responsibilities/Outcomes;



Appendix IV

- 4.5.3 Ensure the availability of adequate funds from Government and the donor community as is reasonably possible, to execute the core responsibilities set out in this agreement, and
- 4.5.4 ensure effective communication on all relevant matters with the Director-General of the Department.
- 4.6 The relationship between the Minister and the Director-General is pivotal to good government. Within this relationship, the Director-General shall act with integrity and professionalism, within the law, and with respect for the Minister's role and the collective Cabinet process in which Ministers participate and shall loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day.
- 4.7 The Director-General shall be responsible for managing the Department and the Minister has a right to assume that the Department is being run in compliance with the law, prescripts and within its budget. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Minister for carrying out the functions and duties of the Department, tendering free and frank advice to the Minister and other Ministers of the Government, the general conduct of the Department, and the efficient, effective and economical management of the activities of the Department. The Director-General shall be responsive to the Minister's policy, information and support requirements, and priorities in respect of public service transformation issues taking into account the Department's capacity and budget.
- 4.8 The Director-General shall, where necessary, delegate powers vested in him without lessening his responsibility and accountability for actions taken on his behalf.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

- 5.1 The Director-General shall report to the Minister against all parts of this agreement, particularly, where performance varies from expectations. The Director-General shall -



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- 5.1.1 alert the Minister to any emerging factors that could preclude the achievement of any performance agreement undertakings;
- 5.1.2 establish and maintain appropriate internal controls and reporting systems in order to meet performance expectations; and
- 5.1.3 provide quarterly reports to the Minister on revision of targets if necessary and progress towards the achievement of performance agreement undertakings.

6. PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

In pursuance of the strategic direction the Government has undertaken to transform the public service, I, Mthuli Paseka Ntshole, Director-General, commit myself to achieve the following core responsibilities and outputs during the period January 1999 to 31 March 2000:

6.1 Public Service Wide Core Responsibilities (External)

- 6.1.1 Policy Development for the Public Service (Page 7)
- 6.1.2 Develop Frameworks for Norms and Standards (Page 7)
- 6.1.3 Issue Directives and Determinations (Page 8)
- 6.1.4 Policy Advice and Assistance (Page 8)
- 6.1.5 Capacity Building Initiatives (Page 9)
- 6.1.6 Represent the State as Employer in Negotiations (Page 10)
- 6.1.7 Marketing and Public Relations (Page 10)
- 6.1.8 Implementation of the PRC Report (Page 10)

6.2 Core Responsibilities Within DPSSA (Internal)

- 6.2.1 Institutionalising Project Management within the Department (Page 11)
- 6.2.2 Internal Support and Internal Policy Development (Page 11)
- 6.2.3 Management of Conduct (Page 11)
- 6.2.4 The elimination of inefficiency (Page 12)
- 6.2.5 The promotion of Representativeness (Page 12)



Appendix IV

CORRESPONDING RESPONSIBILITY	PUBLIC SERVICE/TYPE CORE RESPONSIBILITY/EXTERNAL OUTPUTS	INTERMEDIATE RESULTS	TEXT FOR ADDITIONAL STANDARDS
6.1.1 Policy Development	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recruitment Policy widely consulted, approved by Minister and promulgated 2. IT Strategy and Policy widely consulted, approved by Minister and promulgated 3. Policy on Organisational Matters widely consulted, approved by Minister and promulgated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End March 2000 • End March 2000 • End March 2000 	
6.1.3 Develop Frameworks for Norms and Standards	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 CORE's drafted and implemented on Peral 1.2 CORE's published 2. Job Evaluation System drafted and implemented across the Public Service 3. The capacity created of at least one person per dept in Business Process Re-engineering 4. Skills, service delivery and personnel audits completed and report of an acceptable standard submitted to Minister 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End May 1999 • End October 1999 • End April 1999 • End March 2000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To commence in January 1999 in priority areas (N. Province & E. Cape), Initial Audit • End March 1999, Implementation of recommendations start in June 1999

7. Provision of services to citizens

	<p>is a Housing, Medical Aid and leave undertaken and finalised to an acceptable standard</p> <p>6. Finalise and implement New Disciplinary Code</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> End April 1999 (Depending on the outcome of WTC Court Case) 	
6.1.3 Issue directives and determinations	<p>1. Establishment and phasing in of SETA</p> <p>2. Establishment of and secretariat support for PSETA</p> <p>3. Performance Management Systems in place</p> <p>4. Good Management Guide for the Public Service published and distributed</p> <p>5. Employment contract for heads of departments finalised</p> <p>6. Advise Minister on determinations in accordance with statutory requirements or make determinations where delegated by Minister</p> <p>7. Proposals on Efficiency Enhancement made to Minister</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commencing 1 April and ongoing End March 2000 End March 2000 End July 1999 End July 1999 On a needs basis End April 1999 	
6.1.4 Policy Advice and Assistance	<p>Timely and accurate advice in the following areas:</p> <p>1. Remuneration</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On a needs basis 	

	2. Human Resource Development and Human Resource Management 3. Conditions of Service 4. Information Technology and Information Management 5. Organisational Arrangements 6. Batho Pele 7. Labour Relations		
6.1.5 Capacity Building Initiatives	Programmes of Training around core competencies in the following priority areas: 1. Planning and Work Organisation 2. Human Resource Management 3. Information Technology and Information Management 4. Labour Relations 5. Provisioning Administration, Gender, Management of Diversity and Training of Frontline Staff 6. EU Project Key Deliverables for 1-6 above: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Teams in place Needs Analysis/Validation completed Course Development phased in and Trainers recruited Market & Promote Courses Review & Monitor Programmes Comprehensive Training Needs Analysis and Skills Audit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15 January 1999 End January 1999 End Feb. 99 & ongoing Commencing in March 99 & ongoing End August 1999 End August 1999 	

6.1.6 Represent the State as Employer in Negotiations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Obtain mandate for negotiations and cost these adequately 2. Ensure adequate representation of the employer in the PSCBC 3. Support the Minister in his role as chairperson of the Mandate Committee 4. Manage the Budget Vote: Improvement of Conditions of Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing • Ongoing • Ongoing • Ongoing 	
6.1.7 Marketing and Public Relations	Effective and Active Marketing and Public Relations activities for the Department undertaken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing 	
6.1.8 Implementation of the PRC Report	<p>Implementation of all relevant recommendations of the PRC Report (to be decided upon by Cabinet) in areas of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Resource Management and Development in the Public Service • Information Management Systems and Technology in the Public Service • Organisational Matters in the Public Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commencing January 1999 and ongoing 	

